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This thesis explores the factors that explain varying degrees of coherence in 
European Union (EU) crisis management and draws implications for its role as an 
international security actor. The analysis starts from the assumption that coherence is 
a function of competing and conflicting interests and norms. The influence and 
interaction of these factors across governance levels are viewed through two 
theoretical lenses: liberal intergovernmentalism and sociological institutionalism. 
Derived hypotheses are evaluated through a comparative case study design, focused 
on three instances of crisis management in Africa, namely Libya (2011), Somalia 
(2011-2012), and Mali (2012-2013). The analysis traces the activities and interaction 
of EU institutional actors and member states, with a focus on France, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and Germany. It suggests that the degree of coherence in EU crisis 
management is contingent on the congruence of domestic economic and electoral 
interests, as well as national threat perceptions. But it also depends on the extent to 
which EU-level coherence norms resonate with national norms on the use of force 
and preferred modes of multilateral cooperation. The study identifies scope 
conditions for the interaction of interests and norms: if economic and electoral stakes 
are high and calculable, interest-based calculation prevails. If, instead, decision-
makers are faced with low stakes and uncertainty, embedded national norms are 
more likely to shape their behaviour. The Union thus represents a rather 
unpredictable security actor, whose multi-level coherence depends on the context-
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 Introduction Chapter 1:
The EU aspires to be a coherent and effective international actor in order to “defend 
its fundamental interests and values, promote its key political objectives and prevent 
crises or help to restore stability” (European Commission and HR 2013c).1 The 
degree to which the Union has been able to live up to this aspiration has varied 
throughout the past decades. Faced with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, prominently announced 
that the “hour of Europe” had dawned (in Blockmans and Wessel 2013: 2). However, 
the Union failed to stop or even contain the violence in its own backyard. The next 
‘dark hour’ of EU crisis management arrived when the American-led invasion in Iraq 
(2003) split the continent into ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe (Rumsfeld 2003).  
Shortly after the divisions over Iraq, the Union published its first strategic document, 
the European Security Strategy (Council 2003a). The Strategy stated that the EU 
could only live up to its full potential if it became more coherent. It specified that 
“[g]reater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing 
the external activities of the individual member states” (Council 2003a: 13). Six 
years later, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009),2 with its central objectives of increasing 
coherence in EU external action, raised expectations that the hour of Europe had 
finally come.  
However, faced with the first major foreign policy crisis after the ratification of the 
Treaty, these expectations were dashed. In early 2011, the Europeans openly clashed 
on the Libyan crisis and failed to provide a unified response. In the meantime, and 
perhaps less prominently, Somalia – one of the world’s most complex conflict 
theatres – had become the Union’s prime example of coherent and effective crisis 
management (European Commission and HR 2013c: 2). This thesis aims to explain 
                                                
1 ‘HR’ stands for the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission. 
2 The Treaty of Lisbon will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘Lisbon Treaty’.  
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such observed variation in the coherence of EU crisis management. It investigates the 
influence and interaction of conflicting interests and values across governance levels. 
It thereby questions the assumption implicit in the introductory quote, namely that 
the Union’s “fundamental interests and values” are truly shared.  
This introductory chapter starts by presenting the main argument and findings of the 
study. Section two provides an overview of the broadening understanding of EU 
crisis management and reviews its evolving implementation. Section three then 
situates the thesis within the broader literatures on policy coherence, EU crisis 
management, and European foreign policy. It points towards key findings and gaps 
and presents the specific contribution of this study. A detailed thesis outline closes 
the chapter.  
1.1 The quest for coherence  
In EU studies, coherence is often conceptualised as an independent variable. Many 
studies evaluate the impact of (in)coherence on the effectiveness, credibility, and 
power of the EU as an international actor (for example Lerch and Schwellnus 2006; 
Olsen 2008; Pace 2009). This conceptualisation is in line with the official Brussels 
discourse, which depicts coherence as an essential condition for effective external 
action. The Council (2000), for instance, declared that “reinforcing the coherence of 
the Union’s external action and realising its policy objectives are priorities if the 
Union is to pull its full weight in international affairs”. However, the present study 
takes a step back and conceptualises coherence as a dependent variable. It analyses 
the causes of coherence and discusses potential implications.   
Research question and focus  
“Conflicting interests and values are the main cause of incoherence within most 
systems and at most levels” (Forster and Stokke 1999: 24). This is one of the key 
messages of a seminal volume on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).3 In 
                                                
3 PCD entered the political debate in the early 1990s and aims to “exploit positive synergies and 
spillovers across all public policies to foster development” (OECD 2012: 3).  
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2003, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
reiterated the message, stating that coherence “has always been and will continue to 
be a function of competing and conflicting interests and values” (OECD 2003). 
Taking these statements as working assumptions, this study addresses the following 
research question: How does the interaction of interests and norms influence the 
degree of coherence in EU crisis management? Findings are discussed in light of the 
broader debates on effectiveness and the Union’s role and future as an international 
security actor. 
For the purpose of this study, coherence is understood as the absence of contradiction 
(consistency) and existence of synergies between various crisis management policies, 
instruments, and activities geared towards a set of overarching objectives. The 
analysis distinguishes vertical, horizontal, and institutional coherence (Nuttall 2005: 
97). Vertical coherence refers to the interaction and congruence between the EU-
level and member state crisis responses. Horizontal coherence designates the 
interaction between the objectives and instruments of different EU-level crisis 
management policies and activities. Finally, institutional coherence – a sub-category 
of horizontal coherence – is understood as the interaction between EU-level 
institutions and actors responsible for crisis management.  
Coherence is used as a conceptual tool to analyse the implementation of the Union’s 
comprehensive approach to crisis management. The latter is defined as the integrated 
use of political, economic, and military instruments and policies towards the 
overarching objective of changing the dynamics of a given crisis or conflict to 
achieve increased security and stability (Council 2003a; 2008b; European 
Commission and HR 2013b). The analysis thus extends to five policy areas, namely:  
• diplomacy;  
• humanitarian aid;  
• development aid;  
• economic sanctions and restrictive measures; and 
 
  4 
• crisis management operations and missions in the framework of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSPD).4  
The empirical focus of this thesis is on post-Lisbon crisis management in Africa. The 
analysis evaluates and compares EU crisis responses and concentrates on internal 
dimensions of coherence. The historical development of the Union’s crisis 
management and foreign policy do not constitute central analytical categories of this 
study. Neither does it provide comprehensive analyses of the internal dynamics and 
drivers of conflicts or crises. The study further excludes a category of coherence that 
has become known as multilateral or external coherence (Gebhard 2011; Versluys 
2007). The latter can be understood as the extent to which the Union’s crisis 
management is in line with, or positively contributes to, the activities and measures 
of other international actors (Koenig 2011a: 17). While this dimension is certainly 
relevant, the Union’s ability to interact at the international level is – at least partially 
– contingent on its ability to agree on common policies or activities internally.  
Coherence, efficiency, and effectiveness  
The practical benefits of coherence are widely recognised in the broader multilateral 
governance context. There is general agreement that incoherence increases the risk of 
duplication, inefficient spending and ineffective policies (de Coning 2007). But what 
is the specific rationale for coherence in EU crisis management? Why focus on 
Africa? And what contextual factors made these topics salient at the time of writing? 
The conflicts in the Balkans, in Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown that “the 
usefulness of military power alone has serious limits” (Howorth 2007: 93). They led 
to the recognition that military instruments need to be combined with political and 
development instruments to produce a lasting effect (Drent 2011: 3; Gross 2013). 
This recognition triggered an inflation of concepts on how civilian and military 
actors and instruments could be combined. The United Nations (UN) introduced the 
                                                
4 For the purpose of simplicity, the following will subsume the European and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy under the abbreviation CSDP. 
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‘integrated approach’ to capture “new multi-polar coordination challenges facing 
complex peacekeeping operations” (de Coning 2008b: 3). The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO 2014) adopted a comprehensive approach to facilitate 
cooperation with “civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level”. And 
nation states introduced terms such as ‘3-D security’, the ‘whole-of-government 
approach’, or ‘inter-linked security’ to enhance cooperation among ministries, 
departments, and agencies.5 Overall, comprehensive approaches have become “the 
gold standard in international security affairs” (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 
2011: 221). 
Reconciling various dynamics of multidimensional crisis or conflict management 
represents a challenge for every governance system. Yet the Union’s sheer number of 
civilian and military instruments as well as its various decision-making layers and 
procedures compound the challenge. Over the years, the EU has introduced various 
legal provisions and institutional coordination mechanisms to enhance coherence in 
its external action in general, and in crisis management in particular (for an 
overview, see Gebhard 2011).  
Nevertheless, the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy concluded that, despite some progress, the need to strengthen coherence 
remained (Council 2008b). In 2013, the European Commission and the HR (2013b: 
2) noted that the comprehensive approach had yet to be systematically applied to 
conflict prevention and crisis resolution. The Union has been undergoing a 
continuous learning process to enhance its capacity for crisis management. However, 
the politicisation of internal lessons learned and their negative perceptions as 
“shaming and blaming exercises” tends to dilute their results (Dari et al. 2012: 13). 
In addition, documents on lessons learned are often not publicly available and thus 
evade external, and potentially more objective, scrutiny. Meanwhile, the discrepancy 
                                                
5 The concept of 3-D security refers to the strategic combination of development, diplomacy, and 
defence.  
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between comprehensive ambition and implementation continues to call for in-depth 
investigation. 
Empirical reality makes this call even more pressing. In recent years, the Union has 
faced new, inter-linked security challenges in its neighbourhood. The Arab uprisings, 
starting in 2010, represented a prime example of the changing security environment 
at the Union’s borders. Meanwhile, globalisation and the growing trans-
nationalisation of threats have pushed the boundaries of the neighbourhood. 
Decision-makers and academics increasingly include Sub-Saharan African countries 
in Europe’s so-called “broader neighbourhood” (Biscop 2013; Coolsaet et al. 2013; 
Simón 2013).  
The latter comprises the African “arc of instability” stretching from Somalia across 
the Sahel towards Western Sahara (see Figure 1). Negative externalities emanating 
from this area – including terrorism, organised crime, and migration – are likely to 
affect Europe more than any other region. In addition, several EU member states 
have a particular responsibility in the African continent due to their colonialist past. 
The combination of rising and interlinked security, development and governance 
challenges; potential negative externalities; and historical responsibility provide 
powerful political rationale for a more effective implementation of the 
comprehensive approach.  
But there is also considerable economic rationale. The financial and economic crises 
entailed Europe-wide austerity measures and budget cuts. The effects were 
particularly marked in the area of defence, where expenditures had already been on a 
course of decline since the end of the Cold War. As a result of austerity, almost all 
EU member states cut their defence budgets. In some smaller member states, those 
amounted to one third (Mölling 2011). The crisis had a slighter, but nonetheless 
notable effect on the Union’s collective development aid, which dropped 
consecutively in 2011 and 2012 (EurActiv 2013).  
 
  7 
Figure 1: Africa’s arc of instability 
Source: Alexander (2013) 
In 2011, European think tank experts published open letters warning decision-makers 
of an inward-looking Europe that sacrificed external action on the altar of austerity 
(Cameron et al. 2011; Furness et al. 2011). In 2013, the Commission and the HR 
(2013c: 3) still emphasised that financial resources were “under pressure”, making 
“the case for a comprehensive approach (…) stronger than ever”. An effective 
implementation of the Union’s comprehensive approach would allow the member 
states to pool scarce military and civilian resources to ensure peace and stability in 
the increasingly volatile neighbourhood. Identifying the causes of continued 
incoherence and duplication represents a necessary step towards this aim.  
Coherence and EU actorness  
Studying the causes of (in)coherence is also relevant to the broader academic debate 
on the EU’s nature and role in international affairs (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; 
Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Sjöstedt 1977). Coherence 
is usually seen as a central component of EU ‘actorness’ (Niemann and Bretherton 
2013; Thomas 2012). Scholars commonly define actorness as the “capacity to behave 
actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” 
(Sjöstedt 1977: 16). Jupille and Caporaso (1998: 215) view cohesion, defined as the 
ability “to formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences”, as a key 
element of actorness. Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 38; 2006) include “the ability to 
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identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies” among their five 
conceptual components of actorness.  
The causes of (in)coherence are also relevant to a parallel strand of literature that 
simply assumes that the Union is an actor, or at least some kind of “presence” in 
international affairs (Allen and Smith 1991).6 Researchers in this field tend to 
conceptualise the Union as a type of ‘power’, but the debate on the sources of this 
power remains unresolved (see for example Aggestam 2008; Damro 2012; Manners 
2002; Nye 1991; Toje 2011).  
This study specifically contributes to the debate on the Union’s actorness and power 
in security affairs (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011; Gegout 2009; Kaunert 
and Zwolski 2012; Whitman and Wolff 2010; Zwolski 2012b). Crisis management 
can be seen as a tough test for EU actorness as it requires internal coherence when 
faced with an often disproportionately dynamic external opportunity structure 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Niemann and Bretherton 2013).7 But it also represents 
a crucial and visible test (Gordon 1997). The ability to influence external events and 
players lies at the heart of the understanding of power in international affairs.  
One of the most prominent conceptualisations of the Union’s role in international 
security affairs is the notion of ‘civilian power Europe’, a term first coined by 
François Duchêne (1973). The concept rests on three key elements: the 
transformation of intra-European relations from war to peace and ‘civilised politics’; 
the reliance on civilian, primarily economic means; and the exertion of power 
through persuasion rather than coercion (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 11). 
Some argue that the Union’s acquisition of military crisis management capabilities 
(see section 1.2) has muddled its civilian power profile (Smith 2005; Stavridis 2001). 
Others hold that the concept still has “considerable empirical and theoretical 
                                                
6 The concept of ‘presence’ designates Europe’s variable impact on international affairs, regardless of 
the ‘messy’ way in which it is produced (Allen and Smith 1991: 20).   
7 Bretherton and Vogler (2013: 398) define opportunity structure as „the external context of ideas and 
events that enable or constrain [EU] action“. 
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purchase” (Whitman 2006: 113). A third group proposes to go beyond the traditional 
distinction of civilian and military power and to focus on the Union’s normative 
influence or ethical dilemmas (Aggestam 2008; Manners 2002). The present study 
does not pretend to offer a solution to this debate. Yet the evaluation of the Union’s 
internal congruence in terms of norms and interests allows us to draw informed 
conclusions on the current ideational consensus and material boundaries of the EU’s 
role as a security actor.  
Analysing EU crisis responses  
To evaluate the influence and interaction of norms and interests across governance 
levels, this study applies two analytical lenses. The first starts with rationalist 
assumptions and is based on liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993a; 1998). 
From this perspective, the pursuit of coherence is viewed as a two-level game 
(Putnam 1988). The degree of coherence is seen as the unintended outcome of 
strategic interaction between influential domestic and national players pursuing self-
regarding interests (Pilegaard 2003). The key players are large and prosperous 
member states with relative bargaining advantages.  
The second analytical lens builds on sociological institutionalism and starts with 
moderate constructivist assumptions (Adler 1997; Hall and Taylor 1996; Wendt 
1999). From this perspective, EU crisis decision-making is depicted as a ‘multi-level 
norm game’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).8 In this game, political and 
administrative decision-makers are assumed to balance EU-level coherence-related 
norms with embedded national or organisational norms. The degree of coherence 
essentially depends on the extent to which these two sets of norms resonate.  
Each analytical lens yields three hypotheses addressing the interaction of EU crisis 
management players at the domestic, the intergovernmental, and the EU institutional 
                                                
8 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 893) speak of a two-level norm game, “in which the domestic and the 
international norm tables are increasingly linked”. The present study applies the concept to the more 
multi-levelled EU governance context.  
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levels respectively. In line with the working assumption that coherence is a function 
of competing interests and norms, the two lenses are not seen as mutually exclusive. 
This study rather investigates the circumstances under which either lens holds greater 
explanatory power.  
The hypotheses are evaluated through a comparative “multiple-case embedded” 
design (Yin 2009: 59). The selected cases are the Union’s crisis responses to:  
• Libya (February 2011-October 2011);  
• Somalia (November 2011-November 2012); and  
• Mali (March 2012-August 2013).  
Within these crisis responses, the study concentrates on specific analytical units. The 
analysis of vertical coherence centres on the roles of France, the UK, and Germany 
(the ‘Big Three’). To address the underlying factors of horizontal and institutional 
coherence, the responses of the Union’s key institutional players in the field of crisis 
management are evaluated.  
The analysis draws on insights from official documents, political speeches and 
declarations, national parliamentary debates, analyses by leading think tanks, media 
reports, opinion polls, and 46 semi-structured interviews with EU and national 
officials. Single case analysis is based on detailed process tracing and directed, 
qualitative content analysis (Bennett and Checkel 2011; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). 
Cross-case analysis follows the method of structured, focused comparison (George 
and Bennett 2005b).  
Key findings: balancing interests and norms  
The study suggests that coherence in EU crisis management can, in fact, be 
understood as a function of competing and conflicting interests and norms. It shows 
that the Union’s crisis management players are aware of coherence-related standards 
of appropriateness. However, as they are only thinly socialised into these norms, 
immediate strategic interests or long-standing embedded norms continue to inform 
their behaviour and rhetoric (Checkel 2005).  
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The analysis of vertical coherence illustrates that national decision-makers are 
domestically constrained in their ability to agree to or comply with EU-level crisis 
management decisions. This is particularly the case if decisions acquire political 
salience and divide government and opposition in the face of upcoming elections. In 
these cases, decision-makers orient themselves towards the median voter interest. 
The study further suggests that sector-specific economic interests influence national 
crisis decision-making. If economic interests converge without competing, a high 
degree of coherence can be expected. If, however, they diverge or compete, 
unilateral deviations or actions are likely. Moreover, decision-makers are constrained 
by domestically embedded norms. For decisions in the arena of EU crisis 
management, national predispositions on the use of force and preferred modes of 
multilateral cooperation are particularly salient.  
Interaction in the intergovernmental arena is characterised by competitive and 
cooperative dynamics. Under consensus rules, the member states agree on lowest 
common denominator outcomes as well as mutual compromise outcomes. In addition 
to domestically embedded norms and interests, national preference functions include 
perceptions of risks and threats, which are mediated by relevant precedent crisis 
management cases.  
The three case studies show that the influence of institutional players on the degree 
of vertical coherence is limited. It crucially depends on the degree of delegated 
sovereignty and thus on the legal division of competences.9 In addition, there are 
obstacles to institutional influence on the degree of horizontal coherence. The post-
Lisbon transition phase created new overlapping responsibilities between new and 
old crisis management players. These overlaps fostered inter-institutional tensions 
and rivalries. Tensions were particularly marked at the interface of security and 
development and cognitive barriers, stemming from diverse professional 
backgrounds, compounded them. Norms that clash with the narrative of the 
comprehensive approach are those related to the preservation of the apolitical 
                                                
9 See articles 2-6 TFEU.  
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character of aid. It is too early to tell whether socialisation and learning dynamics, 
triggered by the Union’s post-Lisbon institutional coordination mechanisms, will 
lower cognitive barriers and assuage rivalries in the medium to longer-term.  
Each theoretical lens explains parts of the puzzle. Case analysis shows that high 
stakes (referring to electoral as well as economic risks and costs) and relative 
certainty with regard to the payoffs of alternative courses of action favour strategic 
calculation. If stakes are low and outcomes uncertain, embedded norms and a logic 
of appropriateness are more likely to prevail. The analysed crisis decisions often 
entailed potentially high economic costs, payoffs, risks, or important electoral 
consequences. Situations where domestically defined interests ‘trumped’ norms were 
thus more abundant.  
Based on the evaluation of coherence and its determinants, the analysis suggests that 
the degree of the Union’s security actorness is bound to vary on a case-by-case basis. 
The Union’s ability to act coherently, actively, and deliberately in international 
affairs is less contingent on institutional coordination mechanisms or legal provisions 
than on the congruence of situation-specific interests and salient norms. The analysis 
further shows that the degree of coherence in EU crisis responses tends to increase 
over time. Stakes become lower; political insulation increases; and more sustained 
and regular interaction favours socialisation dynamics. In other words, the Union’s 
security actorness is likely to increase the more the situation moves from crisis 
response (potentially requiring the use of force) towards conflict prevention.  
1.2 The broadening notion of EU crisis management 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a gradual shift from a territorial, 
military, and state-centred understanding of security towards a de-territorialised, 
civil-military, and human-centred perspective (Kaldor et al. 2007). In line with this 
paradigmatic shift, the Union’s profile as an international security actor gradually 
expanded. This section outlines how EU crisis management is defined, why it 
developed, and which crises or conflicts it addressed.  
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Delineating ‘EU crisis management’ 
A ‘crisis’ can be defined as “a phase of disorder in the seemingly normal 
development of a system” (Boin et al. 2005: 2). Typical characteristics include threat, 
uncertainty, and urgency. Crises can affect various systems including, for instance, 
the economy, politics, or personal lives of citizens. This thesis concentrates on 
security-related crises, which can be distinguished as acute situations “in which 
armed force is (likely to be) used” (Blockmans and Wessel 2009: 5). Crisis 
management, in turn, designates the policies, activities, procedures, and instruments 
used to contain a crisis and to influence its future course with the aim of its 
resolution (Blockmans and Wessel 2009: 5). Typically, the literature distinguishes 
crisis management, as referring to early or immediate reactions to an acute situation, 
from medium to long-term activities in the realm of peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation.10  
However, in the EU crisis management “has become a catch-all term without precise 
definition” (Schroeder 2009: 492). The Union extended the meaning of ‘crisis 
management’ beyond the immediate or acute phases of an emergency and to the 
whole range of the its security-related external activities (Blockmans and Wessel 
2009: 6). The European External Action Service (EEAS 2014a), for instance, 
employs the term ‘crisis response’ to describe “the immediate mobilisation of EU 
resources to deal with the consequences of external crises caused by man-made and 
natural disasters”. The EEAS also uses the term ‘crisis response cycle’, which 
includes activities related to conflict prevention, peace-making, and post-conflict 
stabilisation (see Figure 2).11  
This thesis employs the terms ‘crisis response’ and ‘crisis management’ 
interchangeably. The focus lies on the Union’s short to medium-term reaction, rather 
                                                
10 Peace-making describes the imposition of the cessation of violence and reconciliation among 
warring parties. Meanwhile, post-conflict stabilisation targets the root causes of a crisis and seeks to 
prevent the resurgence of violence (Blockmans and Wessel 2009: 5). 
11 Conflict prevention refers to policies, activities, and measures designed to avert or mitigate violent 
conflict (Gross and Juncos 2011).  
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than on longer-term activities and measures in the realm of post-conflict 
reconstruction and conflict prevention. The short- to medium-term can be considered 
a crucial test for the implementation of the comprehensive approach. As Figure 2 
shows, it is the phase, in which diplomatic, economic, and military activities are most 
likely to converge. Vertical and horizontal coordination challenges thus coincide 
under conditions of heightened uncertainty and urgency.    
Figure 2: The EU’s crisis response cycle  
Source: (EEAS 2014b) 
Decision-makers further divide crisis management into the political, strategic, and 
operational levels (Council 2008a; Simón 2013). The political level refers to policy 
formulation and decision-making in the inter-governmental arena, taking place in the 
European Council or Council. The strategic level encompasses planning activities 
such as those for civilian and military CSDP missions and operations. And the 
operational level refers to implementation and comprises the management of 
activities or instruments in the field. This thesis concentrates on decision-making and 
cooperation at the political and strategic levels, as they can be seen as essential pre-
conditions for coherent policy implementation on the ground. 
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The CSDP’s first decade  
Having delineated conceptual boundaries, let us now turn to the most salient and 
visible instrument of short- to medium term EU crisis management: the CSDP. 
Europe’s failure to react to the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s gave the political 
impetus for the birth of the collective crisis management capacity. At a meeting in St. 
Malo in 1998, France and Britain agreed that “the Union must have the capacity of 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (St. Malo 
Declaration 1998). They also decided to create “the appropriate structures and a 
capacity for situation analysis, sources of intelligence and capability for relevant 
strategic planning” (St. Malo Declaration 1998). In the following year, at the 
European Council in Cologne, the member states endorsed the Franco-British 
initiative and incorporated the Western European Union in the EU. They also agreed 
to complement military crisis management with a civilian dimension.  
The new crisis management capacity was firmly located within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), and thus in the sphere of intergovernmental decision-
making. At the political level, the key actors were the European Council and General 
Affairs and External Relations Council as well as its preparatory bodies, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). As Chair of the European Council and Council, the rotating 
Presidency had an important agenda-setting function. The development of the CSDP 
also led to the establishment of new institutional crisis management actors. It 
enhanced the responsibilities of the High Representative for the CFSP and of its 
supporting body, the Council Secretariat. The latter became host to the Union’s 
growing civilian and military crisis management structures at the strategic level.  
Between 2003 and 2009, the Union deployed 23 CSDP missions and operations (see 
Table 1). Their geographic and functional scope gradually broadened. With an initial 
focus on traditional military peacekeeping and police missions, the spectrum of tasks 
came to include border management, monitoring, rule of law reforms, security sector 
reform (SSR), and maritime counter-piracy. Geographically, the CSDP initially 
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focussed on the Western Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
military arm then expanded in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood and Africa. 
Meanwhile, civilian missions were also deployed more globally, notably in the 
Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.  
Table 1: CSDP missions and operations (2003-2009) 
Name Location   Nature  Type Staff12 Duration  






Military  Military 350 2003 
Artemis  DRC Military Military 2,000 2003 
EUFOR 
Althea BiH Military Military 2,200 Since 2004 
EUPOL 
Proxima FYROM Civilian  Police  169 2004-2005 
EUJUST 
Themis Georgia Civilian  Rule of law 10 2004-2005 
EUBAM  Moldova and Ukraine Civilian Border 233 Since 2005 
EUPOL 
Kinshasa DRC Civilian  Police 23 2005-2007 




Territories Civilian  Border  24 Since 2005 
EUJUST 
LEX Iraq Civilian Rule of law  30 2005-2013 
                                                
12 Staff numbers refer to EU and international staff. They are approximate and reflect the status quo in 
2009 (Grevi et al. 2009).  
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Name Location   Nature  Type Staff12 Duration  
Support to 
AMIS  Sudan/Darfur 
Civil-
military Assistance  47 2005-2007 
AMM  Indonesia/Aceh Civilian  Monitoring  125 2005-2006 
EUFOR   DRC Military Military 2,400 2006 




Territories Civilian  Police 42 Since 2006 
EUPOL Afghanistan  Civilian  Police 225 Since 2007 





Military Military 3,700 2008-2009 
EU SSR Guinea Bissau  Civil-military SSR 14 2008-2010 
EULEX Kosovo Civilian  Rule of law 1,642 Since 2008 
EUMM Georgia  Civilian  Monitoring  340 Since 2008 
EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta Somalia  Military Military/naval  2,000 Since 2008 
Source: Grevi et al. (2009), Gross and Juncos (2011) 
Incremental learning and outstanding challenges  
The evolution of the CSDP can be seen as an incremental learning process. There are 
many examples testifying to the Union’s learning capacity (see Dari et al. 2012: 34-
100). However, Europeans also faced recurrent challenges. These challenges can be 
grouped in four categories: strategic deficit, capability gaps, dysfunctional 
coordination, and limited impact (Asseburg and Kempin 2009; Dari et al. 2012; 
Grevi et al. 2009; Gross and Juncos 2011).  
Many CSDP missions and operations were criticised for the absence of an 
overarching political strategy. Helly (2009: 11), for instance, argued that the Union’s 
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engagement in Chad and the CAR did not follow any “clear common foreign policy 
objectives”. A symptom of the strategic deficit was the Union’s preference for an 
‘end-date’ rather than an ‘end-state’ approach to crisis management (Mattelaer 
2008). The former implies that the exit strategy is contingent on a particular date, 
rather than on changes in the security situation on the ground.  
The CSDP’s first decade also highlighted capability gaps. EU crisis management is 
contingent on the member states’ willingness to provide military and civilian 
personnel on an ad hoc and voluntary basis. The financing of military operations 
follows the principle ‘costs lie where they fall’.13 A striking example for capability 
shortages was operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, which only attained initial operational 
capacity after six months and six force generation conferences (Mattelaer 2008). 
Furthermore, the operation had to rely on Russian transport helicopters, which only 
arrived three months before the end of the operation (Seibert 2010). In addition, the 
Union faced shortcomings in civilian capabilities. This was particularly the case for 
the more dangerous or distant missions. For the EU’s police mission in Afghanistan, 
the Council decided to raise the number of civilian personnel from 160 to 400 in May 
2008. Yet, two years later, only 265 were on the ground (Koenig 2010: 17).  
Coordination problems appeared in almost all cases of EU crisis management. Policy 
analysts regularly admonished inter-institutional turf wars in Brussels, the divide 
between development and security, and the lack of civil-military planning (Drent 
2011; Emerson et al. 2007; Grevi et al. 2009). On the ground, dysfunctional 
coordination occurred between civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, 
Commission delegations, EU Special Representatives (EUSR), and member state 
representatives.  
The final critique, which is often seen as a result of the aforementioned 
shortcomings, concerns the limited impact of EU crisis management. CSDP missions 
and operations were often small in scale and scope, and short in duration. Between 
                                                
13 Only the common costs – usually a small share of overall costs – are financed through the Athena 
mechanism, and thus distributed among all member states according to Gross National Income. 
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2003 and 2009, ten out of 23 numbered less than 100 staff (see Table 1). An example 
for limited impact is Operation Artemis (2003) in the DRC where the operational 
area was restricted to the district capital Bunia and the mandate to three months. 
Instead of durable conflict resolution, the operation displaced violence beyond the 
area of operations (Dari et al. 2012: 42). CSDP missions and operations were often 
successful in fulfilling narrow mandates, but failed to have lasting impact on broader 
political conditions.  
The promise of comprehensiveness 
With its panoply of external instruments, the Union seemed predestined for 
comprehensive crisis management. In addition to its emerging capacity for crisis 
management, it had a worldwide network of Commission Delegations at its disposal. 
Combined, the Union and its member states were and are the world’s leading 
development and humanitarian aid donor. In addition, it is the world’s single most 
important trading bloc with an intricate net of trade agreements with the developed 
and developing world.  
The European Security Strategy of 2003 clearly emphasised the ambition to “bring 
together the different instruments and capabilities” (Council 2003a: 13). The Strategy 
underscored that the instruments “should follow the same agenda,” and added, “[i]n a 
crisis there is no substitute for unity of command” (Council 2003a: 13). The 
specificity of the EU’s comprehensive approach is the focus on internal coordination. 
By comparison, NATO’s comprehensive approach concentrates more on in-theatre 
cooperation with other international actors or organisations – in other words – on 
multilateral coherence (NATO 2014).  
One of the major objectives of the Lisbon Treaty was to enhance the coherence of the 
Union’s external action. Its key institutional innovations were the double-hatted HR 
and the EEAS – a diplomatic service, composed of member state, Commission, and 
Council Secretariat officials.14 Both the HR and EEAS were explicitly mandated to 
                                                
14 See article 18 TEU. 
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ensure the consistency and coherence between the Union’s various external and 
internal activities.15  
The Treaty also introduced innovations, specific to the field of crisis management. It 
re-named the European into the Common Security and Defence Policy and formally 
broadened the Petersberg tasks to include conflict prevention, military advice and 
assistance, joint disarmament operations, and post-conflict stabilisation.16 The Treaty 
also introduced mechanisms for more flexible intergovernmental cooperation. Article 
44 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), for instance, allows the Council to 
entrust a CSDP operation or mission to an intra-European coalition of the ‘willing 
and able’ (Blockmans and Wessel 2009: 39). Similarly, new provisions on 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ enabled smaller groups of disposed member 
states to enhance their cooperation in military capability development.17  
In 2010, the HR introduced the new Directorate-General (DG) for Crisis Response 
and Operational Coordination (CROC) to the EEAS. In early 2011, the crisis 
management structures, formerly located within the Council Secretariat, were 
transferred to the new Service. Furthermore, the HR introduced the ‘Crisis Platform’ 
– a temporary coordination mechanism, variably including the crisis management 
structures, geographical and horizontal EEAS departments and relevant Commission 
services such as the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).  
While the EEAS was gradually consolidating, the Union reviewed its crisis 
management procedures dating from 2003 (Council 2013f). At the same time, the 
Commission and the HR (2013b) were developing a joint Communication on the 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. Both documents were 
published in 2013 and further raised expectations for a more ambitious, 
                                                
15 For the difference between consistency and coherence, see section 2.1. 
16 The Council originally outlined the so-called Petersberg tasks for the Western European Union in 
1992, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. The broadened tasks 
can be found in article 43 (TEU). 
17 See article 42, paragraph 6. 
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comprehensive, and active EU role in international crisis management. The present 
study evaluates to what extent the Union has been able to meet these expectations. 
1.3 Identifying the gap 
This thesis aims to contribute to literatures on policy coherence, EU crisis 
management, and EU foreign policy. Its contribution is both theoretical and 
empirical. It devises an original framework for the analysis of multi-level crisis 
decision-making and applies it comparatively to three prominent post-Lisbon cases. 
This section reviews relevant findings of the literature, points towards shortcomings, 
and outlines how this study intends to address them. 
Causes of (in)coherence  
Both ‘coherence’ and the ‘comprehensive approach’ are under-conceptualised. 
Gebhard (2011: 123) argues that “the notion of coherence is among the most 
frequently misinterpreted and misused concepts in EU foreign policy”. Meanwhile, 
despite the political omnipresence of the comprehensive approach in EU and security 
studies, its strategic, operational, and organisational meaning remains “inherently 
elusive” (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011: 223). Due to the Union’s specific 
focus on internal coordination, this thesis concentrates on the concept of coherence, 
which it understands as key organising principle for the implementation of the 
comprehensive approach.  
During the past decade, the literature on policy coherence – particularly on PCD – 
has flourished (Ashoff 2005; Barry et al. 2010; Carbone 2008; Pietrangeli 2007; 
Hoebink 2005; Keijzer and Oppewal 2012; Youngs 2004). There are numerous 
valuable empirical evaluations of policy coherence. However, few engage in 
systematic theory-led analysis, leaving the concept largely under-theorised (May et 
al. 2006: 2; Pilegaard 2003). A review of inductive and conceptual studies yields a 
range of causal factors for (in)coherence (see Table 2). As the overview shows, the 
literature underlines the role of interests, ideas, institutions, and complexity across 
governance levels. However, most studies in the field start from implicit or explicit 
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institutionalist assumptions, leading to an over-emphasis on institutional factors (den 
Hertog and Stroß 2013; Portela and Raube 2009).  
Table 2: Causes of (in)coherence in the literature  
Category Examples  
Interests and 
power  
• Competing or divergent national interests (Ashoff 
2005; European Commission 2007; European 
Commission 2009; Forster and Stokke 1999)  
• Inter-institutional power struggles (Hoebink 2005; 
Nuttall 2005; Uvin 1999)  
• Influence of domestic interest groups (Ashoff 2005; 
Barry et al. 2010; Hoebink 2005)  
Cultural and 
ideational factors  
• Competing or diverging national values or norms 
(Ashoff 2005; Forster and Stokke 1999) 
• Different organisational cultures (Christiansen 2001; 
Egenhofer et al. 2006; Hoebink 2005; Portela and 
Raube 2009; Uvin 1999) 
Institutions  • Institutional fragmentation (Christiansen 2001; May et 
al. 2006) 
• Absence or inadequacy of institutional coordination 
mechanisms (Egenhofer et al. 2006; European 
Commission 2006; European Commission 2007) 
Complexity and 
analytical capacity  
• Lack of information and bounded rationality (Ashoff 
2005; Hydén 1999);  
• Multitude of actors (Portela and Raube 2009; Uvin 
1999),  
• Complexity of decision-making processes (Ashoff 
2005: 36), 
• Proliferation of policy objectives within and across 
issue areas (Ashoff 2005: 38-39) 
Source: own compilation  
Meanwhile, the EU studies literature on coherence strongly emphasises the role of 
legal rules and provisions. Incoherence is viewed as the result of functional 
fragmentation in the Union’s legal system (see for example Cremona 2008; den 
Hertog & Stroß 2013; Gauttier 2004; van Elsuwege 2010; Tietje 1997). The number 
and scope of legal provisions aimed at enhancing the coherence of the EU’s external 
action has expanded since its first appearance in the Single European Act in 1986 
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(Cremona 2008; Gebhard 2011).18 As seen above, the amendments and innovations 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty represent a culmination in this trend.  
However, legal scholars also caution that the impact of these provisions may be 
overestimated (Gauttier 2004: 24; Cremona 2008: 13; Van Elsuwege 2010: 1015). 
The coherence requirement is legally binding but it is currently not legally 
enforceable (Gebhard 2011: 114). While coherence is an integral part of the EU's 
legal framework, van Elsuwege (2010: 1015) concludes that it “remains essentially a 
political imperative which largely depends on the political will of the Member States 
and the institutions”. The rather ambiguous notion of ‘political will’ leads us back to 
the intricate balance of values, interests, and power in political decision-making (Post 
et al. 2010). 
Theorising EU crisis management 
Policymakers and academics underline the Union’s comparative advantage in 
combining civilian and military instruments (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 
2011). The discourse advocating a comprehensive approach to security and crisis 
management has become “dominant in the EU and remains largely uncontested” 
(Zwolski 2012a: 994). But at the same time, studies of EU security and crisis 
management often narrowly focus on the CSDP. The reason for the discrepancy 
between political discourse and academic practice lies in the conceptual and 
methodological complexity of bringing various institutional frameworks, policy 
issues, and governance levels into one analytical framework (Gebhard and Norheim-
Martinsen 2011; Gross and Juncos 2011; Zwolski 2012b).  
In addition to its narrow focus, the EU crisis management literature has long suffered 
from a lack of theory-informed studies (Gross 2009; Gross and Juncos 2011; Klein 
2010). Analyses of the CSDP tend to be “either descriptive or prescriptive or both” 
                                                
18 The Single European Act (SEA) introduced the requirement of coherence/consistency into EU 
primary law. It underscored Europe’s aim of “speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act 
with consistency and solidarity” (preamble). The SEA specified that the “external policies of the 
European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Co-operation must be consistent” 
(art. 30 (5) SEA). 
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(Bickerton et al. 2011: 7). Since the late 2000s, there has been growing theoretical 
interest in the study of EU crisis management. A 2011 special issue of the Journal of 
Common Market Studies (Bickerton et al. 2011) announced a ‘second wave’ of 
CSDP scholarship and identified four core theoretical concerns:  
• The role of power 
• The influence of institutions 
• The balance between structure and agency  
• The relationship between material and ideational factors  
These concerns place the study of EU crisis management at the centre of 
International Relations (IR) theory.  
With their focus on nation states, the security dilemma, and relative gains, neo-
realists have long played a marginal role in the field of EU integration (Andreatta 
2011). They typically attempt to explain the CSDP as an attempt to balance against 
the US, to rally against a common threat, or as “a collective attempt at milieu 
shaping” (Hyde-Price 2006: 122; Jones 2007; Posen 2004; Posen 2006; Rynning 
2011). However, they also struggle to explain continued integration after the end of 
the Cold War and bipolarity (Pohl 2012: 4). Intergovernmentalism attempted to 
reconcile realist assumptions with European integration, by allowing for sustained 
cooperation in fields of low politics, but excluding high politics (Hoffmann 1966). 
Both theoretical strands would emphasise the structurally determined security 
interests of the Union’s largest member states as key drivers behind coherent crisis 
management. Notwithstanding, they are hard to reconcile with the comprehensive 
approach to crisis management, which represents a deliberate attempt to blur the 
distinction between high and low politics.   
By emphasising the role of ideas, social constructivists offer a fundamentally 
different perspective on EU crisis management. A particularly fruitful strand of 
research is the literature on strategic culture (Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2004; 2005; 
2006). Scholars in this field interpret the development of the CSDP as a sign for the 
gradual evolution of a shared European strategic culture (Biava et al. 2011; Cornish 
and Edwards 2005; Howorth 2002). Meyer (2004: 4) defines the latter as the “ideas, 
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norms and patterns of behaviour that are shared across the actors and publics 
involved in the processes of pursuing European security and defence” [original 
emphasis]. From this angle, the development of a collective European strategic 
culture can be seen as an essential pre-condition for coherent EU crisis management 
(Biava et al. 2011; Rynning 2003).  
The strategic culture literature yields valuable insight into long-standing ideational 
factors shaping the course of national security and defence policies. But while 
strategic culture accounts allow us to trace behavioural continuities back to 
historically grown ideational constraints, they are less able to accommodate 
behavioural change. Cultural approaches often have to adopt a longue durée 
perspective as administrative and political cultures change very slowly (Schein 1996; 
Biava et al. 2011). Even key proponents of the strategic culture approach concede 
that its ability to “explain and forecast change has suffered from neglecting the link 
between material structures and ideas” (Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 61; see also 
Meyer 2011). 
Another constructivist-inspired strand that more easily integrates material factors is 
the Europeanization approach. Scholars in this field usually understand intra-
European convergence as a “two-way process through which national governments 
both shape European policies (uploading dimension) and adapt to them 
(downloading dimension)” (Müller 2012: 3). Gross (2009) has applied the 
Europeanization approach to analyse the extent to which member states’ positions 
have converged in favour of a greater EU role in crisis management. In her insightful 
longitudinal study, she detects some evidence of Europeanization between 2001 and 
2006. Gross (2009: 172), however, concludes that intra-European convergence 
remained limited and that “Europeanization does not serve as an overall explanation 
for national policy decisions”. Instead, domestic considerations and proven national 
foreign policy parameters often prevail.  
These findings point towards a third strand of IR theory, namely liberalism. Liberal 
scholars have largely eschewed the area of EU crisis management and foreign policy. 
Some even argue that the field displays an “omitted theory bias” in this respect 
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(Jørgensen 2006: 519; Krotz and Maher 2011: 571; Moravcsik 1997: 538-541; Pohl 
2012: 2). While liberal intergovernmentalism has become one of the most influential 
theories of EU integration, it has found little application beyond the economic realm 
and treaty-amending decisions (Moravcsik 1993a; 1998). Nonetheless, Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig (2009: 74) argue that the approach “applies far more broadly 
than is commonly supposed”, including to every day EU decision-making. They 
emphasise the need to transcend the sterile debate between grand theories and to 
refine the components of liberal intergovernmentalism on the basis of empirical 
analysis. So far, only few have followed their advice (see Jürgenliemk 2008; Kaim 
2007; Pohl 2012; 2014). 
Institutions: constraining or enabling  
As the Union’s crisis management machinery expanded, neo-institutionalists 
discovered it as a field of study. They generally agree that ‘institutions matter’, but 
their conceptualisation of institutional influence varies (Aspinwall and Schneider 
2000; Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalism often focuses on the 
evolution of EU crisis management. Scholars in this field depict it as a path-
dependent process, in which the member states are constrained by previous decisions 
and institutional choices (Petrov 2011). Historical institutionalism helps explain the 
direction and pace of institutionalisation, but is less suited to the analysis of day-to-
day crisis decision-making (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs 2010).  
Meanwhile, rational choice institutionalism concentrates on the conditions for the 
delegation of power from political principals to institutional agents and on the 
conditions for agent discretion. Klein’s (2010) application of this variant to EU crisis 
management modelled the member states as a unitary principal and the Commission 
and Council Secretariat as agents. Despite limited delegation, she detected significant 
agent influence on the implementation of EU crisis management (Klein 2010). She 
presented operation EUFOR Chad/CAR as an example where time pressure enabled 
the Union’s military bodies to push the member states towards military options 
(Klein 2011). This very example shows that the ‘unitary principal assumption’ is 
problematic. It might well have been the distribution of member state preferences 
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that led to the alleged institutional influence. In fact, France strongly pushed for the 
implementation of a military operation while the preferences of other member states 
were rather vague. Paris had officials in strategic positions in Europe’s crisis 
management structures and provided the bulk of resources. 
Finally, sociological institutionalism starts from a broad definition of institutions, 
including “symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates” (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 14). Applications to EU crisis management are scarce and tend to focus on 
institutional development and change (Faleg 2012; Mounier et al. 2007; Schröder 
2011). Juncos’s (2011) analysis of the design and performance of operation EUFOR 
Althea in BiH constitutes a useful exception. She demonstrates how institutional 
actors deviated from the member states’ initial rational plan. But, she also identifies 
the need for more research into the effects of socialisation, the boundaries between 
rational and appropriate behaviour, and the nexus linking national interests to 
‘Brusselisation’ (Juncos 2011).19  
Multi-level foreign policy governance  
Traditional approaches in IR and EU integration theory are often considered too rigid 
for the study of EU crisis management and foreign policy (Gross 2009). Meanwhile, 
neo-institutionalism tends to be confined in its analytical focus. Alternative 
approaches that attempt to address the broader picture of EU foreign policy decision-
making have emerged in the fields of governance and foreign policy analysis.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, EU studies witnessed a ‘governance turn’ (Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger 2006). Governance differs from the hierarchical notion of 
government and can be defined as “steering capacities of a political system without 
making any assumption as to which institutions or agents do the steering” (Gamble 
2000: 110). Reflecting overlapping and interdependent loci of governance and 
increasingly entwined intergovernmental and supranational logics, scholars have 
                                                
19 ‘Brusselisation’ refers to a process of social interaction, during which national officeholders move 
from national preferences to a collective European preference in the absence of coercion or material 
incentives (Allen 1998: 54). 
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described EU foreign policy as “multi-level governance” system (Hooghe and Marks 
2001; M. Smith 2004).  
A growing sub-field of the governance literature is security governance (Diedrichs 
2006; Hollis 2010; Kirchner 2006; Schröder 2011). From this perspective, EU crisis 
management is seen as a system of “co-ordination, management and regulation of 
issues by multiple and separate authorities (…) directed towards particular policy 
outcomes” (Kirchner 2006: 948). Incoherence can be seen as resulting from the 
complexity of overlapping steering processes in the absence of an overarching 
political authority (Pilegaard 2003). Governance approaches are able to 
accommodate a broadened understanding of security by including state and non-state 
actors, external and internal crisis management dimensions, and formal or informal 
modes of coordination (Schröder 2011). They thus provide valuable insight into the 
complexity of EU foreign policy and crisis management.  
However, governance approaches are often descriptive in character and neglect 
power and agency. A recent analysis of the CSDP governance network confirms the 
existence of a complex constellation of ties between national and supranational 
actors (Mérand et al. 2011). But it also shows that the CSDP remains dominated by a 
few traditional actors, in particular national ambassadors in Brussels. The authors 
conclude that “these actors are not giving up on state power, but reconstituting it at 
the supranational level” (Mérand et al. 2011: 121). The depiction of the EU foreign 
policy as multi-level governance system thus represents a useful conceptual frame, 
but the analysis of crisis decision-making demands attention to hierarchy, power, and 
agency.  
A theoretical paradigm that more readily incorporates these factors is foreign policy 
analysis. Long reserved to the study of national foreign policy, this sub-field of IR 
theory gained traction in EU studies at the turn of the century. In the context of the 
present study, foreign policy analysis presents three advantages. First, it explicitly 
focuses on political decision-making processes and underlying motivations (Gross 
2009: 10). Second, it is adaptable enough to scrutinise EU-level and national foreign 
policy (White 1999; White 2004). And third, it concentrates on domestic processes 
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and factors, which – as Gross (2009) has demonstrated – play an important role in 
European crisis management.  
Foreign policy analysis has been criticised for its lack of a grand theory and its 
ambiguous assumptions leading to ‘analytical kitchen sink’ models (Garrison 2003: 
178). However, the introduction of middle-range theories can sharpen the analytical 
focus (Kaarbo 2003: 151). White (1999) and Kaarbo (2003: 162) recommend 
introducing constructivist approaches to examine “the linkage between social 
structures and calculating agents”.  
Addressing the gaps  
The present study devises an original theoretical framework for the analysis of 
coherence. With its focus on multi-level crisis decision-making, the framework can 
be situated within the broader realm of foreign policy analysis. However, rationalist 
and moderate constructivist theoretical lenses are incorporated to narrow down the 
analytical focus. The rationalist lens builds on liberal intergovernmentalism and 
adapts it to the issue area of crisis management. The constructivist lens represents an 
application of sociological institutionalism to the multi-level governance system and 
draws on findings from the strategic culture literature.  
The analytical framework thus addresses three shortcomings in the literature. First, it 
fills the gap of theory-led studies in the coherence literature. Second, it applies one of 
the most prominent EU integration theories (liberal intergovernmentalism) to the 
‘hard case’ of comprehensive crisis management. And third, it contributes to the 
sociological institutionalist research agenda by introducing dynamics of vertical and 
horizontal norm contestation. This adaptation is in line with Aspinwall and Schneider 
(2000: 29) who recommend studying the “cross-cutting influence of non-national 
norms”. In addition, the focus on contestation allows us to explore conditions for 
norm compliance and helps counter a common critique of sociological 
institutionalism, namely its neglect of agency (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Juncos 
2011). The framework thus speaks to the core theoretical concerns of the ‘second 
wave’ of CSDP scholarship: the role of power, the influence of institutions, the 
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balance between structure and agency, and the relationship between material and 
ideational factors. 
By theorising the influence of norms and interests, this study in particular contributes 
to the ongoing theoretical dialogue between rational choice and constructivist 
scholars (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Johnston 2005; Jupille et al. 2003; Zürn 
and Checkel 2005). This debate has largely supplanted that between neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism, which dominated EU studies until the 
1990s (Christiansen et al. 1999). For a long time, rationalist and constructivist 
approaches were seen as incompatible, and the ontological and epistemological 
divides between them viewed as insurmountable. However, since the turn of the 
century, there is an increasing trend to bridge these divides and to view them as 
compatible, if not complementary. Theoretical dialogue between rationalist and 
constructivist approaches has empirical and theoretical advantages. Not only does it 
permit us to paint a more encompassing and nuanced picture of social reality (Fearon 
and Wendt 2002). It is also possible to delimit the scope and applicability of 
theoretical approaches. As King et al. (1994: 101) put it, “[t]he process of trying to 
falsify theories in the social sciences is really one of searching for their bounds of 
applicability”. 
By devising an original ordinal measure for the degree of coherence, this study helps 
clarify the conceptual and empirical boundaries of the term. Its application to the 
specific area of EU crisis management further contributes to an enhanced 
understanding of the comprehensive approach. Systematic enquiry into the 
challenges of comprehensive multilateral crisis management is not only relevant to 
the field of EU studies, but also to the broader literature on multilateral conflict 
management and peacekeeping.  
Last but not least, the empirical analysis evaluates three recent cases of post-Lisbon 
crisis management. By studying the first three years of the operational functioning of 
the Union’s new crisis management set-up, it provides original empirical insight into 
the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. It further offers an in-depth analysis of the 
determinants of French, British, and German foreign and security policy. Finally, the 
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study of the micro-foundations of coherence permits us to draw informed 
conclusions on the state of the art and future prospects of the Union’s post-Lisbon 
security actorness.  
1.4 Thesis outline  
Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of this 
thesis. It starts by conceptualising policy coherence and adapting it to the issue area 
of crisis management. Thereafter, the two theoretical lenses are introduced and 
applied to multi-level crisis decision-making. The chapter concludes by bringing the 
lenses together and devising an analytical framework to theorise the interaction. The 
analytical framework includes six hypotheses on the influence of interests and norms 
on the degree of coherence in EU crisis management. It further devises four scope 
conditions on their interaction across governance levels.  
The comparative multiple-case embedded design is introduced in chapter 3. 
Reflecting the nature of policy coherence as a social phenomenon without clear 
boundaries, the research design is qualitative. However, as coherence is a matter of 
degree and can never be fully attained, the concept is operationalised at ordinal level. 
The chapter further specifies the interests and norms on which this thesis focuses and 
how their existence, influence, and interaction are established on the basis of 
empirical evidence. The operationalisation of dependent and independent variables is 
followed by a discussion of the methods for case selection, analysis and comparison, 
as well as data collection.  
Theory and research design find application in chapters 4, 5 and 6, which analyse the 
Union’s post-Lisbon crisis responses to Libya, Somalia, and Mali. To facilitate cross-
case comparison, the case studies follow a similar structure. They start by evaluating 
the degree of coherence in the Union’s crisis responses on the basis of the pre-
established indicators. They then trace the crisis responses of France, the UK, and 
Germany to detect underlying causes for the observed degree of coherence in the 
domestic and intergovernmental arenas. To conclude, the case studies move to the 
institutional arena to discern dynamics of institutional influence and interaction.  
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The findings of the case studies are drawn together in chapter 7. The chapter is based 
on two modes of comparison. The first and primary comparative mode is modelled 
on the method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005b). The 
research question is divided into three sub-questions addressing each analytical level. 
The chapter assesses the validity of the structured answers provided by the 
hypotheses. The secondary mode of comparison consists of evaluating the role of 
embedded analytical units (member states and institutions) across cases and over 
time. Comparison shows that the three cases of EU crisis management varied in 
terms of coherence. The degree of coherence in the Libyan response was relatively 
low, whereas the collective response to the Somali conflict displayed a relatively 
high degree of coherence. Meanwhile, the Union’s responses to the Malian crises 
were coherent on paper, but not in terms of resources. Across cases, the key factors 
behind incoherence are:  
• competing or disparate economic interests;  
• electoral calculation;  
• embedded national norms on the use of force and modes of multilateral 
cooperation; and  
• institutional competence overlaps and rivalries.  
The analysis of analytical units shows that there is some convergence over time. But 
this convergence might be offset by temporary domestic or institutional incentives.  
The conclusion (chapter 8) summarises the main findings of the study and 
systematically reviews the hypotheses and scope conditions. It discusses potential 
trade-offs between coherent crisis management on the one hand, and timeliness as 
well as effectiveness on the other. It is argued that coherence might be a necessary 
condition for effective goal attainment in the medium- to longer term. However, in 
cases where an urgent and forceful response is required, European coherence might 
actually prevent effective action. The thesis concludes by discussing implications for 
the Union’s future as a security actor and potential future avenues of research.  
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 Theorising coherence in EU crisis Chapter 2:
management  
The degree of coherence in EU crisis management can be seen as the aggregate 
outcome of political decision-making processes at various governance levels. To 
elucidate the underlying causes and mechanisms, the present chapter introduces two 
theoretical lenses: liberal intergovernmentalism and sociological institutionalism. 
Their separate application leads to alternative depictions of EU crisis decision-
making as a rational or norm game. An analytical framework brings the two games 
together to derive hypotheses on the interaction and effect of interests and norms 
across three governance levels: the domestic, the intergovernmental, and the EU 
institutional arena.   
To bridge the epistemological divide between the two conceptualisations of the 
game, sociological institutionalism is combined with a moderate or ‘thin’ 
constructivist stance (Adler 1997; Wendt 1999). Moderate constructivists 
acknowledge that the world surrounding us is socially and materially constituted and 
do not reject a positivist understanding of causality (Jupille et al. 2003: 14-15). A 
positivist epistemology is more prone to provide common ground between rationalist 
and thin constructivist lenses. As Smith (1999: 691) puts it, “[t]o the extent that 
constructivists can treat reasons as causes, they can debate easily with (neo-liberal 
institutionalist) rationalists”.  
The analytical framework expects norms on the use of force and modes of 
international cooperation to interact with electoral and economic interests in the 
domestic arena. It suggests that national calculation, on the basis of societal interests 
and threat perception, interacts with EU-induced norms of cooperation to produce 
outcomes in the intergovernmental arena. Finally, it assumes that bureaucratic 
interests and long-standing organisational norms meet in the EU institutional arena to 
determine institutional discretion and interaction. What prevails in influencing the 
degree of coherence is hypothesised to depend on four contextual scope conditions: 
the magnitude of stakes, the level of information and certainty as well as the 
embeddedness of norms and their prescriptive clarity.  
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The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first conceptualises policy coherence and 
adapts it to the issue area of comprehensive crisis management. The second and third 
parts introduce the theoretical lenses and their core tenets and apply them to multi-
level crisis decision-making. Their separate application fosters an awareness of the 
similarities and differences, necessary to prevent “crude synthesis” (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 24). The chapter concludes by presenting the analytical framework that will 
guide subsequent empirical analysis.  
2.1 Coherence for EU crisis management  
Coherence is often described as an “elusive” or even “slippery” term (Bertea 2005). 
Its elusiveness is partly due to the large number of existing definitions and typologies 
(den Hertog and Stroß 2013). The aim of this section is to clarify the meaning of 
coherence and to adapt the concept to the issue area of comprehensive EU crisis 
management. The resulting definitions and typologies serve as a conceptual anchor 
for the subsequent theory-based enquiry and as a basis for the more specific concept 
operationalisation following in chapter 3.  
Defining coherence  
In common parlance, coherence is equated with consistency (Hoebink 2005). It is 
defined as the quality of ‘being free from self-contradiction’ or as the ‘action of 
sticking together’ (Picciotto 2004: 323). The term implies logic and constancy of 
purpose. In philosophy, the truth of a proposition consists of its coherence with all 
other true propositions. In physics, coherence describes the force by which molecules 
are held together, the ‘constant phase relationship of waves’, or the degree of 
viscosity (that is, the resistance of a liquid to ‘flow’) or firmness of a substance. 
These definitions are quite precise (Picciotto 2004: 323). 
Defining coherence in the social sciences is less straightforward. There are numerous 
definitions of ‘coherence’ in public policy terms. Its conceptual delimitation remains 
subject to academic controversy (den Hertog and Stroß 2013). One of these 
controversies concerns the distinction of the terms ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’. 
According to Nuttall (2005: 93), distinguishing these two terms amounts to 
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“linguistic pedantry”. In practice, the terms are often used interchangeably (Gebhard 
2011: 105). A common example are the different language versions of the EU Treaty 
texts, in which ‘consistency’, ‘cohérence’, or ‘Kohärenz’ are treated as synonyms 
(Van Elsuwege 2010: 1013).  
However, an increasing number of scholars argue that the distinction between 
consistency and coherence is an analytical necessity (Cremona 2008; Gebhard 2011; 
Missiroli et al. 2001; Tietje 1997). Their argument is based on three key differences 
between the concepts. First, policy coherence has a more positive connotation than 
policy consistency and is superordinate to it (Missiroli et al. 2001). While 
consistency merely refers to the absence of contradiction, coherence goes beyond 
that and involves the promotion of synergies and mutually reinforcing effects 
between actors, policies, and instruments (OECD 2001). Second, consistency and 
coherence differ with regard to their “ontological contexts” (Gebhard 2011: 106). 
While consistency describes the character of an outcome or state, coherence is a 
dynamic concept defining the quality of a process over time. Finally, the two terms 
vary in their degree of stricture (Missiroli et al. 2001). Consistency is seen as a 
dichotomous variable since something is either consistent or it is not (Missiroli et al. 
2001). Coherence, instead, is a matter of degree and an attribute of processes. It can 
never be fully attained and it is thus only possible to compare different degrees of 
coherence (de Coning 2008a). Although the line between consistency and coherence 
is often hard to draw in practice, this thesis maintains the distinction for the purpose 
of analytical precision and views consistency as a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for coherence (den Hertog and Stroß 2013).  
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Connotation negative  
(absence of contradiction) 
positive  
(existence of synergies)  
Ontological 
context  




(consistent / inconsistent) 
continuous  
(variation in degrees)  
Source: own compilation based on Gebhard (2011: 105-106) and Missiroli et al. (2001)  
Another debate, more prominent among policymakers than academics, regards the 
specific versus the general nature of policy coherence (McLean Hilker 2004). The 
question is whether policy coherence should be geared towards a specific goal or, 
alternatively, seen as a general principle cutting across different policy areas (OECD 
2005: 28). The most prominent example of a specific conceptualisation of the term is 
Policy Coherence for Development, in short PCD. Policymakers in the field of 
development argue that it is necessary to promote PCD since their policy area is 
generally given lower political priority in comparison to other policies with shorter 
time horizons, such as defence or humanitarian aid policies (McLean Hilker 2004). 
Other specific conceptualisations include coherence geared towards environmental 
protection, gender equality, or the respect of human rights (Keijzer and Oppewal 
2012: 10). The bottom line is that the perspective on the objectives and direction of 
policy coherence often depend ‘on where you sit’.  
This thesis applies coherence as a conceptual tool for the analysis of comprehensive 
EU crisis management.20 The latter was defined as the integration of political, 
economic, and military instruments and policies with the overarching objective of 
changing the dynamics of a given crisis or conflict towards increased security and 
stability. However, as Keijzer and Oppewal (2012: 26) argue, the objectives of 
                                                
20 Missiroli et al. (2001) coined the notions of “coherence for security policy” and “coherence for 
crisis management”. These notions are based on the argument that political discussions about 
coherence in CFSP moved from the ‘F’ of foreign to the ‘S’ of security in the early 2000s. Due to the 
broadening nature of EU security policy, the ‘S’ is increasingly incorporated diplomatic and military 
action.  
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coherent policy-making are “highly context-specific”. Therefore, the specific 
objectives of both (a) single EU crisis management policies or activities as well as 
(b) the overarching objectives of the Union’s crisis response will be outlined in 
relation to the conflict at hand in the case study sections of this thesis. In more 
general terms, coherence is understood as the absence of contradiction (consistency) 
and existence of synergies between various crisis management policies, instruments, 
and activities geared towards a set of overarching objectives (de Coning 2008a).   
Process, output, and outcome coherence  
Accounting for the dynamic character of policy coherence, some scholars distinguish 
process, output, and outcome coherence (Christiansen 2001; di Francesco 2001; den 
Hertog and Stroß 2013; King et al. 2012). Process coherence refers to the interaction 
of political and administrative units in the elaboration of policies, instruments, and 
activities. It is pursued through the activities of coordination or cooperation and 
entails “developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, setting goals and 
priorities, sharing information, division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising 
resources” (de Coning 2007: 9). Output coherence designates the inter-relation of 
administrative and political outputs generated in the course of political and 
administrative processes and the extent to which these relate to overarching 
objectives (Christiansen 2001). Finally, outcome coherence refers to the inter-
relation of the effects or impacts political and administrative outputs have on external 
targets and the extent to which these effects contribute to overarching policy 
objectives. 
It can be assumed that coherent coordination processes among administrative and 
political units are necessary conditions for the formulation of coherent outputs (di 
Francesco 2001; OECD 1996). The causal link that is more often questioned is the 
one between process and output coherence on the one hand, and outcome coherence 
on the other (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 26). The more the policy process moves 
from the stages of policy preparation, formulation, and planning towards 
implementation, the higher is the number of external intervening variables and 
factors that potentially influence international political outcomes (Keijzer and 
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Oppewal 2012: 24). It thus becomes difficult to distil the ‘net effect’ of a specific set 
of policy measures, or the part of the outcome that can be attributed to these policy 
measures (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 8). Several studies evaluating policy 
coherence across different policy fields therefore recommend that the evaluation of 
policy coherence best stops at the level of policy outputs (see Keijzer and Oppewal 
2012: 24).  
Applied to EU crisis management, process coherence refers to the interaction of 
political and administrative actors responsible for (parts of) the EU’s crisis response. 
Outputs vary depending on the decision-making level and policy field. They include, 
for instance, EU decisions, diplomatic demarches, and civilian or military CSDP 
missions and operations (Thomas 2008).21 Meanwhile, the outcome of EU crisis 
management is the net effect of these outputs on the dynamics of a conflict or crisis. 
Exemplary factors intervening between the EU’s crisis management outputs and 
outcomes include the role of influential Third countries or of peace spoilers in the 
affected country or region (Thomas 2012: 460).22 This thesis analyses the degree of 
output coherence in EU crisis management (as a dependent variable) and investigates 
independent or intervening variables in corresponding processes of political and 
administrative interaction. In light of the number of uncontrollable external 
intervening factors, it does not focus on the multiple causal effects influencing 
outcome coherence.  
Categorising coherence  
To account for the complexity of the EU as a multi-layered governance system, EU 
scholars usually distinguish different categories of coherence. The aim here is not to 
provide a comprehensive overview of existing categories and taxonomies. Instead, 
the focus lies on the three most common categories of coherence in the study of EU 
                                                
21 A detailed description of political and administrative outputs follows in section 3.1. 
22 ‘Peace spoilers’ are political leaders, parties, or sub-state actors that obstruct conflict settlement as 
peace could threaten their power, worldview, or interests (Stedman 1997).  
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foreign policy, namely vertical, horizontal, and institutional coherence (Nuttall 2005: 
97).  
Vertical coherence describes the interaction between different spatial or 
organisational levels of policy-making (Duraiappah and Bhardwaj 2007: 3). 
Translated into the EU context, it refers to the interaction between member state 
policies and supranational EU-level policies. It is challenged if “one or more member 
states pursue national policies that are out of kilter with the policy agreed at EU 
level” (Nuttall 2005: 93). Classical examples of vertical incoherence can be found in 
the field of sanctions (Portela and Raube 2009). Despite an EU visa ban on senior 
Zimbabwean officials imposed in 2002, France invited President Robert Mugabe to 
the France-Africa Summit in Cannes in 2003; Italy hosted the Zimbabwean leader at 
the occasion of the funeral of Pope John Paul II in 2005; and the Portuguese Council 
Presidency even invited him to the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007 (Kubosova 
2007). While these measures were technically ‘legalised’ through specific exemption 
clauses, they contravened the original aim of the EU’s sanctions (Portela and Raube 
2009). 
Horizontal coherence relates to the interaction between different policies at the same 
hierarchical or organisational level (Duraiappah and Bhardwaj 2007: 3). In the EU 
literature, it usually refers to the coherence between different EU-level policies. 
Policies are horizontally coherent if the objectives they pursue and the means they 
use are consistent – or at least complementary – and mutually reinforcing. Linking or 
integrating a set of diverse policies, comprehensive crisis management carries an 
inherent potential for horizontal incoherence. Examples of complex interdependence 
and potential trade-offs of close policy integration can be found at the interface 
between the humanitarian dimension on the one hand, and the political and military 
dimensions on the other. A close integration of humanitarian aid within a broader 
political and military strategy may compromise the humanitarian aim of neutral, 
impartial, and independent aid delivery (de Coning 2008a).23 Conversely, impartial 
                                                
23 Neutrality, impartiality, and independence are among the universal ‘humanitarian principles’ that 
govern the way humanitarian responses are carried out. Neutrality implies not taking sides in 
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humanitarian aid delivery can fuel and prolong conflict by providing warring factions 
on either side with means for subsistence (Macrae and Leader 2001; Versluys 2007).  
A third category of coherence that has gained importance along with the expansion 
of the role and competences of EU institutions is (inter)-institutional coherence. 
Institutional coherence is, in fact, a sub-category of horizontal coherence (Nuttall 
2005: 97). It refers to the absence of contradiction and the existence of synergies 
between the activities of different EU-level institutional actors. In this thesis, 
institutional coherence specifically refers to the interaction between EU-level 
institutional actors responsible for comprehensive crisis management. Common 
examples of institutional incoherence include ‘turf wars’ or tensions between the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat. Tensions typically surface in the grey areas 
between security and development, including, inter alia, civilian crisis management, 
election monitoring, small arms and light weapons, or issues of external 
representation (Beger and Bartholmé 2007; Youngs 2007).  
Table 4: Categories of coherence in EU crisis management 
Vertical coherence Between the EU-level crisis response and the crisis 
responses of the member states. 
Horizontal coherence Between the objectives and instruments of different 
EU-level crisis management policies. 
Institutional coherence Between EU-level institutions and actors responsible 
for EU crisis management. 
Source: adapted from Nuttall (2005: 97)  
Coherence can be seen as a ‘meta-norm’ of EU governance (Thomas 2008; 2011). It 
applies to different issue areas, to supranational institutions as well as to the national 
level. As a meta-norm, coherence is related to other procedural norms24 embedded in 
                                                                                                                                     
hostilities. Impartiality means that aid is delivered regardless of nationality, race, religion, or political 
ideology. Finally, humanitarian agencies or offices should plan and implement their policies and 
activities independently of other governmental policies or actions (Council et al. 2008). 
24 We distinguish procedural from substantive norms such as liberty, democracy, or human rights 
(Manners 2002; Thomas 2008; Thomas 2011). 
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the EU Treaty texts including the principle of loyal cooperation and provisions on 
mutual and regular information and consultation (Thomas 2008).25 But, while the 
coherence requirement is firmly embedded in EU primary law, compliance remains 
an essentially political ‘game’.26 The next two sections introduce alternative ways of 
viewing this game and lay the ground for the analytical framework in section 2.4. 
2.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism: a rational game  
Devised by Moravcsik in 1993, liberal intergovernmentalism has become one of the 
most prominent theoretical approaches in the study of EU integration. It is often used 
as a first cut explanation to be compared with alternative explanations (Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig 2009: 67). Liberal intergovernmentalism is an application of 
rationalist institutionalism and combines elements from liberalism, negotiation 
theory, and functional regime theory (Moravcsik 1993b). This section introduces its 
key assumptions and propositions and applies them to EU crisis management. From a 
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, EU crisis decision-making can be seen as a 
fast coordination game (Wagner 2003). In this game, the degree of coherence is the 
unintended consequence of the strategic interaction of a number of rational actors 
pursuing self-regarding interests (Pilegaard 2003). 
The primacy of the nation state and actor-centred rationality  
Liberal intergovernmentalism rests on two basic assumptions. The first is that nation 
states are the key actors in a context of international anarchy (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 68). Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasises the importance 
of societal economic interests and relative bargaining power. Unlike its realist or 
neo-realist counter-parts, it does not assume that state preferences are shaped by 
concerns for national security, that state power is derived from coercive capabilities, 
or that intergovernmental institutions are insignificant. The EU is viewed as an 
                                                
25 See articles 4(3), 24(3), 32 paragraphs 1, 34 (1)(2) TEU.  
26 This thesis borrows from game theoretical language for illustrative purpose rather than for game-
theoretic analysis.  
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international regime designed to facilitate policy coordination and to ensure credible 
commitments and compliance under conditions of economic interdependence 
(Keohane 1984: 51; Krasner 1983: 1).  
The second basic assumption is that states and their leaders are rational (Moravcsik 
1993b). The rationality assumption is an agency assumption grounded in 
methodological individualism.27 It implies that a logic of expected consequences 
drives human behaviour (March and Olsen 1998). Actors are assumed to calculate 
the payoffs of alternative courses of action and to choose the option that yields the 
highest benefits under given circumstances (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 
68). In their ability for strategic calculation, actors are, however, constrained by the 
level of information and the degree of uncertainty about the future (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009; Simon 1955).  
National decision-makers are assumed to pursue a set of consistently ordered 
preferences and to choose alternative policy options accordingly. National 
preferences designate a variable set of exogenously given interests regarding 
“potential ‘states of the world’” (Moravcsik 1998: 20). These fundamental 
preferences are more stable than the policies, strategies, and tactics, which constitute 
the ‘currency’ of day-to-day foreign policy-making (Moravcsik 1997). Liberal 
intergovernmentalism acknowledges that they can include ideational factors such as 
ideology, but generally views them as causally inferior to material factors 
(Moravcsik 1993b; 1999).  
A two-level game in three steps  
These two assumptions constitute the basis for a sequential theoretical approach 
following three steps: national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining, 
and institutional choice (Moravcsik 1993a; Putnam 1988). In the first step, liberal 
intergovernmentalism opens the ‘black box’ of the unitary state and applies liberal 
                                                
27 Methodological individualism is an approach which analyses social phenomena in terms of the 
underlying action and interaction of individuals (Wincott 1995). 
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theory to explain the process of societal preference aggregation. Accordingly, “the 
foreign policy goals of national governments vary in response to shifting pressure 
from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political 
institutions” (Moravcsik 1993b). National preferences are thus not fixed, but emerge 
through the domestic struggle for political influence, the outcome of which varies 
across states, time, and issue area (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 69). 
Liberal intergovernmentalists view the relationship between society and state as one 
between principals and agents where societal principals use elections to delegate 
power to governmental agents. The main concern of elected leaders is to stay in 
office (Moravcsik 1993b).  
At the second stage, elected representatives take the domestically determined 
national preferences to the EU ‘bargaining table’. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
views EU-level negotiations as a game of coordination with distributional 
consequences (Moravcsik 1993b). The outcome of this game, also referred to as the 
international ‘supply’ of cooperation, depends on the relative bargaining power of 
the member states (Moravcsik 1993b). Their bargaining power is shaped by three key 
factors: the intensity of national preferences, the existence of unilateral or 
multilateral alternatives to EU-level cooperation, and the potential for compromise 
and issue linkage (Moravcsik 1993b). Liberal intergovernmentalism accords more 
bargaining power to large, prosperous, and self-sufficient EU member states 
“because they gain relatively little from agreement, compared to their smaller, 
poorer, more open neighbours” (Moravcsik 1993b: 500).  
The third stage or theoretical element of liberal intergovernmentalism is institutional 
choice. Following functional regime theory (Keohane 1984), it posits that 
governments delegate or pool sovereignty28 through supranational institutions 
because they lower the transaction costs of international cooperation, increase the 
                                                
28 Moravcsik (1998: 67) distinguishes between the pooling and delegation of authoritative decision-
making. The member states pool sovereignty if they decide that an issue area should be governed by 
any other rule than unanimity voting. In the EU context, this usually refers to qualified majority 
voting (QMV). Member states delegate sovereignty when supranational institutions are allowed to 
take certain (implementing) decisions autonomously, without prior inter-state vote or veto option.  
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efficiency of intergovernmental bargaining, and secure long-term gains of 
cooperation through credible commitments (Moravcsik 1993b). Liberal 
intergovernmentalism views the acts of delegation or pooling as the result of rational 
calculation by the member states who weigh the gains from more efficient collective 
decision-making against the increased political risk of being outvoted or out-ruled 
(Moravcsik 1993b). Governments are most likely to delegate sovereignty to 
supranational institutions when the joint gains from cooperation are large, when the 
level of political risk for them and interested societal groups is low, and when there 
is uncertainty about the future (Moravcsik 1993b).29 Institutional delegation and 
pooling lock in policy coordination and raise the costs of non-decisions and non-
compliance (Moravcsik 1998: 73).  
Figure 3: Liberal intergovernmentalist steps of EU integration  
Source: own representation based on Moravcsik (1993b) 
                                                
29 Future uncertainty relates to “incomplete contracting” that arises when the member states share 
broad goals but may defect from future contingencies related to these goals. The delegation of 
sovereignty ties the hands of future governments and thus enhances the credibility of a policy. 
Without future uncertainty, member states could elaborate mutually binding rules instead of lasting 
institutions (Moravcsik 1998: 73-74).  
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EU crisis management: a fast coordination game  
From a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the key players in EU crisis 
management are large, prosperous, and self-sufficient EU member states (Moravcsik 
1993b). The focus thus lies on France, Germany, and the UK. Due to their economic 
weight and relative superiority in the military and diplomatic domains, they hold a 
bargaining advantage over other EU member states (Gross 2009: 4-6). EU crisis 
decision-making constitutes a fast coordination game, in which power-seeking 
national officeholders pursue exogenously determined preferences in relation to an 
evolving emergency or conflict (Wagner 2003).  
The EU’s legal coherence requirement is a functional norm designed to secure gains 
from cooperation, to reduce transaction costs, and to increase the efficiency of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Member states have a self-regarding interest in 
effective collective problem solving and in enhancing their international influence 
through the EU. However, in the absence of effective sanctioning mechanisms, they 
are likely to defect from previous decisions if those contradict important societal 
interests and national preferences.  
The liberal intergovernmentalist theory of national preference formation holds best if 
societal preferences are relatively stable and well-defined, when cause-effect 
relationships are certain, and when the decision-making process is de-centralised 
granting access to societal pressure groups (Moravcsik 1993b). The explanatory 
power of liberal intergovernmentalism is thus highest in issue areas such as trade or 
agriculture where societal economic preferences are relatively stable and where the 
consequences of governmental decisions are calculable. If societal costs and benefits 
of government decisions are more diffuse and uncertain governments are much less 
constrained by their domestic constituencies (Moravcsik 1993b).  
Liberal intergovernmentalist expectations about the role and autonomy of 
‘supranational entrepreneurs’ depend on the transaction costs of intergovernmental 
cooperation in terms of the generation of information and ideas (Moravcsik 1998: 
54-60). If transaction costs are low and asymmetrical interdependence dominates 
intergovernmental bargaining, the autonomous influence of supranational 
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entrepreneurs is assumed to be minimal. However, supranational entrepreneurs may 
wield influence in policy areas where the level of delegation is high (such as trade 
and aid); in situations characterised by high degrees of complexity, uncertainty, and 
urgency (high transaction costs); or if they hold relevant expertise the member states 
lack (comparative advantage) (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 77). A general 
pre-condition for autonomous influence on policy outputs is that supranational 
entrepreneurs have preferences that differ from those of the member states 
(Moravcsik 1998: 58). 
Blind spots and adaptations  
Comprehensive EU crisis management is a hard case for liberal 
intergovernmentalism. In the context of the present study, the theoretical approach 
presents two major weaknesses. The first is its narrow conception of the process of 
domestic preference formation (Wincott 1995). Rooted in political economy, liberal 
intergovernmentalism focuses on the role of economic interest groups. In policy 
fields where the societal costs and gains of decisions are more diffuse, such as 
diplomacy and humanitarian aid, it reverts to realist or ideational explanations 
(Pilegaard 2003). In these areas, Moravcsik (1993b; 1998) holds that governmental 
decisions reflect ideological predilections, geopolitical considerations, or a rather 
vague notion of national interest as perceived by national foreign policy elites. 
Second, liberal intergovernmentalism is “deliberatively weak on institutions” 
(Pilegaard 2003: 8). It thus has a strong explanatory bias towards vertical coherence. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism accords independent preferences, and under the 
outlined circumstances, also influence to supranational entrepreneurs. But, it makes 
no prediction about the nature of these preferences or about the way they affect 
political outcomes (Kassim and Menon 2003). The outlined weaknesses call for three 
theoretical adaptations.  
The first broadens the process of domestic preference formation to include public 
opinion. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) concede that public opinion can 
influence EU-level decisions if those acquire political salience. Political salience can 
be defined as “the significance, importance and urgency that an actor ascribes to a 
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certain issue on the political agenda” (Oppermann 2008: 182). Crisis decisions 
concerning the use of force or an interference into the internal affairs of a Third 
country are often consequential, controversial, and visible (Boin et al., 2005: 43). 
They are thus more likely than other EU-level decisions to draw media attention and 
to acquire political salience. Societal principals are most likely to influence EU-level 
decisions if they are aware of these decisions and if they are able to sanction their 
agents’ foreign policy performance through upcoming democratic elections 
(Oppermann 2008: 182-184). Under these conditions, rational decision-makers 
seeking re-election are assumed to opt for positions that are close to “median 
domestic interest” rather than the median EU interest (Moravcsik 1993a: 30). 
The second adaptation concerns national strategic calculation in the absence of 
salient societal constraints. The substantive focus on crisis management calls for the 
inclusion of national threat perception, a traditional neo-realist variable. ‘Threat 
perception’ denotes the assessment of an objectively existing external threat.30 
Perception refers to the perceiver’s limitations in analytical and predictive capacity 
and to the possibility of purposive misrepresentation by the sender (Gross Stein 
2013). This rationalist understanding of threat perception differs from a definition as 
a predominantly social or discursive construction (Meyer 2009). Walt (1987) 
assumed that states mainly cooperate or form alliances to balance against collective 
security threats. Balancing behaviour can include military and non-military means 
(Bock and Henneberg 2013: 9). From this perspective, coherent EU crisis 
management is more likely in situations where the member states perceive the 
existence of a collective threat. Conversely, asymmetric threat perceptions are 
expected to cause divergent member state behaviour and unilateral action.  
The third adaptation extends rationalist assumptions to the preferences and role of 
supranational entrepreneurs. It draws on the second generation literature on 
                                                
30 A ‘threat’ can be defined as the anticipated loss or harm to an individual or members of a given 
community (see Astorino-Courtois 2000). In this study, the community refers to the nation state.   
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‘bureaucratic politics’ (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999).31 Scholars in this 
paradigm view political decisions as unintended outcomes of competitive bargaining 
games between bureaucratic actors with their own conceptions of goals and priorities 
(institutional preferences). Supranational entrepreneurs can be seen as collective 
rational entities bound by career paths and common structures (Juncos and Pomorska 
2012). They pursue institutional preferences while seeking to maximise autonomy 
and avoiding time-consuming and resource-intensive coordination (Allison and 
Halperin 1972: 75). Dysfunctional interaction occurs if overlapping competences and 
resource scarcity increase the necessity for coordination and trigger inter-institutional 
competition (Christiansen 2001; Klein 2010). Competition is particularly likely if a 
new institution invades the functional ‘territory’ of established actors within a given 
policy space (Dijkstra 2009). However, in line with the core assumptions of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, institutional preferences and rivalries are only assumed to 
affect policy coherence if the member states delegated sovereignty or if the 
transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining are high.  
In ‘hard cases’, where economic interests are weak or diffuse, Moravcsik (1997; 
2009) encourages careful theoretical synthesis or dialogue between liberal 
intergovernmentalism and ideational, constructivist-inspired approaches. The plea to 
introduce ideational factors is also in line with the newer generations of foreign 
policy analysis and bureaucratic politics (Drezner 2000; Garrison 2003; Jones 2012). 
Therefore, the following section introduces a sociological institutionalist perspective. 
It does not only address blind spots of the ‘rational game’, but also helps delineate its 
explanatory boundaries (King et al. 1994: 101).  
 
                                                
31 Jones (2012) delineates the second from the first generation, the latter of which focused on role of 
domestic politics in public policymaking. The third generation employed the term ‚governmental 
politics’ and departed from the rationalist roots of the paradigm to explore factors derived from social 
psychology.   
 
  49 
Table 5: Core theoretical components of the ‘rational game’  
Assumptions Centrality of member states; actor-centred 
rationality 
Logic of action  Logic of consequences  
Causal mechanism Strategic calculation  
Perspective on EU 
decision-making 
Fast coordination game  
Key causal factors  • Domestic arena: economic and electoral 
interests  
• Intergovernmental arena: national 
calculation and threat perception 
• EU institutional arena: overlapping 
competences and scarce resources  
Scope conditions  • Societal influence: calculability of economic 
stakes; political salience  
• Institutional influence: transaction costs of 
intergovernmental bargaining 
Source: own compilation based on Moravcsik (1993a; 1993b; 1998; 2009) 
2.3 Sociological institutionalism: a norm game  
Sociological institutionalism is a sub-field of organisation theory (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 13). The focus here lies on the constructivist-inspired strand that emerged as 
part of the ‘cognitive turn’ in sociology (Hall and Taylor 1996).32 The latter posed a 
direct challenge to the dominant rationalist paradigm in IR including theories such as 
neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Finnemore 1996). From a sociological institutionalist perspective, 
EU crisis management can be depicted as a multi-level norm game.33 The degree of 
                                                
32 Hall and Taylor (1996: 15) distinguish an older, ‘normative’ version of sociological institutionalism 
focusing on institutional roles and a newer, ‘cognitive’ version influenced by social constructivism.  
33 The notion of ‘game’ tends to have a rationalist connotation. Here it rather refers to the idea that 
players are influenced by different social rules emanating from various levels of the game. These rules 
can conflict, resonate, or influence each other. In line with constructivist, sociological institutionalist 
assumptions, players are assumed to follow rules, but they have a degree of agency when faced with 
the choice between distinct rules that yield a comparable degree of social legitimacy.  
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coherence depends on the congruence of contextually salient national and 
organisational norms. 
Institutions and norms 
Sociological institutionalism starts from the basic premise that institutions ‘matter’. 
Like their rationalist colleagues, sociological institutionalists view institutions and 
organisations as environments for political struggles and games. However, they posit 
that institutions have an autonomous role as they shape political action and 
outcomes, and not simply reproduce rational contestation among disaggregated units 
(Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Unlike liberal intergovernmentalism, sociological 
institutionalism has no theoretical bias towards any particular analytical level, issue 
area, or form of cooperation. 
Sociological institutionalism defines institutions broadly including “not just formal 
rules, procedures or norms, but [also] the symbol systems, cognitive scripts and 
moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 14). This broad definition blurs the lines between ‘institutions’ and 
‘culture’ and pictures them as mutually constitutive and analytically inseparable. 
Where rationalists view transaction costs related to collective action in terms of 
information seeking, bargaining, and enforcement costs, sociological institutionalists 
emphasise the costs of overcoming cognitive boundaries stemming from differences 
in language, faith, geography or epistemic professionalism (Aspinwall and Schneider 
2000).  
Sociological institutionalists reject methodological individualism in favour of 
scientific holism and consider that structure and agents are inextricably linked and 
mutually constituted (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Structure is, however, 
ontologically prior to agency: formal and informal institutions are viewed as 
independent variables shaping individual preferences, behaviour, and identity 
(Finnemore 1996). While rationalists view institutions as constraining factors in an 
agent’s pursuit of exogenously given preferences, sociological institutionalists view 
them as constraining and enabling environments that endogenously constitute 
individual preferences and identities (March and Olsen 2005). Institutions define 
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what actors perceive as appropriate, possible, and rational. Human action is seen as 
driven by a logic of appropriateness rather than by one of consequences. Individuals, 
organisations and states adopt a certain behaviour not because of rational calculation 
or considerations of efficiency, but because it enhances social legitimacy (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 949) .  
Norms and behaviour  
Socialisation is the causal mechanism linking structures and agents. Rooted in social 
psychology, socialisation is traditionally defined as a social, interactive process that 
gradually induces individuals, organisations, and states into the “norms and rules of a 
given community” (Checkel 2005: 804). Norms can be defined as “shared 
expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors” (Checkel 
1999: 83). Institutions trigger socialisation processes and diffuse models of “‘good’ 
political behaviour” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 713). The outcome of 
socialisation is sustained norm compliance in the absence of coercion or material 
incentives (Checkel 2005).  
Socialisation research suggests that the induction of agents into a particular collective 
norm is most likely if: 
• it is triggered by a legitimate, stable, well-defined, and cohesive institution;  
• the socialising object is a novice with few prior embedded beliefs that 
conflict with the norm at hand;  
• the interaction between socialising and socialised agents is sustained, regular 
and intense (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001; Lewis 2005; March and Olsen 
2009; Zürn and Checkel 2005).  
There is little consensus on the substantive norm or issue properties that facilitate 
socialisation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Zürn and Checkel 2005).  
Scholars, however, agree that dynamics of socialisation at the international level are 
secondary to those at the national level (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; 
Schimmelfennig 2005). Empirical findings indicate that individuals are more loyal to 
domestic identities than to supranational ones (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). These 
findings are in line with the expectation that the degree of socialisation into a 
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collective norm depends on the level of prior experience as well as the time, 
intensity, and regularity of social interaction. According to Checkel (2001: 222), the 
effect of international socialisation is strongest if there is no domestic opposition or if 
the interaction between socialising agent and object is insulated from domestic 
pressures and occurs in non-politicised, in-camera settings.  
Checkel (2005) distinguishes two ways in which agents can act in line with a logic of 
appropriateness: the first is role-playing, also referred to as type I or ‘thin’ 
socialisation. It implies that agents act in accordance with a given norm without 
being persuaded that it is “the right thing to do” (Johnston 2005). Agents are aware 
of community norms and consciously adapt their behaviour accordingly. Type II (or 
‘thick’) socialisation goes deeper than role-playing and implies that socialised actors 
accept and internalise norms to the extent that they take them for granted. The key 
difference is that type II involves a change in the agent’s preferences and/or identity, 
whereas type I does not. 
But even internalised standards of appropriateness do not directly translate into 
human behaviour (March and Olsen 2009). It is therefore necessary to specify factors 
that condition the strength or weakness of the relationship between rules and action, 
or in other words, the “compliance pull” of a given norm (Thomas 2008: 11). There 
is little agreement on the substantive norm properties determining its compliance 
pull. However, an increasing number of scholars agrees that the prescriptive clarity 
or determinacy constitutes a relevant intrinsic norm characteristic (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; March and Olsen 1998; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; 
Schimmelfennig 2003; Thomas 2008). The compliance pull of a norm is assumed to 
be strongest if it is clear that it applies to a given situation and what policy behaviour 
it prescribes (Thomas 2008: 11).  
EU crisis management: a multi-level norm game  
In analogy to the previous section, EU crisis management can be depicted as ‘multi-
level norm game’ in which supranational entrepreneurs and national elites process 
and balance competing standards of appropriateness emanating from their multiple 
social embeddedness (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Zürn and Checkel 2005). The 
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EU is one of the most densely structured transnational institutional spaces in the 
world and thus qualifies as a “most likely case for socialization dynamics” (Zürn and 
Checkel 2005). However, the environment characterising EU external action is also 
an institutionally fragmented multi-level governance system (Stetter 2004). In 
fragmented and loosely coupled systems, socialising objects are faced with 
“competing rules of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2009: 15). One of the key 
differences between the game portrayed in the previous section and this one is that 
interaction at the vertical and at the horizontal (inter-institutional) levels is assumed 
to be of comparable importance for political outcomes. 
The collective EU norm this thesis concentrates on is the meta-norm of coherence. 
From a sociological institutionalist perspective, this norm goes beyond formal legal 
requirements and encompasses informal norms such as the coordination and 
consultation reflex, the member states’ consensus-seeking behaviour, and a general 
“culture of compromise” (Lewis 2005; Thomas 2008). The predominant aim of the 
pursuit of coherence is not efficiency but an increase in the social legitimacy of the 
institution and of its participants. An actor is assumed to comply with coherence-
related norms if they or the behaviour they prescribe resonate with the actor’s 
identity (Fearon and Wendt 2002). Non-compliance is expected if the actor is faced 
with conflicting norms yielding higher degrees of social legitimacy. Competing 
standards of appropriateness engender norm contestation (Wiener and Puetter 2009). 
Reflecting the Union’s nature as a multi-level governance system, this thesis 
distinguishes vertical and horizontal dynamics of contestation. 
Vertical norm contestation refers to the interaction between European and domestic 
standards of appropriateness. As European socialisation dynamics are secondary to 
domestic ones, socialisation into an EU-level norm has to pass through the filter of 
domestic structures and norms. The result is national variation in terms of norm 
interpretation and compliance (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893). If the European-
level norms and policies are largely compatible with those at the domestic level, the 
member state is likely to comply with them (Börzel and Risse 2000; Checkel 1999). 
Compliance problems arise when embedded EU-level norms stand in contrast with 
embedded domestic norms or structures. Vertical norm contestation is less relevant if 
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political insulation deflects societal legitimacy demands and facilitates a socially-
induced shift of loyalty to the supranational collective (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005).  
The interaction of supranational entrepreneurs can be understood as a process of 
horizontal norm contestation. Institutional growth, specialisation and 
compartmentalisation multiplied the number of socialisation sites within the Union 
and fostered the development of sub-cultures (Christiansen 2001; Hooghe 2005).34 
These sub-cultures stem from epistemic professionalism, intra-institutional 
boundaries (such as departments or directorates), or geographic dispersion. They 
often have a more intense socialising effect on individuals than the overall 
organisational culture (Hooghe 2005). The proliferation of sub-cultures thus 
increases the number of competing standards of appropriateness. It also heightens the 
cognitive barriers that need to be overcome in cases of inter- and intra-institutional 
cooperation towards collective political outputs (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). As 
March and Olsen (2005) put it, “[s]trong identification with a specific organization, 
institution, or role can threaten the coherence of the larger system”. Table 6 
summarises the key theoretical elements of the ‘norm game’.  
                                                
34 Organisational culture refers to “the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a 
group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various 
environments” (Schein 1996: 236). 
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Table 6: Core theoretical components of the ‘norm game’  
Assumptions Formal and informal institutions influence political 
interaction and outcomes  
Logic of action  Logic of appropriateness  
Causal mechanism Socialisation  
Perspective on EU 
decision-making 
Multi-level norm game (vertical and horizontal norm 
contestation) 
Key causal factors • Domestic arena: domestic norms and 
legitimacy demands  
• Intergovernmental arena: EU norms and 
political insulation  
• EU institutional arena: organisational norms  
Scope conditions  Socialisation:  
• Cohesiveness of socialising institution  
• Noviceness of socialisee 
• Sustained and intense social interaction  
• Political insulation from domestic pressures  
 
Norm compliance:  
• Norm determinacy  
• Prescriptive clarity of the norm  
Source: own compilation based on Hall and Taylor (1996) and Zürn et al. (2005) 
2.4 A game of interests and norms  
Human behaviour may be influenced by a combination of habit, emotion, 
internalised rules, and cost-benefit calculation (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; March 
and Olsen 2009). The aim of this thesis is not to depict EU crisis management as 
either a purely rational or norm-driven game. It is conceivable that compliance with 
the EU-level norm of coherence reflects both the rationalist aim to increase 
efficiency and reduce duplication and the desire to act in accordance with collective 
standards of appropriateness. The question is rather, how interests and norms interact 
to yield varying degrees of coherence. The present framework does not seek to pick a 
theoretical winner, but rather to discern, under which conditions or in which domain 
either theoretical perspective yields higher explanatory power (Fearon and Wendt 
2002; Zürn and Checkel 2005).  
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The analytical framework applies the previously introduced theoretical propositions 
to the domestic, intergovernmental, and EU institutional arenas. It addresses the 
constraining effect of societal actors, dynamics of intergovernmental decision-
making, and the role and influence of supranational institutions. In reality, the three 
arenas overlap and decision-making processes occur simultaneously. The distinction 
is made for the sake of analytical clarity and to facilitate subsequent empirical cross-
comparison. The derived hypotheses are not viewed as mutually exclusive, but as 
dependent on the proposed situational conditions. 
Societal interests vs. engrained norms  
Both theoretical perspectives emphasise the role of the domestic level. However, 
their assumptions on the most influential domestic factors differ. From a liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective, two types of societal forces are assumed to 
constrain governments in their ability to cooperate at the EU-level: powerful 
economic interest groups and the median voter interest.  
National decision-makers are constrained if a crisis or a corresponding EU measure 
has calculable effects on relatively stable domestic economic interests. In 
comprehensive crisis management, these attributes particularly apply to the field of 
economic sanctions (Wagner 2003: 584). Their societal benefits – namely political 
influence on the behaviour of a Third country – are diffuse. Meanwhile, the 
immediate costs are usually concentrated on certain productive business sectors 
(Dittmeier 2009). If economic losses resulting from EU-level sanctions are high and 
representatives of the concerned sectors have access to the decision-making process, 
governments are constrained in their ability to agree or comply with European 
sanctions.  
However, EU crisis management activities may also serve the protection of particular 
bilateral economic interests in the affected or neighbouring countries. In such cases, 
economic interest groups can be assumed to push for collective action. The bottom 
line is that the degree of coherence depends on the divergence or convergence of 
preferences of influential economic interest groups in the most powerful EU member 
states. 
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If EU-level decisions acquire political salience, national officeholders are 
constrained by the median voter interest. Public opinion matters if there are 
upcoming elections and if an EU-level decision can be assumed to have electoral 
consequences. The political salience of a topic or decision increases if it is subject to 
controversy between government and opposition (Oppermann and Viehrig 2008: 
183). Under these circumstances, national officeholders are assumed to avoid risky 
EU-level decisions and to act in accordance with the perceived public interest (M. 
Smith 2004: 753). The constraining effect of public opinion thus depends on the 
timing and nature of the EU decision and the decision-makers degree of uncertainty 
about potential electoral pay-offs. Electoral calculation can prevent EU-level 
decisions or lead to unilateral defections. Even if foreign and security policy are 
usually not the most decisive issues in elections, precedent cases such as the 2003 
Iraq war illustrated potential negative or positive pay-offs of salient crisis decisions 
(Pohl 2012: 11).  
A sociological institutionalist perspective instead suggests that national officeholders 
are constrained by embedded domestic norms. The latter indicate what behaviour is 
considered appropriate, desirable, and legitimate in light of a state’s national identity. 
National strategic cultures provide a repertoire of rules and standards of 
appropriateness and can be seen as “an ideational milieu which limits behavioral 
choices” (Johnston 1995: 46). Out of this repertoire, the present analysis focuses on 
two sets of norms that the literature identified as particularly relevant in the context 
EU crisis decision-making: norms on the use of force and on modes of multilateral 
cooperation (Missiroli et al. 2001; Howorth 2002; Howorth 2004).35  
The question whether or under what conditions it is legitimate to use military means 
lies at the heart of national security cultures (Johnston 1995; Meyer 2004). In the EU, 
answers to these questions traditionally differ. Engrained or institutionalised 
domestic norms on the use of force can be assumed to shape decisions on the balance 
                                                
35 A detailed discussion of these norms in relation to the ‘Big Three’ follows in the operationalisation 
section in chapter 3. This section focuses on the more general link to EU crisis decision-making. 
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between military and civilian EU instruments, the participation or agreement to 
military CSDP operations, and respective commitments of resources, military assets, 
or personnel (Biava et al. 2011).  
Regarding norms on modes of international cooperation, the typical dichotomy is 
between Atlanticism and Europeanism (Howorth 2002). However, Meyer (2005) 
makes a convincing case for transcending the traditional dichotomy to include the 
whole spectrum of national predispositions, namely neutrality, unilateral action, 
bilateral, or multilateral cooperation. These predispositions are assumed to shape 
general decisions on the use of an EU framework for crisis management or existing 
alternatives. A predisposition for multilateralism is, for instance, more likely to 
resonate with coherence than a tradition of neutrality.  
Both theoretical lenses suggest that coherent EU crisis management is more likely if 
decisions are insulated from the domestic context. From a liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective, insulation provides national decision-makers with 
more room for bargaining, including issue linkage and package deals.36 From the 
perspective of sociological institutionalism, insulation deflects societal pressures for 
legitimacy and promotes loyalty shifts towards the European collective. If decisions 
are not shielded from the domestic context, the theoretical expectations differ, as 
summarised by hypotheses 1a and b: 
H1a: If an EU crisis management measure or activity entails important 
sector-specific economic or electoral costs in one or several of the ‘Big 
Three’, the degree of coherence will be low.  
H1b: If an EU crisis management measure or activity conflicts with 
embedded national predispositions regarding the use of force or preferred 
modes of cooperation, the degree of coherence will be low.  
                                                
36 In the language of two-level games, independence from domestic constituencies enlarges EU-level 
win-sets, making agreement more and defection less likely (Putnam 1988; Jacobson et al. 1993). 
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Strategic vs. cooperative bargaining  
What characterises the process of intergovernmental interaction and which outcomes 
are likely? Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that national officeholders engage 
in strategic bargaining. The outcome depends on the decision-makers’ calculation of 
the costs and benefits of EU-level cooperation against those of existing alternatives 
(Moravcsik 1993b). The most basic alternative is unilateral action (Moravcsik 
1993b). The second option is a coalition, consisting of EU member states (such as 
the EU-3 in Iran), other international organisations (such as NATO and the UN), or 
international coalitions of the willing (such as the US-led Multi-National Force in 
Iraq in 2003).  
Opting for EU-level cooperation is in the rational interest of national officeholders if 
it brings about “politics of scale” (Ginsberg 1989; Moravcsik 1998: 30). Politics of 
scale imply that the bundling of national diplomatic, economic, and military 
resources increases the influence on a given crisis or conflict, while lowering 
individual costs and risks. Politics of scale are even more relevant when they help 
balance against a (perceived) national threat.  
These benefits are weighed against the economic and political costs and risks of EU-
level cooperation in crisis management. Costs and risks vary substantially, depending 
on the crisis management activity or issue area. It is arguably cheaper and less risky 
to agree to a common diplomatic position than to participate in a military CSDP. 
Political costs comprise losses of national sovereignty and the diminution of bilateral 
influence on a given conflict, country, or region (Gordon 1997). The aggregation of 
national cost-benefit calculations in intergovernmental bargaining is assumed to 
preclude collective decisions, if preferences are incompatible. Otherwise, lowest 
common denominator outcomes, reflecting the overlap of the preferences of the most 
influential member states, are expected (Thomas 2011: 21-22). 
By contrast, sociological institutionalists expect cooperative intergovernmental 
bargaining and mutual compromise outcomes (Thomas 2011:18-19). The assumption 
is that repeated cooperation has socialised national decision-makers into coherence-
related norms. But the effect of these norms on intergovernmental cooperation also 
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depends on their salience and relevance within a given organisational setting 
(Thomas 2008). They are more salient in institutionalised EU settings than in 
external settings such as NATO or UN channels. Cooperative bargaining is also more 
likely if intergovernmental deliberations occur behind closed doors (Lewis 2005; 
Checkel 2005).  
The two theoretical perspectives thus differ in their assumptions on the process and 
output of intergovernmental cooperation. Liberal intergovernmentalists hold that 
competitive bargaining under consensus rules produces lowest common denominator 
outcomes (Moravcsik 1998). Sociological institutionalists, instead, expect member 
states to make concessions for reasons of collective social legitimation and in the 
absence of coercion or material incentives (Lewis 2005; Thomas 2008; Thomas 
2011). Hypotheses 2a and b summarise the respective determinants of 
intergovernmental decision-making and – by derivation – the degree of coherence:  
H2a: If threat perceptions of the ‘Big Three’ diverge, or the costs and risks of 
participation in joint EU crisis management activities exceed benefits, 
outcomes reflect the lowest common denominator and the degree of 
coherence will be low.  
H2b: If intergovernmental decision-making is insulated from international 
and societal pressures, cooperative bargaining produces mutual compromise 
outcomes and the degree of coherence will be high.  
Bureaucratic interests vs. norms  
The two theoretical lenses diverge most substantially when it comes to the role and 
influence of EU institutions. The rationalist perspective makes the influence of 
supranational entrepreneurs dependent on the degree of delegation or pooling of 
sovereignty and the distribution of information (Moravcsik 1998: 54-60). 
Supranational entrepreneurs are assumed to wield influence in policy areas where 
they have autonomous competences (such as trade and aid), if a situation is 
characterised by high degrees of complexity, uncertainty, and urgency (high 
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transaction costs), or if they hold relevant expertise the member states lack 
(comparative advantage).  
In comprehensive crisis management, relevant expertise can also translate into a 
superior ability to link disparate policy areas (see Moravcsik 1998: 484). EU 
institutions may have a comparative advantage in fostering horizontal coherence. 
They could thus maximise the revenues of politics of scale through issue linkage and 
package deals. However, this comparative advantage is bounded by dynamics of 
bureaucratic politics. Overlapping institutional responsibilities and resource 
competition are expected to engender tensions, rivalries, and ultimately, 
dysfunctional cooperation. These dynamics produce duplication of efforts and 
implementation gaps, and thus the opposite of politics of scale (Christiansen 2001). 
The sociological institutionalist perspective assigns a broader and more influential 
role to EU institutional actors. They are understood as socialisation platforms 
promoting the Union’s standards of appropriateness, which constrain and enable 
national and bureaucratic behaviour. However, comprehensive crisis management 
brings together officials in the fields of diplomacy, development, and the military. 
The multitude of actors and issues involved leads to high degrees of institutional 
specialisation and fragmentation. As a result, horizontal contestation between 
coherence and other norms embedded in institutional sub-cultures or professional 
epistemic communities is likely. 
The literature on inter-institutional cooperation and the comprehensive approach 
highlights two cultural cleavages (Baumann 2008; Biava et al. 2011; Drent and 
Zandee 2010; Gebhard 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011). The first is 
between security and development. It is thus also between long-term structural and 
short-term operational civilian and military and instruments (Gebhard and Norheim-
Martinsen 2011). By promoting an integration of security and development 
objectives, the meta-norm of coherence conflicts with the professional epistemic 
norm of apolitical aid (Zwolski 2012a). The second, and somewhat overlapping 
cleavage is between civilian and military bodies or instruments (Drent 2011). Due to 
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different professional socialisation, they tend to operate according to different 
priorities, time horizons, and standard procedures (Baumann 2008).  
However, sociological institutionalists would assume that informal and formal 
institutional cooperation and coordination mechanisms can lower cognitive barriers 
and increase trust (Christiansen 2001). They provide platforms for social interaction 
and communication and thus foster common cognitive templates, norms, and 
procedures. Their socialising effect is contingent on the frequency, intensity, and 
regularity of social contact. The influence of coordination mechanisms on inter-
institutional coherence thus increases with the time of their existence, the regularity 
of meetings, and the intensity of interaction.  
Both theoretical lenses thus predict dysfunctional inter-institutional cooperation. 
However, the rational perspective traces it back to competition and rivalry, whereas 
the sociological one emphasises contending organisational norms. Accordingly, 
potential remedies for incoherence would differ. A rationalist perspective would 
emphasise a clear separation of competences, while a sociological understanding 
would suggest the introduction of formal or informal institutional coordination 
mechanisms. Hypotheses 3a and b summarise the contending expectations on 
institutional interaction and influence.  
H3a: If supranational entrepreneurs have overlapping competences and if 
resources for a given EU crisis management measure or activity are scarce, 
the degree of coherence will be low.  
 
H3b: If formal and informal coordination mechanisms provide for frequent 
and intense social interaction between institutional actors responsible for EU 
crisis management activities, the degree of coherence will be high.  
The game changers  
At an abstract level, the distinction between factors implying a logic of 
consequentiality or a logic of appropriateness may seem clear-cut. However, in 
empirical reality, strategic and rule-following behaviour is often hard to distinguish. 
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The present analysis proposes two remedies. The first is theoretical and entails 
introducing contextual conditions, under which one logic of action is more likely to 
guide behaviour than the other (Jupille and Caporaso 1998; March and Olsen 1998; 
2009). This section introduces four scope conditions and derives corresponding 
propositions. The second is methodological and involves juxtaposing rhetoric and 
action, as well as both of them across contexts and time. An elaboration follows in 
chapter 3.  
The logic of consequences is more likely to guide behaviour if actors have intense 
preferences, namely if the stakes attached to action alternatives are high (Aspinwall 
and Schneider 2000; March and Olsen 1998; Sears and Funk 1991). In the context of 
this study, high national stakes mean that a particular EU crisis management measure 
or decision entails important economic costs/benefits or foreseeable electoral 
gains/losses. They are also high if crises or conflicts are perceived as important 
threats or if the participation in collective responses implies high costs or risks. High 
institutional stakes are attached to measures affecting the very core of an institution 
and thus concern its survival. An institutional player, for instance, faces high stakes 
if competence overlaps concern one of its central functions or if the expansion of 
another player bears the risk of significant budget or personnel cuts.  
The second condition concerns rational calculation. The ability for calculation is 
contingent on high levels of information and certainty about existing alternatives and 
their payoffs. National decision-makers cannot be assumed to act on the basis of 
economic interests, if they lack information on the potential economic effects of 
alternative crisis management scenarios at the time of decision-making.   
Meanwhile, rule-based behaviour is more likely if norms are deeply internalised 
(type II socialisation) (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005). It presupposes long periods of 
socialisation within stable and cohesive institutions. Embedded or historically 
engrained norms are thus expected to ‘trump’ newer or shallower norms (type I 
socialisation) (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005; Meyer 2004). This is the rationale 
behind the assumed prevalence of domestic or professional over European or 
international norms.  
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However, rule-based behaviour is also contingent on norm determinacy (March and 
Olsen 2009). The determinacy, or prescriptive clarity, of a norm depends on the 
existence of competing or conflicting norms, and thus on the level of contestation 
within a given collective (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). In the past, Germany has 
provided an interesting example of sub-national norm contestation: the engrained 
principle of military restraint has clashed with its similarly engrained predisposition 
for multilateralism (Edwards 2006: 8). Contested norms present decision-makers 
with indeterminate behavioural prescriptions.  
The outlined scope conditions yield three propositions on the situational prevalence 
and interaction of logics of action:  
• Proposition 1: If stakes are high and information is abundant, while norms are 
shallow or indeterminate, the logic of consequences prevails.  
• Proposition 2: If stakes are low or information is scarce, while norms are 
embedded and determinate, the logic of appropriateness prevails.  
• Proposition 3: If stakes are high and information is abundant, while norms are 
embedded and determinate, both logics are at play.  
 
These propositions help us discriminate between the two theoretical lenses and 
respective hypotheses on the basis of observed behaviour. In the case of proposition 
3, it is hard to interpret which logic of action is prevalent (Risse et al. 1999: 158). If, 
for instance, important national economic interests and engrained norms on the use 
of force speak for unilateral intervention, it is difficult to determine ex post, which 
was decisive. The methodological tools presented in the next chapter provide some 
remedies. An even more intricate scenario is the one where there are neither high 
stakes nor determinate norms. Under these circumstances, drawing any theory-driven 
conclusions from observed behaviour represents a challenge. Yet, in the field of 
crisis management, where decisions tend be costly, consequential, or norm-related, 
these circumstances are not very likely to apply.  
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Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to lay the foundations for a systematic, theory-based 
empirical enquiry into the EU’s quest for coherence in crisis management. A pre-
condition for systematic enquiry was clarifying and delineating the analytical 
dimensions of the concept of policy coherence. For the purpose of this study, it was 
defined as the absence of contradiction (consistency) and existence of synergies 
between various crisis management policies, instruments, and activities geared 
towards a set of overarching objectives. It represents a meta-norm applying to the 
different levels of the EU multi-level governance system. The degree of coherence 
was portrayed as a matter of compliance, which is subject to political and 
administrative struggles and games.  
The chapter introduced two theoretical lenses offering distinct perspectives on these 
games. From a rationalist point of view, a high degree of coherence is likely if EU-
level decisions are in line with national economic and electoral interests as well as 
threat perceptions. EU institutional actors are assumed to play a marginal role, 
contingent on the level of delegated authority and situation-specific informational 
advantages. From the constructivist, sociological institutionalist perspective the 
degree of coherence was depicted as a function of conflicting or resonating national 
and organisational norms. Institutions play an important role as overarching 
ideational structures, which enable the players of the game to increase trust and 
lower cognitive barriers. The framework identified four ‘game changers’ or scope 
conditions, which respectively incite rational or rule-based behaviour: the magnitude 
of stakes and the degree of information and certainty on the one hand, and the 
embeddedness and prescriptive clarity of norms on the other. Table 7 summarises the 
hypotheses. 
 
  66 
Table 7: Summary of hypotheses 
Arena Theoretical 
lens37 
Causal factors Effect on 
coherence 
Domestic LI H1a: Conflicting economic or 
electoral interests in ‘Big Three’  
Negative 
SI H1b: Conflicting embedded domestic 
norms on the use of force or on 




LI H2a: High costs and risks vs. low 
benefits of EU crisis management 
activity or divergent threat 
perceptions in ‘Big Three’ 
Negative 
SI H2b: Salient EU norms of 





LI H3a: Overlapping competences of 
supranational entrepreneurs + 
scarce resources 
Negative 
SI H3b: Formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms + time and 
intensity of social interaction 
Positive 
Source: own compilation  
The outlined multi-level analytical framework offers a fresh perspective on the 
micro-foundations of the EU’s role as an international security actor. It engages with 
the decade-old debate in EU studies on the interaction of domestic, 
intergovernmental, and supranational dynamics. By directly addressing the 
relationship between agency and structure, it is closely linked to a central debate in 
the field of IR. The following chapter aims to ensure that the contribution to these 
theoretical debates remains firmly anchored in empirical reality.  
                                                
37 ‘LI’ stands for liberal intergovernmentalism and ‘SI’ for sociological Institutionalism. 
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 Measuring coherence and its causes  Chapter 3:
Testing the accuracy and utility of theoretical explanations in empirical terms 
involves measuring the presence, absence or amount of the concepts used to grasp 
the phenomenon (Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 127). It is thus necessary to 
establish correspondence rules that connect the dependent variable, the degree of 
coherence, and the hypothesised causal factors to observable facts in the empirical 
world. In other words, we must devise operational indicators (Schnell et al. 2008: 
127). The research design is the logic linking these indicators to the initial research 
question and, ultimately, the conclusions of the study (Yin 2009: 26). It defines the 
units of analysis as well as the criteria for data collection and interpretation.  
This chapter starts by translating the dependent variable – the degree of output 
coherence – into observable indicators. The operationalisation logically flows from 
its conceptualisation in section 2.1. The chapter then moves on to the indicators for 
the independent variables. It specifies which types of interests and norms this thesis 
focuses on and how their existence, influence, and possible interaction are 
established on the basis of empirical evidence. The final two sections offer overviews 
of the comparative case study design and the methods of analysis and data collection.  
3.1 Degrees of coherence  
There have been various attempts to define policy coherence in operational terms 
(May et al. 2006). However, even in the field of PCD, where measurement is 
arguably most advanced, the empirical evaluation of the concept is only “in an early 
and nascent stage” (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 33). This section devises an ordinal 
measure of coherence based on a qualitative assessment of four operational 
components: consistency, objectives, interaction, and compliance.  
The quest for valid indicators  
Evaluations of coherence across different policy fields predominantly use 
quantitative or qualitative indicators and methods. The main advantage of 
quantitative approaches is their reliability (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 32). They 
provide solid ground for comparison across countries and over time. However, 
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quantitative indicators are often inferior in terms of content validity. They are more 
likely to neglect relevant dimensions of abstract concepts if they do not fit with their 
assumptions or statistical models (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 5).  
Policy coherence is a multi-layered and complex phenomenon that is not easily 
captured by a few data points. Some measures, such as the Commitment to 
Development Index devised by the Centre for Global Development, aim to gauge the 
complexity of the concept by incorporating a large number of quantitative indicators 
into a composite index (Roodman 2012).38 Yet these types of indices are far from 
parsimonious and face methodological challenges in terms of the standardisation and 
value weighting of their components (King et al. 2012).  
The advantage of qualitative indicators and methods is that they usually excel in 
terms of content validity (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 32). A concept can be 
evaluated taking into account its multiple dimensions and the specific context. 
However, context-specificity is often achieved at the expense of reliability. An 
example is the Union’s PCD Work Programme 2010-2013, in which the European 
Commission (2010) presented a set of targets and indicators for the evaluation of 
PCD in five priority areas.39 Overall, it devised 87 mostly qualitative indicators. In 
the subsequent PCD Report, supposedly based on these indicators, the Commission 
(2011a: 22-23) itself criticised their lack of precision. It further admonished the use 
of diverse indicators and methodologies across EU institutions and member states 
and pointed out problems of ad hoc measurement.  
When faced with a trade-off between reliability and validity, Buttolph Johnson and 
Reynolds (2012: 144) recommend favouring the latter. They argue that a valid 
measure is always reliable while a reliable measure is not necessarily valid. 
                                                
38 The Commitment to Development Index is a composite quantitative measure for the contribution of 
selected rich countries to global development in seven policy areas (aid, trade, finance, migration, 
environment, security, technology) (Center for Global Development 2014).  
39 The priority areas include trade and finance; climate change; global food security; migration; and 
security.  
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Following this recommendation and taking account of the complexity and dynamic 
nature of policy coherence, the present study opts for qualitative indicators and 
methods for the assessment of policy coherence. It does not rely on the Commission 
indicators for coherence, but devises a measure that stays as close as possible to the 
conceptual definition provided in section 2.1 (King et al. 1994: 152).  
The terms of the equation  
When evaluating complex concepts, reliability and validity can be enhanced by 
clearly outlining “all the terms in the equation” (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012: 31). For 
the purposes of this work, coherence was defined as the absence of contradiction and 
the existence of synergies between various crisis management policies, instruments 
and activities geared towards a set of overarching objectives. Thus, the policy areas, 
corresponding outputs, and objectives that are central to this work must be specified.  
The focus of this study lies on five policy areas, namely: diplomacy; humanitarian 
aid; development aid; sanctions and restrictive measures; and the CSDP. These areas 
are at the core of the comprehensive approach to crisis management as outlined in 
the European Security Strategy and in a more recent joint Communication of the 
Commission and the HR (Council 2003a: 11; European Commission and HR 2013c: 
3). Policy outputs vary according to policy area, level of governance, and phase in 
the administrative or political decision-making process. At the EU level, they include 
CFSP instruments such as documents outlining general guidelines and EU decisions, 
defining actions, positions, and arrangements for implementation.40 They also 
comprise decisions on restrictive measures or funding decisions. Concentrating on 
short- to medium-term crisis response and conflict management, long-term, structural 
development cooperation is not a central analytical component of this study. The 
focus is more on the Union’s financial instruments than on multi-annual aid 
                                                
40 These instruments are outlined in article 25 TEU and replace the former distinction between 
Common Strategies, Joint Actions, and Common Positions.  
 
  70 
packages. Table 8 provides a non-exhaustive overview of generic policy outputs in 
the analysed policy areas.41 
Table 8: Policy outputs by issue area 
Policy field Policy outputs (examples) 
Diplomacy • Speeches, positions, statements, declarations 
• Demarches 
• Political dialogue and mediation efforts 
• Nomination of special delegates to the region or 
country (such as EU Special Representatives) 
• Opening of diplomatic representations 
Humanitarian aid  • Humanitarian and emergency aid, opening of 
humanitarian field offices 
Development aid • Financial instruments: Instrument for Stability (IfS),42 




• Arms embargoes 
• Economic and financial sanctions 
• Targeted (or smart) sanctions (freezing of assets, 
visa or travel bans) 
CSDP • Fact-finding missions 
• Civilian missions 
• Military operations 
Source: own compilation  
 
                                                
41 The depicted policy outputs are ‚generic’ as they do not correspond to specific European or national 
policy outputs. Rather, they represent categories that will be used to evaluate the coherence of policy 
outputs across different countries and levels of governance.  
42 Since 2007, the Commission has relied on the IfS for short-term financial support of activities or 
measures in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding (European 
Commission 2014b). In March 2014, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace replaced the 
IfS and increased the focus on conflict prevention.  
43 The APF has been established in 2004 as part of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy’s Partnership on 
Peace and Security. The fund is used for regional conflict prevention, capacity building, and African-
led peace support operations as well as conflict resolution (European Commission 2014a).  
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The Lisbon Treaty introduced eight overarching policy objectives applicable to all 
areas of EU external action, including the five policy areas under analysis:  
• safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence 
and integrity; 
• promote democracy and good governance;  
• preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security; 
• foster the sustainable development with the goal to eradicate poverty; 
• encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy; 
• environmental protection and sustainable management of global natural 
resources; 
• assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made 
disasters; and 
• promote stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.44 
As guidelines for EU external action, these objectives are rather vague. It is therefore 
necessary to outline the specific objectives of crisis management activities and 
measures in direct relation to the conflict or crisis at hand. Specific objectives will be 
introduced in each of the case studies in this thesis.  
The degree of output coherence  
Having defined the policy areas that, in principle, should cohere, their outputs, and 
overarching objectives, we can now to turn to the actual dependent variable. As 
perfect policy coherence cannot be attained in a democratic governance system it is 
only possible to compare different degrees of output coherence (Gauttier 2004; 
Ashoff 2005; de Coning 2008a). Therefore, it is measured at ordinal level. There are 
four operational elements the literature on policy coherence repeatedly uses to 
discriminate between degrees of coherence:  
1. The first is consistency, or the absence of contradiction between different 
policy outputs. As noted above, consistency can be considered a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for policy coherence (Missiroli et 
                                                
44 See article 21 (2) TEU. 
 
  72 
al. 2001). An example of inconsistency would be if different players in 
EU external policy issued contradictory diplomatic statements in reaction 
to a crisis.  
2. The second element is the existence of common objectives and of shared 
priorities among objectives (Duraiappah and Bhardwaj 2007; May et al. 
2005; May et al. 2006; Picciotto 2004). A high degree of coherence can 
be expected if these objectives and priorities are agreed in the form of a 
common strategy or strategic approach towards a certain conflict or crisis.  
3. The third element concerns the process of interaction between individuals 
or entities responsible for the generation of policy outputs. A high degree 
of coherence is more likely if there is coordinated, non-adversarial, and 
collaborative interaction (Duraiappah and Bhardwaj 2007: 3; European 
Commission 2010). Coherence is unlikely if different players compete for 
policy ‘turf’. 
4. The fourth and final element is compliance with joint decisions, positions, 
actions, rules or provisions (Duraiappah and Bhardwaj 2007: 3; Thomas 
2012: 459). Full compliance also implies providing appropriate resources 
and means required for implementation (Duke 2002; Portela and Raube 
2009). A lack of compliance could, for instance, mean that the member 
states agree on a joint EU operation but fail to provide the needed 
resources.  
 
The operational components form the basis for the ordinal scale summarised by 
Table 9. Establishing the degree of output coherence is an interpretative exercise 
based on a variety of data sources (see final section of this chapter). The assessment 
proceeds in three steps. The first consists of disaggregating the Union’s crisis 
response into its component policy outputs. The second evaluates the inter-relation of 
stated policy objectives and priorities. And the third involves analysing the 
interaction of policy players at the vertical and horizontal levels. Taken together, 
these steps yield an overall assessment of the degree of coherence in the Union’s 
crisis response.  
 
  73 
Table 9: Ordinal scale for the measurement of coherence  
Degree of  
Coherence 
Operational components  
and indicators 
Incoherent 
• Consistency: no  
Indicator: contradiction or interference between policy outputs or 
activities  
• Objectives: divergent  
Indicator: no common strategy, divergent objectives 
• Interaction: dysfunctional 
Indicators: no mutual information, adversarial interaction 
• Compliance: no  
Indicators: Defection from previously agreed rules or decisions 
Low 
• Consistency: yes  
Indicators: no contradiction or interference between policy 
outputs or activities  
• Objectives: non-interfering 
Indicator: no common strategy, parallel objectives, but no 
common priorities 
• Interaction: non-interfering   
Indicators: mutual information, but no consultation or 
collaboration 
• Compliance: minimal 
Indicator: No defection from previously agreed rules or 
decisions, but no pooling of means or resources 
Medium 
• Consistency: yes 
Indicators: no contradiction or mutual interference between 
policy outputs or activities 
• Objectives: complementary  
Indicators: overlapping objectives but divergent priorities  
• Interaction: cooperative 
Indicators: mutual information and coordination  
• Compliance: partial  
Indicators: No defection from previously agreed rules or 
decisions; partial pooling of means or resources 
High 
• Consistency: yes 
Indicators: no contradiction or mutual interference between 
policy outputs or activities 
• Objectives: collective  
Indicators: common strategy, same objectives, same priorities,  
• Interaction: collaborative  
Indicators: full coordination and division of labour  
• Compliance: fully compliant  
Indicators: no defection, full pooling of means and resources  
Source: own compilation  
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This operationalisation can but represent an imperfect approximation of the abstract 
concept of policy coherence. Still, it has four distinct advantages. First, it takes 
account of the process-oriented and dynamic ontology of coherence as it permits the 
degree of coherence to vary over time and throughout discrete episodes of decision-
making (Thomas 2012: 460). Second, it is applicable to different policy areas. Third 
it can be used for the assessment of vertical, horizontal, and institutional coherence. 
Finally, it is reasonably parsimonious, considering that composite indices for the 
measurement of policy coherence often include several dozens of component 
indicators (see European Commission 2010; Matthews and King 2012; Roodman 
2012).45  
3.2 Interests, norms, and behaviour  
Detecting the influence of norms and interests in foreign policy decision-making is 
an intricate exercise. One has to establish correspondence rules that permit us to 
approximate the cognitive basis of observed behaviour. This section starts by 
specifying how the presence of the norms and interests relevant to this study is 
established in empirical reality. In other words, it provides operational definitions for 
the causal factors identified by the rational and norm games. The chapter then 
outlines a methodological strategy that helps distinguish the logic of appropriateness 
from that of consequences. The operational definitions constitute the basis for the 
methods for data collection and analysis, outlined subsequently in sections 3 and 4.  
Societal, national, and organisational interests  
The degree of coherence in EU crisis management is assumed to depend on societal 
constraints (H1a) emanating from powerful economic interest groups in the ‘Big 
Three’. The underlying rationale is that national participation in EU crisis 
management activities or measures creates positive or negative economic 
externalities. Externalities increase with the level of economic interdependence 
between the intervening EU member state and the conflict or crisis country. A high 
                                                
45 The security component of the Commission Work Programme 2010-2013 alone comprises 26 
indicators (European Commission 2010: 33-40).  
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level of economic interdependence is operationalised through: the levels of bilateral 
trade, investment, and resource dependency (energy and raw materials). The 
assessment is based on official statistics.  
Economic interdependence was only assumed to influence crisis decision-making if 
the sector-specific costs of participation in EU crisis management activities are 
calculable and if influential interest groups have access to the decision-making 
process. Where available, this thesis draws on economic risk analyses to evaluate the 
calculability of sector-specific economic costs. Secondary literature, media reports, 
parliamentary debates, and interviews with decision-makers or experts help assess 
access and influence of interest groups on political decision-making processes.     
Table 10: Relevant opinion polling institutes 
France Germany United Kingdom 
Institut français d'opinion 





Infratest dimap  
ComRes; Ipsos MORI; 
YouGov 
 Source: own compilation  
The second domestic constraint this thesis includes is the median voter interest. 
Where available, the latter is approximated through public opinion polls concerning 
particular EU crisis management activities. The study draws on newspaper polls and 
data from renowned national polling institutes (see Table 10). Popularity ratings of 
leading politicians are included as proxies for person-specific electoral risks and thus 
as indicators of their likelihood to engage in electoral calculation. Media reports and 
parliamentary debates allow for qualitative assessments of political salience and the 
degree of contestation between government and opposition. To compare levels of 
political salience across member states, the numbers of parliamentary debates that 
dedicated substantial attention to the conflict or crisis in question are juxtaposed. 
‘Substantial’ implies that the conflicts or respective responses are subject to political 
debate, and not only mentioned in passing. Finally, electoral calendars provide 
information on the temporal proximity of local, regional, and national elections.  
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Intergovernmental bargaining is assumed to reflect aggregated national cost/risk-
benefit calculation (H2a). For nation-specific costs of CSDP measures and aid 
pledges, the analysis relies on figures in official documents or expert estimates. It is 
more difficult to assess the costs of political measures in the field of diplomacy. 
Losses of national sovereignty or of bilateral influence are hard to quantify. The 
same applies to national benefits from collective EU crisis management measures. 
They may include increased influence and legitimacy or reduced risk when 
intervening in a Third country. This study thus evaluates perceived political costs, 
risks, and benefits on the basis of political speech acts and expert interviews. To 
evaluate national threat perceptions, this thesis draws on national intelligence reports 
or warnings, where available. They come closest to objective assessments and can be 
assumed to directly inform decision-makers. Intelligence reports are compared to 
threat depictions in political discourse.  
 
Finally, the rationalist perspective suggested that inter-institutional tensions occur if 
competence overlaps meet resource scarcity (H3a). The Treaties expressly provide 
for a division of labour between the Commission and the Council in the fields of 
economic sanctions (Gauttier 2004). However, they do not entirely regulate 
competence overlaps in issue areas, such as 
• declaratory diplomacy and external representation;  
• civilian crisis management;  
• SSR;  
• dual-use goods;  
• small arms and light weapons;  
• defence-industrial aspects; 
• election monitoring; and  
• conflict prevention (Duke 2006; Gyllensporre 2010; Justaert 2011). 
 
In terms of resources, there is a traditional divide between the Commission and the 
institutional actors involved in the CFSP (Duke 2006). The former is responsible for 
the management of the common budget (Stroß 2012). CFSP institutions are reliant on 
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Commission approval in areas such as civilian crisis management, financed through 
the common budget. The Lisbon Treaty enhanced interdependence by distributing 
the responsibility for the strategic programming of some financial instruments, 
notably the IfS, between the EEAS and the Commission (Council 2010). While the 
latter is responsible for the instruments’ management, the HR is to ensure political 
coordination. Secondary literature, political speech acts, media reports, think tank 
analyses, and expert interviews are used to assess, whether competence overlaps and 
scarce resources triggered dysfunctional institutional interaction. 
Norms and coordination mechanisms  
The sociological intitutionalist perspective suggested that the degree of coherence in 
EU crisis management depended on embedded domestic norms. This study focuses 
on norms concerning the use of force and preferred modes of international 
cooperation (H1b). It is thus important to establish, how they vary across France, the 
UK, and Germany.  
France traditionally leads the Europeanist camp supporting an autonomous EU role 
in security and defence (Howorth 2004; Marcussen et al. 1999). It considers the use 
of force appropriate to defend selected beliefs or values (Meyer 2005: 529). The 
country derives a sense of international responsibility from its colonial past and its 
position as one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In line with 
the Gaullist paradigm of ‘French Grandeur’, another core tenet of French foreign 
policy is the desire for independence, notably from the US (Krotz 2001). 
The UK, in turn, leads the Atlanticist camp of EU member states favouring 
transatlantic cooperation and the use of NATO for crisis management (Daddow and 
Schnapper 2013; Gross 2009). It shares France’s historically induced global outlook 
and sense of international responsibility as well as its activist stance on the use of 
force (Biava et al. 2011: 6; Meyer 2005: 529). Other core tenets of British foreign 
policy include the primacy of national sovereignty and general scepticism towards 
closer European integration (Marcussen et al. 1999; Miskimmon 2004; Lehne 2012) 
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Table 11: Embedded norms in the ‘Big Three’   
Norm sets France UK Germany 

















Source: own compilation  
Finally, German foreign policy is characterised by the commitment to 
multilateralism, the rejection of power politics, and a distinct culture of military and 
political restraint (Lehne 2012: 10). Military restraint entails deep scepticism about 
the appropriateness of the use of force, which is only considered as a last resort 
(Duffield 1998; Lantis 2002; Meyer 2005). It is institutionalised through the 
requirement of parliamentary approval for Germany’s participation in military 
operations. Political restraint translates into a reluctance to assume a leadership role 
in international affairs or to openly pursue national interests (Duffield 1998: 6). 
Berlin is a traditional proponent of European integration, including the fields of 
security and defence. But, it is also keen to pool resources within NATO and to 
demonstrate Alliance solidarity (Meyer 2004: 5).46 Berlin thus swings somewhat 
uneasily between the Atlanticist and Europeanist camps (Gross 2009: 5). Table 11 
provides an overview of relevant embedded norms in the ‘Big Three’. As outlined in 
the last section of this chapter, their impact is assessed through the analysis and 
juxtaposition of political behaviour and discourse.  
When insulated from domestic contexts, a shift of loyalty towards the European 
collective was assumed to favour cooperative intergovernmental bargaining (H2b). 
The assessment of the latter will proceed in three steps. The first is to establish 
                                                
46 The principle of Alliance solidarity has been deeply embedded in Germany’s foreign policy since 
1945. Membership in Western alliances, including the EU and NATO, was key to restoring 
Germany’s legitimacy in international affairs. 
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whether the member states have moved away from their initial preferences and 
towards a mutual compromise outcome. Initial preferences are established through 
official documents, political discourse, and expert interviews. The second step 
assesses whether deviations from initial preferences were based on exogenous 
incentives or on norms endogenous to the process of intergovernmental cooperation. 
These norms include established procedural standards in EU foreign policy such as 
the consultation reflex or the consensus norm (Thomas 2011: 19). In a third step, the 
effect of these norms is evaluated through their use in official discourse. If guided by 
EU-level norms, decision-makers are assumed to justify decisions on the basis of 
European unity or the necessity of ‘standing together’.  
Table 12: Formal coordination mechanisms for EU crisis management    




Since  Nature 
EU Special Representatives  Field level  1998 Temporary  





2009 Term: five years  
Crisis Management Planning 
Directorate (CMPD – EEAS) 
Civil-military  2009 Permanent  
Department for Crisis 
Response and Operational 





2011 Permanent  




and response  
2011 Permanent  




2011 Temporary  
Source: own compilation 
Finally, the degree of coherence was assumed to be higher if there are formal or 
informal institutional coordination mechanisms providing for sustained, frequent, 
and intense social interaction (H3b). Table 12 lists the relevant formal coordination 
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mechanisms in the area of comprehensive EU crisis management. Their impact as 
well as that of context-specific and informal coordination is evaluated through policy 
analyses and expert interviews.  
Distinguishing rule-based and strategic behaviour  
Distinguishing rule-based and strategic behaviour is methodologically challenging 
(Checkel & Moravcsik 2001). While it is possible to observe norm compliant or non-
compliant behaviour and rhetoric, inferring the ‘real’ underlying motivation is more 
difficult (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Niemann and Mak 2010). Did a decision-maker 
comply because of norm internationalisation or persuasion or was the norm used to 
conceal rationalist intentions? While these questions can never be answered with full 
certainty, there are tools that help distinguish reason from predisposition.  
An indicator for the existence of a norm is that non-compliance prompts justification 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892).47 Rhetorical justifications for incoherent 
behaviour would thus constitute evidence for the awareness of coherence-related 
norms. But only if an actor has internalised a norm, he or she is assumed to display 
consistent rule-following behaviour and rhetoric across contexts and time (Checkel 
and Moravcsik 2001: 224; Fearon and Wendt 2002).  
Strategic behaviour is assumed to be less consistent. In accordance with the 
mechanism of rational calculation, preferences and behaviour change according to 
exogenous incentive structures (Hooghe 2005). The strategic use of norms becomes 
apparent through selective compliance and their opportunistic application in rhetoric 
(Schimmelfennig 2003). If, for instance, decision-makers suddenly change their 
argumentation in the run-up to important national or regional elections, calculation 
seems more likely then principled discourse. Rational actors may also adopt a 
strategy of ‘hypocrisy’ and de-couple rhetoric from behaviour (Lipson 2007). An 
example would be political agreement with an EU-level decision and supportive 
                                                
47 In line with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892), we distinguish between the existence of a norm 
and its actual influence on political behaviour in our operationalisation.  
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rhetoric on the one hand, and deviant behaviour on the other. The analysis will thus 
evaluate to what extent key players (a) behaved according to their own rhetoric and 
(b) acted or argued consistently across time, contexts, and audiences. The outlined 
methodological strategy complements the theoretical scope conditions presented in 
the analytical framework.  
3.3 Crisis responses: cases and players  
The hypotheses derived from the analytical framework are evaluated through a 
comparative “multiple-case embedded” design (Yin 2009: 59). The selected cases 
include three instances of post-Lisbon crisis management in Africa, namely in Libya, 
Somalia, and Mali. Meanwhile, the ‘Big Three’ and various EU institutional players 
involved in comprehensive crisis management constitute embedded analytical units. 
This section presents the rationale for the selection of the research design, case 
studies, time frames, and embedded units.  
Case study comparison  
A case study may be defined “as the intensive study of a single unit for the purpose 
of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004: 342). Case studies 
have several advantages over other types of research designs. They are valuable tools 
for the analysis of contemporary, real life-phenomena where the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context blur (Yin 2009: 18). They permit the researcher to model 
path-dependent processes, multiple interaction effects, and non-linear causal 
relationships, and can uncover spurious causality (George and Bennett 2005a: 9-10). 
Case study analysis also allows us to account for contextual factors that are difficult 
to model in purely statistical terms (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). A case study design 
is recommended if there is no way to control behaviour, many variables of interest 
exist, and the investigation relies on multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2009: 18). It 
is thus particularly suited to the analysis of the dynamic concept of coherence and of 
the effect of multiple causes and mechanisms on complex and overlapping decision-
making processes.   
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According to Lijphart (1971: 691), “the case study method can and should be closely 
connected with the comparative method”. The findings of case study comparison can 
be considered more robust than those of single case studies where it is difficult to 
determine whether or to what extent findings are idiosyncratic to the specific case 
(Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). Multiple case studies increase the ground for 
falsification of established generalisations (Lijphart 1971: 691).  
However, case study designs are usually criticised for their lack of generalizability 
(George and Bennett 2005a; Yin 2009; Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds 2012). In-
depth investigation limits the overall number of cases while multiplying the number 
of variables. Case studies thus excel in terms of internal validity, but they do not 
permit the researcher to estimate average or net causal effects (external validity) 
(Gerring 2004: 348). The limitations of case study designs in comparison to large-N 
evaluations or experimental designs have to be acknowledged. Therefore, the present 
study aims for analytic, rather than statistical generalisation (Yin 2009: 43). The 
former entails drawing conclusions with regard to a theory and its causal 
mechanisms, rather than generalising findings to the whole universe of cases. 
For the purpose of this study, a ‘case’ is defined as a crisis or conflict in a particular 
country or region within a given time period. The main analytical unit within these 
temporal and spatial confines is the EU’s response to the crisis or conflict. The focus 
does not lie on the dynamics or specificities of a given conflict, but rather on the 
reaction of a defined class of actors (or embedded analytical units).  
Balancing comparability and variation  
This thesis evaluates the determinants of coherence in cases of comprehensive EU 
crisis management. Eligible cases should thus satisfy two main criteria: There should 
be a crisis or conflict outside of the Union’s borders. And the Union’s reaction 
should represent an attempt to provide a comprehensive response implying the 
coincidental use of political, military, and economic instruments. The following eight 
conflict or crisis cases satisfy these criteria:  
• FYROM: 2003-2006  
• DRC: since 2003  
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• BiH: since 2004 
• Chad and the CAR: 2007-2009 
• Somalia: since 2008 
• Libya: since 201148 
• Mali: since 201349 
• CAR: since 2014 
 
When selecting cases, Lijphart (1971: 687) recommends choosing comparable cases. 
Comparable implies that they are similar in a number of important dimensions, 
which are not central to the analysed causal link. The rationale is that similarity 
allows us to keep certain variables constant. The present study enhances 
comparability by focusing on cases of post-Lisbon crisis management. This choice 
permits us to control for three groups of variables: EU institutional configuration; 
specificities of political and organisational incumbents; and international context 
(such as financial and Eurozone crises). The downside of control is that the effect of 
the ‘constants’ cannot be evaluated. The analysis will, for instance, not be able to 
draw systematic conclusions on the distinct influence of Angela Merkel’s particular 
leadership style. The thesis will return to the limitations stemming from case 
selection in the conclusion.  
The focus on post-Lisbon crisis management narrows the group of eligible cases 
down to five: the DRC, BiH, Somalia, Libya, and Mali.50 The selection amongst 
them was based on the diverse cases method (Gerring and Seawright 2007: 97-101). 
The method foresees a maximisation of variance on relevant analytical dimensions. 
The latter may include independent or dependent variables and specific combinations 
of the two. Selection bias most frequently occurs when the values on the dependent 
                                                
48 Libya constitutes a special case since the military operation EUFOR Libya was planned but never 
deployed. It is included because, contrary to other cases where an EU operation was discussed, 
EUFOR Libya existed on paper (see Decision 2011/137/CFSP) and reached the final planning stages.  
49 Despite its classification as a training mission, EUTM Mali is conducted as a military operation.  
50 The Union’s crisis management activities in the CAR were too recent at the time of writing. 
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variable are kept constant (King et al. 1994: 128-132; George and Bennett 2005a: 
23). To avoid this type of bias, the present choice was primarily based on the 
variation of the dependent variable. In other words, the cases were to display varying 
degrees of coherence.  
The problem with this method was that there were no readily accessible measures of 
coherence prior to empirical analysis. In such cases, George and Bennett (2005a: 23) 
recommend making a preliminary overview of a larger sample of eligible cases to 
identify those demonstrating typical variation on the dependent variable. The 
preliminary screening involved the combination of two strategies:  
1. The first consisted of a cursory analysis of the universe of cases on the basis 
of the operational components and indicators for coherence. It was mainly 
based on think tank reports and analyses and profited from the author’s 
participation in a collaborative overview study for the European Parliament 
on lessons learned in the field of the CSDP (see: Dari et al. 2012).  
2. The cursory analysis was complemented by preliminary interviews with EU 
officials and experts. Interviewees were asked for an evaluation of the 
coherence of eligible EU crisis management cases. A combination of open 
and probing questions made it possible to assess which cases were considered 
most or least coherent and to compare specific cases in terms of their degree 
of coherence. 
 
These two strategies led to the selection of Libya, Somalia, and Mali. Analysts and 
media reports drew parallels between the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis and the 
foreign policy debacle over Iraq in 2003. Libya was even described as a ‘death blow’ 
for the CFSP and CSDP (Armellini 2011; Brattberg 2011). Hence, the degree of 
coherence was estimated to be relatively low. Meanwhile, EU officials and experts 
referred to the Union’s engagement in Somalia as the ‘ultimate example’ for the 
implementation of the comprehensive approach, insinuating a relatively high degree 
of coherence (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012: 44; Hagström Frisell et al. 2012: 3). Finally, 
interviews and policy analyses indicated that Mali was representative of an 
 
  85 
intermediate degree of coherence. While there were no open inconsistencies, the 
effort was rather French than truly European (Faleg 2013).51  
Table 13: Cases and their variation on relevant dimensions 
 Libya Somalia Mali 
Historical ties Former Italian 
colony52 






Energy (oil and 
gas) 
Maritime trade 
(Gulf of Aden) 
Raw materials in 
neighbouring 
Niger (uranium) 
Key threat(s) Violence against 









Major role for 
NATO (France, 
UK, and US lead) 
Major role for EU, 









Low High Intermediate 
Source: own compilation 
Preliminary analysis also suggested that the cases varied with respect to other 
relevant analytical dimensions. The factors listed in Table 13 could be assumed to 
activate a variety of societal and national interests or norms. The three cases thus 
promised interesting insights into the linkages between a variety of norms and 
interests on the one hand, and differing degrees of coherence on the other.  
                                                
51 Detailed and systematic evaluations of the degree of coherence follow in the case studies. 
52 Between 1943 and 1951, Libya was under French and British authority.  
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Case boundaries  
The primary criterion for the delimitation of time frames was the simultaneous use of 
civilian, economic, and military EU crisis management instruments. An additional 
criterion was the existence of turning points or critical junctures where relevant 
actors faced a choice between alternatives, which determined the further course of 
events (Bennett and Checkel 2011: 31-32). While the case study sections comprise 
historical background information, their main analytical focus lies on the time 
periods outlined below.  
In the Libyan case, the starting point is the outbreak of violence on 15 February 
2011. Different civilian and military response options were discussed at the level of 
the Foreign Affairs Council even at this early stage. The end date of 31 October 2011 
reflects several turning points: the capture of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi; the 
Declaration of Liberation of Libya; the end of NATO operation Unified Protector; 
and the de-activation of the EEAS Crisis Platform for the Libyan crisis. It thus 
represents the end of the ‘hot phase’ of the EU’s crisis response and the start of post-
revolutionary transition.  
In Somalia, the Europeans started to react to the surge of maritime piracy in 2008. 
Since then, the bundle of EU crisis management instruments and measures has 
steadily expanded. However, this thesis focuses on the period between November 
2011 and November 2012. On 14 November 2011, the Union adopted the Strategic 
Framework on the Horn of Africa. According to Helly (2011: 4), the adoption 
marked the transition from an uncoordinated parallel deployment of EU instruments 
to a more strategic approach. It can thus be seen as a turning point in terms of 
comprehensive crisis management. In September 2012, Somalia’s two-decade long 
transition phase officially ended. In November of the same year, the newly elected 
Somali Federal Parliament endorsed the Council of Ministers and thus sealed the 
beginning of the post-transition era (EEAS 2013a).  
Finally, the Mali case study focuses on the period between March 2012 and July 
2013. The country had already been destabilised in January 2012, when the Tuareg 
group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched a 
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rebellion in Northern Mali. The rebellion was followed by a coup d’état by junior 
officers against the country’s democratically elected President on 22 March 2012. 
The coup catapulted Mali crisis into the international spotlight and propelled 
multilateral crisis management efforts. The end date of the case study corresponds to 
the second round of presidential elections, which took place on 11 August 2013. The 
elections marked the return to a democratically elected government and can be 
considered the formal end point of the Malian crises.  
Players at the vertical and horizontal levels   
While the overarching analytical units are European crisis responses, the study also 
includes a number of embedded analytical units. The latter are defined as relevant 
players at the vertical and horizontal levels that are responsible for (parts of) the 
EU’s crisis response. Their selection logically flows from the analytical framework. 
At the vertical level, this thesis focuses on France, the UK, and Germany (the ‘Big 
Three’). This choice is in line with liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, 
according to which any analysis of EU decision-making has to start with the 
preferences and power of the member states. The ‘Big Three’ have comparative 
advantages in the political, economic, and military arenas (see Table 14). And as 
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten (2005) put it, “there is no European 
foreign policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and Britain are on side”.  
Table 14: Combined power of the ‘Big Three’ in numbers  
Political weight  • Over 750 bilateral and multilateral representations 
around the world  
• Over 40 per cent of the Union’s population;  
• 25 per cent of the votes in the Council and 33 per cent 
of the seats in the European Parliament; 
• France and the UK: permanent members of the UNSC 
Economic power  • Almost 50 per cent of the Union’s GDP  
Military power • Nearly 60 per cent of the Union’s military expenditures 
• France and the UK: nuclear powers 
Source: Lehne (2012: 5) 
The ‘Big Three’ are also relevant when it comes to the evaluation of sociological 
institutionalist factors. As the previous section illustrated, they differ substantially in 
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terms of embedded norms on the use of force and preferred modes of cooperation. 
These differences are reflective of intra-European diversity (Howorth 2004: 212). 
Other EU member states have a tendency to align with their distinct normative 
outlooks (Mérand et al. 2011: 126). Most central and Eastern European countries 
tend to share Britain’s Atlanticist vocation and view NATO as a key guarantor of 
their security (Asmus and Vondra 2005). Neutral member states such as Sweden, 
Austria, and Ireland largely align with Germany’s military restraint (Meyer 2005). 
Meanwhile, the Benelux countries have traditionally backed France’s Europeanist 
push for more integration in the area of security and defence.  
Table 15: Key players at the horizontal level 
Institution Sub-institutional entities 
European Council • Permanent President  
Council  • Foreign Affairs Council  
HR • Deputies  
EEAS   • Crisis Management Board  
• Crisis management structures: PSC, Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU 
Military Staff (EUMS), EU Military Committee 
(EUMC), CMPD  
• DG CROC 
European 
Commission  
• Commission President  
• DG ECHO 
European Parliament  • President  
• Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs  
Source: own compilation 
In terms of institutions, liberal intergovernmentalists would focus on arenas for 
intergovernmental bargaining and negotiation and thus on the European Council and 
Council. Sociological institutionalists would also consider supranational institutions 
relevant players. The combination of the two lenses leads us to include the whole 
range of relevant intergovernmental and supranational institutions involved in EU 
crisis response (see Table 15). Players at the horizontal level partly overlap with the 
coordination mechanisms outlined in Table 12. 
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To sum up, this thesis opts for a multiple-case embedded design. The cases, defined 
as EU crisis responses within a given period of time, are Libya (February-October 
2011), Somalia (November 2011-November 2012), and Mali (March 2013-August 
2013). Meanwhile, the embedded analytical units are France, the UK, and Germany 
as well as the Union’s institutional actors in the area of crisis management. Figure 4 
provides a visual illustration of the research design. 
Figure 4: Multiple-case embedded design 
Source: own compilation based on Yin (2009: 46) 
3.4 Analysing and collecting data   
“Too many times, investigators start case studies without having the foggiest notion 
about how the evidence is to be analysed” (Yin 2009: 127). Such studies often stall at 
an early stage. It is therefore important to be clear on the chosen analytical strategy. 
In line with the theoretical framework, this thesis adopted a strategy based on 
competing theoretical propositions (Yin 2009: 130, 133-135). The advantage of a 
theory-guided strategy is that it helps concentrate on certain data points while 
neglecting others (Yin 2009: 130). This section outlines the methods for analysis and 
data collection. The operationalisation of variables presupposes a qualitative 
methodology. Beyond this basic choice, the methods ought to fulfil four criteria. 
They should: 
• be in line with the process-based ontology of coherence;  
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• be compatible with a positivist epistemology; 
• help differentiate between rule-based and strategic behaviour; and 
• facilitate cross-case comparison.  
 
Tracing process coherence  
The analysis of single case studies relied on a combination of two methods: process 
tracing and directed qualitative content analysis. Process tracing is compatible with a 
positivist, or rather scientific realist understanding of causation and is thus suited to 
bridge the meta-theoretical divide that tends to separate the two theoretical lenses 
applied in this thesis (Checkel 2007). In combination with careful triangulation of 
data sources, it can help tease out fine-grained differences between rational and rule-
based behaviour (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001; Checkel 2007; Schimmelfennig 
2005). 
Process tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain 
and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005: 206). The researcher 
identifies a series of intermediate steps and makes theory-informed predictions about 
their causal links. Process tracing thus generates numerous observations within a 
single case or sequence of decision-making (Checkel 2007). It typically relies on a 
combination of deductive and inductive elements (Bennett and Checkel 2011: 22). 
The process is examined in light of theoretical propositions, but new information that 
does not fit the hypothesised path may lead to their modification or re-evaluation. 
Inductive elements prevent theory-driven confirmation bias (Bennett and Checkel 
2011: 23).  
In this study, the analysis of crisis decision-making took a backwards perspective. It 
started by identifying the policy outputs of interest within the time periods of 
investigation. It then proceeded to trace preceding administrative and political 
processes in the ‘Big Three’ and at the level of EU institutions. The aim was to 
evaluate to what extent the evidence conforms to theoretical expectations. Within 
this procedure, equifinality – the possibility that different causal paths can produce 
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the same outcome – was taken into consideration (Checkel 2007: 17). In addition, the 
option of inductively discovering alternative explanations for varying degrees of 
coherence was considered, as was the null hypothesis of an absence of systematic 
variation (Bennett and Checkel 2011: 23).   
To evaluate the influence of norms and perceptions of threat or interest, this thesis 
combined process tracing with directed thematic content analysis (see Breuning 
2011). The latter helped to classify large amounts of political speech acts and expert 
interviews into a workable number of categories and themes with related meanings 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Elo and Kyngäs 2008). The chosen directed approach 
differs from other content analysis techniques due to its deductive character (Hsieh 
and Shannon 2005). Prior to text analysis, the variables identified by the analytical 
framework were translated into an initial coding scheme (see Appendix 1). To avoid 
confirmation bias, the coding process allowed for the inductive creation of new 
themes and categories. The qualitative data analysis software NVivo 9 was used to 
support the coding and to facilitate systematic comparison across cases and units. An 
elaboration on the nature and selection of speech acts as well as the conduct of expert 
interviews follows in the latter two sections of this chapter. 
Modes of comparison  
For systematic case comparison, King et al. (1994: 45) recommend the method of 
structured, focused comparison (George and McKeown 1985). The method is 
‘structured’ as it uses one set of questions that reflects the overall purpose of the 
research for the analysis of all the case studies. It is ‘focused’ since it does not take 
all the available case information into account, but concentrates on specific 
comparable aspects (George and Bennett 2005a: 67).  
The questions used for comparison should be grounded in the theoretical framework 
and adequately reflect the overall purpose of the study (George and Bennett 2005a: 
71). They should be general enough to be applicable to all cases and sub-classes of 
events or analytical units that are studied (George and Bennett 2005a: 86). To further 
enhance reliability, Kaarbo and Beasley (1999: 383) suggest complementing the 
structured questions with equally structured answers. Table 16 outlines the generic 
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questions for case study analysis, while the hypotheses of this thesis provide 
corresponding structured answers.  
Table 16: Questions for structured focused comparison 
Arena Question  
Domestic How did the interaction of domestic interests and embedded 




How did norms and calculation interact at the intergovernmental 




How did EU institutional interests and norms interact in influencing 
the degree of coherence in EU crisis management? 
Source: own compilation 
Structured, focused comparison lies at the centre of the first and primary mode of 
comparison, which evaluates the hypotheses across cases (Yin 2009: 176-177). But 
the multiple-case embedded design provides for two additional comparative 
dimensions. The first is diachronic and refers to variation over time. Including a 
temporal dimension permits us to account for path-dependent institutional dynamics 
or learning effects throughout the three cases (George and Bennett 2005a: 34). 
Diachronic analysis can, for instance, show whether lessons learnt from a previous 
case, rather than the posited causal mechanism, account for a particular outcome. The 
second comparative mode can be labelled ‘nested case comparison’ and refers to the 
comparison of embedded analytical units across cases. It permits us to evaluate 
specificities of single actors or policy fields. A cross-case comparison of Germany’s 
crisis responses will, for instance, show whether the hypothesised causal mechanisms 
apply in a similar fashion throughout different decision-making sequences and cases 
(see Table 17).  
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Table 17: Three modes of case comparison 
Cross-case 
comparison Evaluation of hypotheses across cases  
Diachronic 
comparison Evaluation of hypotheses in light of time  
Nested comparison Evaluation of hypotheses with regard to embedded units 
Source: own compilation 
Mining for data  
To make valid inferences from structured, focused comparison, it is necessary to 
systematically collect the same data across cases and analytical units (King et al. 
1994: 45). The research question and analytical framework of this thesis call for the 
combination of multiple data sources. This section outlines the data collection 
strategies for documentary evidence.  
To reconstruct outputs and processes of EU-level and national crisis responses, this 
thesis relied on a large number of official documents. The latter included reports, 
minutes, agendas of proceedings, and press releases, and were collected for the 
European and national level. In addition, a total of 651 transcripts of official 
speeches, declarations, interviews, and communications by key decision-makers in 
the process were retrieved. The selection of speech acts focused on key political 
decision-makers, namely:  
• senior EU-level officials;  
• the Heads of State or Government of France, the UK, and Germany;  
• and the respective Foreign, Defence, and Development ministers.  
 
To shed light on the initial preferences of national decision-makers, electoral 
incentives, and salient norms, the analysis included 194 transcripts of parliamentary 
debates. They provide a repository of speech acts, delivered in similar settings and to 
comparable audiences over time (Breuning 2013: 241). To maximise comparability, 
only transcripts of general debates (as opposed to Committee meetings) were 
analysed (see Table 18). All documents were retrieved through keyword searches on 
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official EU and national digital databases, delimited by the time frames of the case 
studies. Documentary evidence was corroborated with information from academic 
literature, reports and analyses from leading European think tanks and NGOs as well 
as media reports.  
Table 18: Data collection – national parliamentary debates  








House of Commons, 
daily Hansard debates 
 Source: own compilation  
Behind the scenes: expert interviews 
Interviews are amongst the most important instruments in the process tracer’s 
methods repertoire (Tansey 2007: 767). They help corroborate evidence from other 
sources; fill information gaps in the reconstruction of events or decision-making 
episodes; provide insights into what a set of relevant actors thinks; and permit the 
researcher to directly address hypothesised causal links and mechanisms (Tansey 
2007: 766-767). Interviews are of particular relevance for the analysis of EU crisis 
decision-making, as sensitive information is often not publicly available and 
important parts of the process occur behind closed doors.  
The selection of interview partners followed a purposive (non-random) sampling 
strategy (Blaikie 2009: 178). The objective of interviewing was not to generalise to a 
population of actors, but rather to get information from individuals who were either 
closely involved in administrative and political decision-making processes or held 
relevant expertise (Tansey 2007: 768). To avoid one-sidedness and resulting bias, 
respondents were selected across governance levels, policy areas, and sectors. In 
addition, a balance between French, German, and British nationals was sought.  
The identification of relevant interview partners was based on two criteria (Tansey 
2007: 770-771). The first was positional and involved the selection of relevant 
players on the basis of organisational charts. The second was reputational and relied, 
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both on mentions in documents and on the snowballing technique (Tansey 2007: 
770). The goal of the latter was to identify individuals that were not listed in 
organisational charts, but were nevertheless closely involved in or well informed 
about the analysed decision-making processes.  
The expert interviews were semi-structured. They followed a pre-determined 
questionnaire but left ample room for probing questions or requests for further 
examples. The questionnaire was based on prior case knowledge and mainly 
consisted of open-ended questions (for an example, see Appendix 3). Open-ended 
questions maximise response validity as they permit the interviewee to provide a 
personal interpretation of events or episodes and to organise answers in his or her 
own words (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). This is particularly relevant for elite 
interviewing, as highly educated and knowledgeable individuals are often reluctant to 
be put into intellectual straightjackets by close-ended questions (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002: 674).  
Between July 2011 and December 2013, the author interviewed a total of 46 experts 
in Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin, and Rome (for a list, see Appendix 2). Due to 
limited availability, three interviews were conducted by telephone. Prior to the 
interview, respondents were informed about the purpose of the study. Depending on 
their nationality and preference, interviews were held in English, German, French, or 
Spanish, and usually lasted between 45 and 75 minutes. At the end of each interview, 
respondents were invited to indicate how they would like to be referenced, if at all. 
Interviews were not recorded due to the sensitivity of the topic and the simple fact 
that recording (or any other electronic) devices were not permitted in several of the 
interview locations. The conversations were, however, transcribed in the immediate 
aftermath on the basis of notes and recall. All interview quotes appearing in this 
thesis were translated to English by the author. They are referenced according to 
interviewee preferences and distinguished by capital letters and interview year.  
Interviews bear at least three potential sources for bias. First, there may be problems 
of recall as the events analysed in this thesis lie, at least, several months back. 
Interviewees may have forgotten details and intricacies of decision-making 
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processes. Second, interviews can be subject to ex-post rationalisation and social 
desirability bias (Schnell et al. 2008: 233, 255). According to George and Bennett 
(2005a: 102), policy-makers have a tendency to depict past events as “careful, multi-
dimensional process of policymaking”. Finally, interviewees may consciously distort 
or omit information, for either private (career-related) or official reasons related to 
standards of confidentiality and professional loyalty. Recognising the potential for 
bias, interviews were carefully treated as ex-post accounts of events and the resulting 
information was compared across data sources and interview partners (Yin 2009: 
108-109).53  
Conclusion  
This chapter prepared the ground for empirical enquiry. It translated the elusive 
concept of coherence into observable, qualitative indicators, and grouped them along 
an ordinal scale. It further provided indicators for the theoretically derived 
independent variables. A comparative case study design was chosen to account for 
the complexity of policy coherence as a social phenomenon without clear 
boundaries. The comparison focuses on three cases of post-Lisbon crisis 
management in Africa, namely in Libya (February 2011-October 2011), Somalia 
(November 2011-November 2012), and Mali (March 2012-August 2013). The main 
method this thesis applies for within-case analysis is process tracing. Cross-case 
comparison follows the method of structured, focused comparison. The analysis 
draws on insights from official documents, political speech acts, national 
parliamentary debates, analyses by leading think tanks, media reports, and 46 semi-
structured interviews with EU and national officials.  
The following four chapters represent the implementation of the outlined research 
design and methods. After a brief contextual background, the case studies evaluate 
the degree of coherence in EU crisis management. The subsequent sections turn to 
the causes of (in)coherence by systematically addressing the questions of structured, 
                                                
53 Thematic text analysis with the data analysis software NVivo provided for direct comparison across 
interview partners and with official political discourse. 
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focused comparison and the answers proposed by the hypotheses. Chapter seven 
brings the findings of the three case studies together, in line with the outlined modes 
of case comparison.  
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 Libya – the first test for post-Lisbon Chapter 4:
crisis management54 
The Libyan crisis in 2011 was the first major foreign policy crisis after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. It was a crisis in the EU’s neighbourhood. A UN 
resolution was passed authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. 
Support for Western-led intervention from the region itself was clear. The UN’s 
reaction was lauded for its unprecedented speed, strength, and unity. NATO’s 
military intervention was described as a success and proof of the Alliance’s raison 
d’être. Meanwhile, the EU’s crisis reaction was described as hesitant, slow, divided, 
and essentially incoherent. The question is: Was the Union’s crisis response really as 
incoherent as media reports suggested and, if so, why? 
Despite the absence of an overarching strategy, the Union’s crisis reaction was 
largely coherent in evacuation, humanitarian assistance, and economic sanctions. 
However, unilateral member state actions or inactions stood in the way of a unified 
and synergetic crisis reaction in terms of diplomacy and defence. National divisions 
– particularly between the ‘Big Three’ – restrained the autonomous impact of 
institutional actors to achieve vertical coherence. Their ability to ensure horizontal 
coherence was further limited by competitive dynamics resulting from overlapping 
competences and resource dependence. Cognitive barriers stemming from the 
diversity of organisational cultures reinforced both intra- and inter-institutional 
tensions.  
This chapter starts with a background section on EU-Libya relations, the 2011 crisis, 
and international reactions. Section 2 evaluates the degree of coherence in the 
Union’s crisis response as relatively low. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the underlying 
causes. The former evaluates the role of France, the UK, and Germany and the latter 
addresses the role and interaction of the Union’s institutional players.  
                                                
54 Some of the empirical findings of this case study have been published in academic journals, policy 
briefs, and edited volumes (see: Koenig 2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2014b; 2014a). 
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4.1 Libya, the crisis, and the EU’s response  
In the past, Libya traditionally resisted the Union’s attempts to export its own values. 
At the same time, it was subject to a diversity of partly competing European national 
economic and security interests. This section reviews the historical relationship 
between the Union and Libya before turning to the main topic of this case study: the 
2011 crisis and the Union’s short- to medium term response.  
The EU and Libya: a changing relationship 
After three decades of Italian colonial rule and an interim period of British and 
French administration, Libya became a constitutional monarchy in 1951. In 1969, 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi executed a military coup d’état against King Idris. Eight 
years later, Gaddafi proclaimed the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The 
Jamahiriya, or state of the masses, was forged around networks of familial and tribal 
patronage; characterised by the absence of political parties; and founded on the 
principles of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism (Joffé 2011: 235).55 It soon 
acquired the reputation of a ‘rogue state’ and sponsor of anti-Western terrorism 
(Zoubir 2009: 414).56 But the real turning point only came in the early 1990s when 
Libya was accused of implication in the bombings of the Pan American Airways 
flight over Lockerbie (1988) and the Union des Transport Aériens (UTA) flight over 
Chad and Niger (1989). The UN reacted by imposing economic sanctions on Libya’s 
oil sector and air travel in 1992 and 1993 (Joffé 2011: 236).57  
Libya’s international isolation only ended in 1999 when it surrendered the two 
Lockerbie suspects to be tried before a Scottish Court (Zoubir 2009: 406). The UN 
and the EU immediately lifted their sanctions. In the following years, Libya agreed to 
                                                
55 The regime adhered to the idea that Arab nations, united by their history, religion, culture, and 
language should oppose Western colonialism, expansionism, and interference.   
56 The regime was accused of being responsible for the killing of a British policewoman in 1984, 
leading the UK to break off diplomatic relations. In addition, it was suspected of supplying of 
weapons to the Irish Republic Army and held responsible for the bombing of Berlin’s ‘La Belle’ 
discothèque in 1986.  
57 See UN Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). 
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compensate the families of the Lockerbie and UTA bombings victims, abandon its 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperate in the field of counter-
terrorism (Joffé 2011). 
The 2000s saw the strengthening of commercial and diplomatic ties with Europe. In 
2006, Libya became the EU’s third biggest supplier of crude oil and its sixth biggest 
supplier of natural gas (European Commission 2012b). The desert state also 
developed into an important export market for European goods, including defence 
equipment (Joffé 2011: 238).58 The rise in bilateral trade coincided with diplomatic 
rapprochement. In December 2007, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
received Gaddafi in Paris. In August 2008, the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi signed a friendship treaty with Libya and welcomed its leader for his first 
visit to Rome a year later. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair actively developed 
the British-Libyan relationship, culminating in the controversial release of Lockerbie 
bomber Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi in 2009 (Freeman 2011). During a 2004 visit to 
Tripoli, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced the renewal of 
bilateral ties with Libya and invited its leader to Berlin. The visit, however, never 
materialised as successor Angela Merkel rejected the idea in principle and allegedly 
even refused to shake the tyrant’s hands (Alexander 2011). 
In 2007, the European Commission initiated negotiations for an EU-Libya 
Framework Agreement. According to Joffé (2011: 243), the Commission acted as 
“technical vehicle” for the negotiations while the political thrust mainly came from 
Italy, France, and the UK. All three had commercial objectives, and Italy was 
particularly keen to Europeanise its bilateral efforts in the area of migration control 
(Joffé 2011; Zoubir 2009). As a result, the negotiations mainly focused on the 
country’s economic development and migration management, and less on normative 
issues such as human rights and democratisation. Overall, EU-Libyan relations were 
representative of a broader pattern associated with the Union’s relations with its 
                                                
58 Between 2004 and 2010, EU member states, led by Italy, France, the UK, and Germany, granted 
export licenses for €1,13 billion worth of arms exports to the autocratic regime (Council 2011c). 
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Southern neighbourhood, which consisted of prioritising stability and security at the 
expense of the promotion of democracy and human rights (Hollis 2012). 
The Libyan uprising and international reactions  
Events in December 2010 put an end to the illusion of stability. The self-immolation 
of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi triggered a historic wave of uprisings 
against state oppression in the Arab World. Within weeks, the long-standing 
Tunisian and Egyptian dictators gave way to popular demands and stepped down. In 
February 2011, the wave of protests attained Libya. The arrest of human rights 
activist Fethi Tarbel on 15 February 2011 sparked riots in Benghazi. Protests soon 
spread to other parts of the country and transformed into a general uprising against 
Gaddafi and his clan. The regime reacted with massive repression and violence 
against civilians. In a televised speech on 22 February 2011, Gaddafi swore to fight 
to “his last drop of blood”, threatened to “cleanse Libya house by house”, and urged 
his supporters to “fill the streets” and to attack the “rats” and “cockroaches” 
protesting against him (in Wiley 2011). On 5 March 2011, defected regime members 
and rebel leaders created the National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi, 
which declared itself “the sole representative of all Libya” (National Transitional 
Council 2011).  
In a press statement of 22 February 2011, the members of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) voiced their “grave concern” over the situation in Libya and urged the 
Libyan government to “meet its responsibility to protect its civilians” (UNSC 
2011).59 The UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, 
referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and imposing an 
arms embargo and targeted sanctions on key members of the Libyan regime.60 On 7 
March 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council called for the imposition of a no-fly zone 
                                                
59 The responsibility to protect is an emerging international norm, which has developed in the realm of 
the UN since 1999. If a government manifestly fails to fulfil the duty of protecting its own population, 
the international community has to intervene, including the use of coercive measures such as sanctions 
and the use of force (Gottwald 2012).  
60 UNSC, S/RES/1970 (2011). 
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over Libya (Keyrouz 2011). The Arab League echoed this call on 12 March 2011 
(Khalaf 2011). Faced with continued violence and assured of regional support, the 
UNSC passed resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, establishing a no-fly zone and 
authorising the member states to “take all necessary measures (…) to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack (…) while excluding a 
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.61 
Two days later, a multi-national coalition, spearheaded by the US, France, and the 
UK started a campaign of air strikes against Gaddafi’s forces. On 23 March 2011, 
NATO took charge of the naval enforcement of the arms embargo. At the end of the 
month, the Alliance took over command of all air operations and unified the naval 
and aerial components under operation ‘Unified Protector’.62 Despite daily air 
strikes, a military stalemate emerged in April 2011 (Alcaro 2011). The stalemate was 
not broken until early August 2011, when the rebels launched a forceful offensive 
from the Nafusa mountains. They eventually took over Tripoli on 22 August 2011 as 
Gaddafi and his family fled the city.  
During a conference in Paris on 1 September 2011, the international community met 
with the Libyan opposition and agreed that the UN would play a leading role in 
coordinating support for the country’s reconstruction and consolidation. On 16 
September 2011, the UN General Assembly formally recognised the NTC as Libya’s 
sole representative and granted it a UN seat. Gaddafi was captured and killed on 
Libyan territory on 20 October 2011. Three days later, the NTC announced the end 
of hostilities and declared the country’s liberation. Consequently, NATO ended all 
air operations over Libya on 31 October 2011.  
                                                
61 UNSC, S/RES/1973 (2011). 
62 Operation Unified Protector was carried out by eleven EU member states, Norway, Turkey, the US, 
Canada, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.   
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The Union’s multifaceted response 
In reaction to the Libya crisis, the EU used a broad range of its crisis management 
instruments. On 20 February 2011, HR Catherine Ashton (2011b) issued a 
declaration on behalf of the EU condemning the violent repression against peaceful 
demonstrators and urging the regime “to refrain from further use of violence”. Two 
days later, at a meeting in Cairo, she announced the suspension of the negotiations on 
the EU-Libya Framework Agreement (Ashton 2011c). The Heads of State or 
Government went a step further at the extraordinary European Council meeting on 
11 March 2011, urging Gaddafi to “relinquish power immediately” (European 
Council 2011). They also recognised the NTC as “a political interlocutor”. On 22 
May 2011, the HR opened an EU office in Benghazi with the aim of coordinating 
with the member states and international organisations and of preparing the ground 
for European support in the transition phase (EUROPA 2011). On 12 November 
2011, Ashton opened a full-fledged EU delegation in Tripoli (European Commission 
2011b). 
The Union’s diplomatic response was paralleled by efforts in civil protection and 
humanitarian aid. Only a week after the outbreak of riots in Benghazi, Commission 
DG ECHO activated its civil protection mechanism. Together with the Consular Unit 
of the Situation Centre, the EUMS, and the Hungarian Council Presidency, DG 
ECHO facilitated member state consular operations by identifying and pooling 
transport for the evacuation of an estimated 5,800 EU nationals (DG ECHO 2011). In 
addition, the EU and its member states were the most important humanitarian donors 
throughout the Libyan crisis, pledging over €154,5 million (DG ECHO 2011). A 
large share of these funds went to the International Organisation for Migration and 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to support their efforts in managing the 
refugee crisis.63 On 29 August 2011, DG ECHO opened a field office in Tripoli to 
provide emergency aid.  
                                                
63 As of 9 October 2011, 721,772 people had fled Libya due to the crisis (International Organisation 
for Migration 2011). 
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The EU implemented the sanctions imposed by the UNSC resolutions and went 
beyond them. On 28 February 2011, the Council imposed an arms embargo against 
Libya and targeted sanctions (that is, a visa ban and an asset freeze) on 26 persons 
affiliated to the Gaddafi regime.64 On 10 and 21 March 2011, the Union broadened 
the restrictive measures to include key Libyan financial entities and another 11 
persons. In line with UNSC resolution 1973, the Council foresaw the implementation 
of the no-fly zone and extended the asset freeze to additional persons as well as to 
the Libyan National Oil Corporation and five of its subsidiaries. On 12 April 2011, 
the Union imposed a de facto oil and gas embargo by subjecting 26 energy firms 
allegedly financing Gaddafi´s regime to the asset freeze (AFP 2011b). Finally, the 
Council imposed sanctions on Libyan port authorities on 7 June 2011 (Council 
2011e). It decided to lift its autonomous sanctions on 28 Libyan entities and to make 
unfrozen assets available to the benefit of the NTC on 1 September 2011 (Council 
2011d).  
The Union also made plans for a military CSDP operation in support of humanitarian 
assistance operations. On 1 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 
2011/210/CFSP on operation EUFOR Libya. Contingent on a request by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the operation would 
have been mandated to contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced 
persons and support humanitarian agencies in their activities. Operation EUFOR 
Libya was to have an initial duration of four months and the reference amount for 
common costs was fixed at €7,9 million. The Council decided that its Operational 
Headquarters would be in Rome and appointed an Italian Operations Commander. 
However, UN OCHA never requested the activation of EUFOR Libya. Table 19 
provides an overview of the Libyan crisis and major international and European 
reactions between 15 February and 31 October 2011. 
                                                
64 See Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP. 
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Table 19: Libyan crisis and EU response  
Date Crisis and reaction  
15 February 2011 Arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel and beginning of 
riots in Benghazi 
20 February 2011 Ashton condemns violence against civilians on behalf of EU 
22 February 2011 Suspension of negotiations on EU-Libya Framework 
Agreement 
23 February 2011 Commission DG ECHO activates civil protection mechanism  
26 February 2011 Adoption of UNSC Resolution 1970 
28 February 2011 Council adopts decision 2011/137/CFSP implementing 
UNSC Resolution 1970 
10 March 2011 Council extends economic sanctions to key financial 
institutions  
11 March 2011 Extraordinary European Council meeting: Heads of State or 
Government urge Gaddafi to relinquish power and 
recognise NTC as a political interlocutor  
5 March 2011 Establishment of National Transitional Council in Benghazi  
17 March 2011 Adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973  
19 March 2011 Multi-national coalition begins campaign of air strikes  
21 March 2011 Council imposes autonomous sanctions against 11 persons 
and 9 entities  
23 March 2011 NATO assumes command of enforcement of naval embargo  
24 March 2011 Council amends decision 2011/137/CFSP to implement 
UNSC Resolution 1973 
31 March 2011 NATO assumes command of all air operations over Libya  
1 April 2011 Council adopts decision 2011/210/CFSP on operation 
EUFOR Libya 
12 April 2011 Council imposes autonomous sanctions on Libyan oil and 
gas sector  
22 May 2011 Ashton opens EU liaison office in Benghazi 
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Date Crisis and reaction  
7 June 2011 Council imposes sanctions on Libyan port authorities  
22 August 2011 Libyan opposition takes over Tripoli  
29 August 2011 Commission DG ECHO opens field office in Tripoli 
1 September 2011 Paris conference on Libya  
16 September 
2011 
UN General Assembly formally recognises the NTC as 
Libya’s sole representative 
20 October 2011 Gaddafi is captured and killed  
23 October 2011 NTC declares end of hostilities and Libya’s liberation  
31 October 2011 NATO ends all air operations over Libyan territory  
Source: own compilation  
4.2 A low degree of coherence  
Having reviewed the different elements of the EU’s crisis response, we now focus on 
the dependent variable, the degree of coherence. This section starts by specifying the 
overarching objective(s) of the Union’s response to the Libyan crisis and scrutinises 
the extent to which it was based on a common strategy, objectives, priorities, and 
principles. It then moves to key European players at the vertical and horizontal 
governance levels and evaluates whether their action and interaction were in line 
with or positively contributed to the Union’s stated objectives.  
United on ends – divided on means  
The Libyan uprising caught Europe by surprise (EEAS Official A 2011). The EU’s 
crisis management did not follow an integrated strategy, but was rather reactive and 
“very ad hoc” (EEAS Official D 2013). Nevertheless, there were some common 
European priorities. The HR and member state representatives repeatedly called for 
the cessation of violence against civilians and emphasised the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and the safety and evacuation of European nationals. A 
common political objective, namely, that Gaddafi should relinquish power so that the 
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country could “embark on an orderly transition”, emerged within weeks after the 
outbreak of violence (European Council 2011).  
Europeans were united on the political objective but divided on the appropriate 
means to attain it. On 3 March 2011, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister David 
Cameron wrote a joint letter to their counter-parts in the European Council calling 
for political support to the NTC, humanitarian assistance, the full implementation of 
the arms embargo, and the readiness to contribute to a no-fly zone over Libya 
(Sarkozy and Cameron 2011). At the extraordinary European Council, the member 
states fell short of endorsing the proposed no-fly zone. A decisive intervention by 
Chancellor Merkel led to a less specific commitment to “examine all necessary 
options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support 
from the region” (European Council 2011). Meanwhile, Ashton warned that a no-fly 
zone would entail significant risks and potentially large numbers of civilian deaths 
(in Nicholas and Traynor 2011).   
While the meaning of “all necessary options” was deliberately left open, the member 
states agreed that their examination was to be guided by two key principles. The first 
was Libyan ownership, including assurances of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The second was multilateralism: the cooperation with other international 
partners such as the UN or NATO, and crucially also with the Arab League and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. European leaders continuously underlined these 
principles in declarations and rejected allegations of Western-led regime change, a 
goal that was clearly not inscribed in UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973.   
Diplomacy: mixed messages  
On 20 February 2011, the same day Ashton condemned the use of violence by the 
Gaddafi regime, Berlusconi declared that he had not called Gaddafi as he did not 
want to “disturb” him in a situation that was “still in flux” (in Reuters 2011a). One 
day later, former Italian foreign minister Franco Frattini stressed that Europe should 
not intervene, interfere, or try to export democracy to Libya (in Stratfor 2011). 
Meanwhile, Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg dismissed the Union’s 
condemnations as an attempt to demonstrate its “own importance” (in Philipps 
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2011). He held that the EU should not “get involved too much” as Gaddafi’s fall 
would entail “bigger catastrophes in the world” (in Philipps 2011). As a result, the 
press reported that the EU was “struggling to speak with one voice following a 
massive loss of life in Libya” (Philipps 2011). 
Another issue subject to vertical incoherence was the recognition of the NTC. In 
early March 2011, a British mission, consisting of diplomats, Special Forces, and 
intelligence agents arrived in Benghazi with the aim of establishing first contacts 
with the Libyan opposition (Chulov et al. 2011). The team – which seemingly arrived 
unannounced and heavily armed – was captured by Libyan rebels and only released 
some days later. European diplomats were reportedly “puzzled by the unilateral act 
of James Bond diplomacy” (McGreal and Wintour 2011), which impaired Cameron’s 
endeavour to forge a strong EU alliance against the Libyan regime at the 
extraordinary European Council.  
One day before the extraordinary European Council on 11 March 2011, France 
surprised its European partners by recognising the NTC as the sole legitimate 
representative of Libya and announcing the exchange of ambassadors. A 
spokesperson of Ashton reacted by saying, “we cannot unilaterally rush into 
recognising groups”, a position backed by Germany, Britain, Italy, and others 
(EurActiv 2011). The latter were displeased with France’s unilateral move, as it 
precluded a common approach towards the Libyan opposition (European Diplomat A 
2011). When asked why the French had not consulted their European partners before, 
French Diplomat A (2011) said that this was “la diplomatie électro-choc” geared to 
push the other member states towards recognition. However, after heated 
discussions, the Heads of State or Government only agreed to recognise the NTC as 
a and not as the sole political interlocutor (European Council 2011).  
According to European Diplomat E (2013), the EU liaison office in Benghazi 
established in May 2011 provided for regular intra-European consultation and 
coordination on the ground. However, the British “continued to hold their cards to 
the chest” (European Diplomat E 2013). He described the British position as a 
typical example of “splendid isolation” based on the desire to steer the Libyan 
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dossier. Italy became the second European nation to grant full diplomatic recognition 
to the NTC, Germany followed suit in June, and the UK in July 2011. But the EU as 
a whole only recognised the NTC at the margins of the UN General Assembly in 
September 2011.    
Sanctions: initial reluctance and controversial interpretation 
While the ‘Big Three’ pushed for the immediate imposition of sanctions, Italy, 
Malta, and Cyprus vetoed a corresponding decision at the Foreign Affairs Council 
meeting on 23 February 2011. The three Mediterranean countries feared that a strong 
stance would have migratory consequences. These fears were fuelled by Gaddafi’s 
repeated threats to “unleash an unprecedented wave of illegal immigration” if 
Europeans exerted pressure on the regime (Hewitt 2011). Even after the Europeans 
agreed on sanctions, Italy continued to drag its feet. It initially insisted on a “narrow 
interpretation” of the asset freeze on the Libyan finance sector and continued to 
oppose the imposition of an oil and gas embargo (Castonguay 2011). But, once initial 
reluctance was overcome, the Europeans gradually strengthened their sanctions 
regime.  
Another controversial issue was the delivery of arms to Libyan rebels. In June and 
July 2011, the Italians and French dropped arms on Libyan territory. Juppé (2011a) 
justified this action as support to the self-defence of Libyan civilians under threat. He 
further argued that the arms embargo imposed by UNSC 1970 and implemented by 
the EU only targeted the Gaddafi regime (Juppé 2011d). The British initially opposed 
the delivery of arms stating that the embargo applied to the “whole of Libya” (Hague 
2011). They softened their stance in direction of the French (and US)65 position in 
late March 2011 (Cameron 2011c). German Official C (2013) described the delivery 
                                                
65 At the London conference on 29 March 2011, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
declared that the aim of protecting civilians with all necessary measures inscribed in resolution 1973 
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of arms as a “creative interpretation of international law”. However, these doubts 
were not expressed publicly (European Diplomat F 2013).  
The use of force: minimum consensus  
The most blatant divisions among the member states concerned the use of force and 
the CSDP. While France and the UK were key proponents of UNSC resolution 1973, 
Germany broke ranks and abstained in the corresponding vote on 17 March 2011 
(together with Brazil, India, China, and Russia). On 23 March 2011, when NATO 
took over the naval enforcement of the arms embargo, Germany immediately 
announced the withdrawal of its warships and Airborne Warning and Control 
Systems (AWACS) staff from the Alliance’s operations in the Mediterranean 
(Benitez 2011b).66 
The decision to transfer the command to NATO then divided the French, the British, 
and the Italians. During the first three weeks of March 2011, the French foreign 
minister issued press statements rejecting a NATO takeover arguing that the US-led 
Alliance would send the wrong signals to the Arab world (see for example Juppé 
2011c). Meanwhile, the Italians wanted to avoid a French-led coalition of the willing 
and made the use of their airbases conditional on a handover to NATO (European 
Diplomat C 2011). The US and the UK also urged the French to agree to a NATO 
lead. Yet it was only some days after the start of air operations, when the French 
realised that the success of the operation might depend on American capabilities that 
they gave in (Senior NATO Official A 2011). A condition was that Arab countries 
would be welcomed to join the NATO-led operation (French Diplomat A 2011).  
Due largely to Germany’s rejection of the use of force, an important military role for 
the EU was soon off the agenda (EEAS Official E 2013). However, Germany was 
not the only member state that was reluctant. The only two that pushed for 
engagement in the framework of the CSDP were France and Italy. At the 
                                                
66 The two German navy vessels were redeployed with NATO’s counter-terror operation Active 
Endeavour one week after the start of the Alliance’s Libya operations (Benitez 2011a).   
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extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 11 March 2011, Italy proposed a 
naval EU-NATO operation for the enforcement of the arms embargo. According to a 
European Official (2012), “this would have been an interesting way to cooperate 
with NATO. (…) Militarily, it would have been feasible”. The proposal was 
supported by the French but rejected by several member states, including the UK and 
Germany, who preferred NATO lead (European Diplomat A 2011).  
After lengthy deliberations, the member states decided on operation EUFOR Libya, 
which French Diplomat C (2011) described as the “EU’s consolation prize”. Several 
member states, including Germany and Britain, had insisted that its deployment 
should depend on a call by UN OCHA. The French wanted to broaden this condition 
to include a potential call by the then French-led UN Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (European Diplomat F 2013). At the time, UN OCHA, known for its 
strong stance against blurring humanitarian and military lines, was under British 
lead. Germany and the UK both calculated that, under these circumstances, a call for 
EUFOR Libya would be rather unlikely (European Diplomat F 2013). And in fact, 
the call never came.  
Institutional coherence: contested leadership  
Shortly after Ashton condemned the use of force and called on the Gaddafi regime to 
refrain from further violence, similar statements by the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, European Council, and European Commission followed (Ashton 2011b; 
Ashton 2011a; Buzek 2011; Barroso 2011; Van Rompuy 2011). Largely consistent 
with one another as well as with other EU documents, the multiplicity of statements 
had few repercussions in the media (Busse 2011). However, as European Diplomat A 
(2011) critically remarked, “[t]his is not what we understand by ‘speaking with one 
voice’”.  
On the role of the EEAS, a Senior Commission Advisor (2011) noted: “It had a 
limited role, at least initially. Humanitarian aid was supposed to be coordinated by 
the department for crisis response under Agostino Miozzo. Yet the relationship and 
coordination with DG ECHO still leaves [much] to be desired, in part due also to 
bureaucratic competition and battles for turf”’. In addition to tensions between the 
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Commission and the EEAS, the role of DG CROC was contested within the EEAS. 
Operational from January 2011, the department was the ‘newcomer’ among the 
Union’s crisis management structures. According to a European Official (2012), it 
was unclear at what point the leadership of DG CROC started and, more importantly, 
when it was to be handed over to other actors such as the EUMS.  
The European Parliament (EP) was an ardent critic of the response of the HR/EEAS 
to the Arab spring in general, and to the Libyan crisis in particular: “We would like 
to see from you a more proactive approach” or “[y]our job is superfluous, it’s money 
thrown out of the window” were amongst the critiques that emerged from the EP (in 
Anon. 2011b). The EP’s criticism enabled the HR to defend the EU’s reaction to the 
Libyan crisis publicly, but it also increased the publicity of intra-European divisions 
(Anon. 2011a). 
In addition, the EP actively pushed for a more proactive European crisis response. 
On 8 March 2011, the Liberal group invited two NTC representatives to Strasbourg. 
In a resolution of 10 March 2011, parliamentarians called for strong diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and military assistance of the Libyan opposition, including the 
diplomatic recognition of the NTC (European Parliament 2011). On 9 March 2011, 
Ashton coincided with the NTC representatives in Strasbourg and had to resist 
pressure by members of the EP (MEPs) to establish contact with them. The divisions 
of the member states only allowed for a “secret” meeting behind closed doors 
(Helwig 2013: 247).  
Overall assessment  
The EU’s crisis response did not follow a collective strategy. Nevertheless, the 
Europeans rapidly agreed on a common political objective, which was that Gaddafi 
should relinquish power. In areas of common priority, such as the evacuation of 
national citizens and the provision of humanitarian aid, the EU’s action was forceful, 
coordinated, and coherent. After the initial reluctance of some Mediterranean 
member states was overcome, the Europeans gradually established a strong sanctions 
regime. But at the same time, there were vertical inconsistencies in the Union’s first 
diplomatic reactions to the crisis. Unilateral member state initiatives prevented a 
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common European approach towards the Libyan opposition. In addition, there were 
unilateral deviations from the Union’s sanctions regime. Most importantly, the Union 
was openly divided on the use of force and modes of multilateral cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the role of the Union’s institutions in fostering a coherent crisis response 
was limited and their interaction was fraught with tensions and duplications. They 
did not speak with one, but rather with many voices. Though interviewees reported 
cooperative relations between DG ECHO and parts of the EEAS, there were tensions 
surrounding the new department for crisis response (EUMS Official 2012; EEAS 
Officials D and E 2013). The EP criticised the European crisis response while the 
press quoted European diplomats saying that the CFSP had “drifted away” or that the 
CSDP “died” over Libya (Armellini 2011). The combination of these factors leads to 
the conclusion that the degree of coherence of the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis 
in 2011 was relatively low.   
4.3 The ‘Big Three’: diverging interests and norms  
Did conflicting interests or norms stand behind member state divisions and unilateral 
actions? The previous sections indicated that Italy – a former colonial power with 
strong economic and political ties to Libya – was a relevant player in the EU’s crisis 
response (see Koenig 2011b). But, in line with theoretical assumptions and for 
reasons of cross-case comparability, the following focuses on the ‘Big Three’. The 
analysis starts by evaluating the French response before moving the British and 
German ones.  
France: domestic incentives and Europeanism 
France played a leading role in the drafting process of UNSC resolutions 1970 and 
1973 and was the first nation to recognise the NTC. It pushed for the imposition of 
the no-fly zone and demonstrated military leadership in its implementation. But why 
did France play such a proactive role, leading the EU at times and leaving it behind 
at others? 
Prior to the crisis, France was Libya’s third most important trading partner after Italy 
and Germany. It received 15.7 per cent of its total imports in crude oil from the 
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desert state (International Energy Agency 2011) and accounted for 18.7 per cent of 
total foreign direct investment in Libya making it the country’s leading foreign 
investor (Salem 2011). But despite strong economic ties, France was among the first 
nations calling for economic sanctions against the regime. At the time, it was still 
uncertain whether or to what extent the Gaddafi regime would survive the crisis. It 
thus seems unlikely that France’s early leadership on the Libyan dossier originated in 
economic costs-benefit calculation.  
However, such a calculation might have played a role in the subsequent approach 
towards the NTC. In September 2011, the French newspaper Libération published a 
letter, dated 3 April 2011, in which the NTC promised the French government the 
right to exploit 35 per cent of Libya’s oil in exchange for complete and sustained 
support (de Filippis 2011). While Paris and the NTC denied the existence of such a 
deal, the latter admitted that the future exploitation of Libyan oil resources would 
reflect its appreciation for the support (Rousseau 2011). Such lucrative perspectives 
might have contributed to France’s unilateral recognition of the NTC and its 
controversial decisions to provide the Libyan opposition with arms and military 
advisors.  
But France’s leading role in the Libyan crisis also has to be seen against the 
backdrop of its broader reaction to the Arab uprisings and the resulting domestic 
criticism (French Diplomat A 2011). France’s reaction to the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprisings was reluctant and slow. In January 2011, three days before protesters 
forced the Tunisian leader to step down, former foreign minister Michèle Alliot-
Marie offered the expertise of French security forces to quell the uprising (Willsher 
2011). The government’s stance was sharply criticised at the domestic level, 
culminating in the publication of a letter by French diplomats under the pseudonym 
‘Marly’ on 22 February 2011. The diplomats criticised Sarkozy’s foreign policy as 
“amateurish”, “impulsive”, and “improvised”, and rejected the President’s continued 
backing of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes as “mainstays of the south” (Marly 
2011). As a result, Alliot-Marie had to resign while Sarkozy’s approval ratings 
dropped to an all-time low of 30 per cent in February 2011 (Ruitenberg 2011).  
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“Libya represented a turning point in France’s reaction to the Arab uprisings” 
(French Diplomat A 2011). It was also a good opportunity to mark a shift away from 
the much-criticised patterns of ‘politique arabe’ and ‘Françafrique’ towards 
democratisation and human rights.67 This shift was well received by the French 
public. In March 2011, not only a great majority in the Assemblée Nationale, but also 
66 per cent of the French population approved of military intervention in Libya 
(Ifop/l’Humanité 2011).68 These approval rates were relevant for Sarkozy as he 
prepared for presidential elections in April 2012, in which he was not only facing his 
Socialist opponent but also intense electoral pressure from the populist right-wing 
party National Front. Various interviewees interpreted Sarkozy’s leadership on the 
Libyan dossier as an attempt to distract the domestic audience from internal 
economic problems by demonstrating France’s capability to act abroad (European 
Diplomat D 2013, German Official C 2013, Think Tank Expert A 2013).  
In public declarations, the French government justified its proactive role on the basis 
of the responsibility to protect (Juppé 2011e). French politicians argued that the 
international community needed to learn its lessons from previous massacres such as 
the one in Srebrenica, and emphasised the need to support the Libyan’s popular quest 
for liberty, democracy, and human rights (Juppé 2011f). These norm-based 
arguments resonate with key principles of French foreign policy including its sense 
of international responsibility and the Gaullist concept of the ‘mission civilisatrice’ 
(Skupin 2011).69 The pronounced support for the opposition was in line with a 
national identity shaped by the emergence from the French revolution in 1789. But 
                                                
67 Conceived by General de Gaulle, the “politique arabe” designates France’s special relationship with 
the Maghreb countries (Skupin 2011: 19). Françafrique is a more pejorative term used to describe a 
traditional network of clientelistic economic and political ties between France and its former colonies 
(Sold 2012). 
68 Approval rates gradually dropped starting from April 2011 when a military stalemate between the 
rebel forces and Gaddafi loyalists emerged. But even at their lowest point (June-August) they were 
still at 49 per cent (Schu 2013). 
69 The ‚mission civilisatrice’ can be seen as a sub-category of the French sense of international 
responsibility. It reflects a self-understanding of being predestined to spread democracy, freedom, and 
human rights – “universal values of enlightenment and the French Revolution” (Marcussen et al. 
1999: 620). 
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the relative absence of these principles and values in France’s reaction to the 
Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings indicates that they were at least not the most 
decisive factors behind the nation’s proactive response to the Libyan crisis.   
When it came to the implementation of the no-fly zone, France’s preferred option 
was a Franco-British-led coalition of the willing (van Loon 2012). This preference 
was in line with the country’s traditional desire for independence and autonomy in 
security matters (Bucher et al. 2013). Pragmatic considerations pushed France to 
accept NATO leadership (French Diplomat A 2011). But when speaking about 
operation Unified Protector, the French President and foreign minister continued to 
emphasise that the Franco-British couple was, in fact, leading “l’Europe de la 
défense” (Sarkozy 2011). They belittled NATO’s role, stating that it was merely the 
military arm of the political decision-making body, which was the Libya Contact 
Group (Juppé 2011b).70 According to a French military source, they tried to find “a 
way to get Nato involved without it being seen to head the operation” (in Willsher 
2011). 
Meanwhile, France continued to push for a military CSDP operation (European 
Diplomat A 2011). According to European Diplomat C (2011), “it did not matter 
whether it corresponded to the needs or whether it was logical. The important thing 
was to present some EU crisis management contribution”. The instinctive push for an 
EU role was consistent with France’s traditional Europeanist stance of promoting the 
Union’s politico-military ambitions (French Diplomat A 2011). When the Europeans 
settled for the compromise of operation EUFOR Libya, the French were disappointed 
(Senior NATO Official A 2013). At the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2011, 
Juppé (2011a) said that the Union was behaving like a “humanitarian NGO”. After 
the meeting, he told the press: “The common security and defence policy of Europe? 
It is dead” (Ash 2011).  
                                                
70 The Libya Contact Group was established following the London Conference on 29 March 2011, and 
conceived as a forum for political discussion on the situation in Libya. Co-chaired by the UK and 
Qatar, the group included 21 nations as well as representatives of the UN, NATO, the EU, the Arab 
League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
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France’s proactive role in the Libyan crisis was thus in line with electoral 
considerations, its traditional sense of international responsibility, and its activist 
stance on the use of force. The insistence on a distinct European role resonates with 
the country’s traditional Europeanist stance. However, there was a disconnect 
between the pragmatic acceptance of a NATO framework and the maintenance of a 
Europeanist discourse. The de-coupling between speech and action indicates that – 
though influential – Europeanist principles were not decisive in light of prevailing 
strategic incentives. Strategic political and economic considerations seemed to 
motivate France’s unilateral deviations from EU coherence norms.  
UK: enlightened self-interest and Atlanticism 
The British leadership on the Libyan dossier was less pronounced than that of 
France. Nevertheless, the UK was the first country to propose a no-fly zone, closely 
cooperated with France on the drafting of the UNSC resolutions, and was a key 
contributor to NATO operation Unified Protector. Why did the UK insist on 
involving NATO and what role did it foresee for the EU? 
While Britain had economic interests in Libya, its trade ties were weaker than French 
or Italian ones. It received 8.5 per cent of its total crude oil imports from Libya, but 
was not among Libya’s top trading partners (International Energy Agency 2011). 
The consequences of the Arab uprisings for the fluctuation of the oil price were 
discussed in the House of Commons, but there is no evidence that these discussions 
had major influence on the British reaction to the Libyan crisis. Parts of the public 
debate even centred on the question why Britain should risk intervention in a case 
where its national interests were not directly at stake (Johnson and Mueen 2011).  
Britain’s domestic context provides some answers to this question. The Arab 
uprisings were the first major foreign policy crisis for Cameron’s relatively new 
coalition government, which had been criticised for its cautious reaction to the events 
in Tunisia and Egypt. When violence broke out in Libya, the Prime Minister clearly 
distanced himself from the diplomatic rapprochement of the previous government 
and its “dodgy” deals with the Gaddafi regime, including the controversial release of 
the Lockerbie bomber Al-Megrahi in 2009 (House of Commons 2011b). UK 
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Diplomat C (2013) commented on the difficult relationship with the Gaddafi regime: 
“In the 1980s, there was the Lockerbie bombing and a British policewoman was 
killed. Then, there was a process of reconciliation and normalisation under the Blair 
government. So it was clear that Britain had to play a role in 2011.”  
However, players in the domestic arena were divided on the nature of this role. 
Cameron’s strong backing for the no-fly zone was supported by an overwhelming 
majority of 557 Members of Parliament (Snowdon 2011).71 This support was in line 
with Britain’s sense of international responsibility and activist stance on the use of 
force. UK Diplomat C (2013) noted that there “was a striking element of continuity 
between the Blair and Cameron governments on foreign intervention”. By contrast, 
the British public, sceptical of the use of force after Iraq and Afghanistan, was 
divided on the Libyan intervention.72 The contrast between elite and public opinion 
suggests that the latter was not decisive for Britain’s leadership in the Libyan crisis. 
British decision-making on the Libyan intervention was generally described as “top 
down” (Johnson and Mueen 2011). The fact that there were no major elections on the 
horizon might have reinforced this trend.  
In official statements, the government justified the intervention as being “necessary”, 
“legal”, “right”, and in Britain’s national interest (Cameron 2011d). It was necessary 
because Gaddafi continued to exert violence against civilians. It was legal because 
there was a clear UNSC resolution and broad regional and international support. And 
it was right because Britain “should not stand aside while this dictator murders his 
own people” (Cameron 2011d). The emphasis on the legitimacy of the Libyan 
intervention was reinforced by assurances that there was no commensurability with 
the intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Daddow and Schnapper 2013; Mulholland 2011). 
The intervention was portrayed as being in Britain’s national security interest as it 
                                                
71 Only 13 Members of Parliament opposed military intervention in Libya (Snowdon 2011). 
72 YouGov polls of 22 March 2011 showed that 45 per cent were in favour and 36 per cent against 
intervention. Meanwhile ComRes polls on the same date indicated that only 35 per cent supported 
intervention while 43 per cent opposed it (Snowdon 2011). Although these results are inconsistent 
they both indicate that the British public was divided.    
 
  119 
helped prevent the development of a “failed pariah state festering on Europe’s 
southern border” (Cameron 2011a). However, according to Clarke (2011: 8), Libya’s 
strategic importance for Britain clearly ranked behind concurrent developments in 
Yemen, Somalia, or the Gulf.  
Throughout the crisis, the UK displayed a clear preference for keeping the 
Americans on board and using NATO. On 24 February 2011, Cameron and Obama 
discussed the events in Libya and agreed to “coordinate on possible multilateral 
measures” (Anon. 2011c). When the Americans proved reluctant to get involved in 
military intervention, Cameron (2011b) reassured the House of Commons on 14 
March 2011 that the contact between the two administrations was extremely regular 
and said he wanted “the US to focus on what is happening in Libya”. When the 
extraordinary European Council failed to endorse the Franco-British proposal of the 
no-fly zone, the British Prime Minister said: “Of course the EU is not a military 
alliance and I don’t want it to be a military alliance. Our Alliance is NATO” (in 
Nicholas and Traynor 2011).  
But, for the first time, the UK’s key partner in the Alliance was France. The 
Lancaster House Treaties, a Franco-British defence agreement signed in November 
2010, was one of the building blocks for the strong bilateral cooperation on Libya. 
According to Senior NATO Official B (2013), Britain almost had to play an 
important role in the crisis. “Refusing to play this role”, he said, “would have been 
like going on a holiday on your own within the first two weeks after the wedding”. 
For the UK, the Franco-British leadership was also an opportunity to show that it 
could cooperate with France without having to pass through Brussels (Senior NATO 
Official B 2013). 
British politicians emphasised that Brussels could play a role in the domain of 
sanctions, where it “could actually make a difference” (Cameron 2011e). They spoke 
of the need to reform the European Neighbourhood Policy by introducing stronger 
conditionality in order to turn the Union into a “magnet for positive change in the 
region” (Hague 2011). But at the same time, they downplayed the Union’s role in the 
domains of diplomacy and military crisis management. Ashton’s comments on the 
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potential risks of a no-fly zone at the extraordinary European Council led to open 
clashes with Cameron (Nicholas and Traynor 2011).  
Meanwhile, operation EUFOR Libya did not appear at all in British parliamentary 
debates, public speeches, or interviews. Even when Foreign Secretary William 
Hague was directly asked about potential military efforts to secure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in the House of Commons in April 2011, he did not mention the EU 
or EUFOR Libya (House of Commons 2011a). When asked for the underlying 
reasons for this omission, UK Diplomat B (2013) explained: “It is part of British 
political instinct. If the Foreign Secretary stood up in Parliament arguing that we 
would do something, but only if the EU agreed to it, he would be perceived as 
weak”. The reluctance to involve the Union was thus in line with Britain’s ingrained 
Atlanticist leaning and sceptical stance on European integration (Daddow and 
Schnapper 2013).  
Germany: calculated restraint and Alliance loyalty  
From the outset of the Libyan crisis, Germany condemned the use of violence, 
pushed for the deferral of the case to the ICC, and called for strong economic 
sanctions. However, it rejected the use of force and abstained in the vote on UNSC 
resolution 1973. For the first time since World War II, Germany simultaneously 
diverged from all of its three main Western partners: France, the US, and the UK 
(Hansel and Oppermann 2013: 3). So why did Germany break ranks? How did the 
abstention resonate with traditional principles of German foreign policy? And why 
did it nevertheless agree to operation EUFOR Libya?  
In 2010, Germany was amongst Libya’s most important trading partners and its 
second biggest foreign investor (Maitah et al. 2011; Salem 2011). The country 
ranked fourth on the list of Germany’s crude oil suppliers (Anon. 2011d).73 
Nevertheless, Germany played a leading role on the sanctions dossier, insisted on the 
                                                
73 In 2010, Germany received 7.7 per cent of its total crude oil imports from Libya (International 
Energy Agency 2011) 
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imposition of an oil and gas embargo, and was not among the first to recognise the 
NTC. It is thus unlikely that Germany’s energy interests played a decisive role in its 
response to the Libyan crisis (van Loon 2012: 40). More generally, bilateral trade 
with Libya was not a vital German economic interest (Miskimmon 2012: 402). By 
2010, the desert state ranked sixty-sixth on the list of Germany’s export destinations 
and thirty-eighth in terms of imports. Siding with the emerging economies in the UN 
vote was certainly more lucrative (Miskimmon 2012; van Loon 2012).  
The official narrative justifying the abstention in the Security Council was that, after 
“careful” and “difficult” consideration, the government concluded that the risks of 
German military participation exceeded the benefits and that the consequences of a 
no-fly zone were unforeseeable (Westerwelle 2011a). This narrative was 
complemented by the argument that Germany could not interfere everywhere 
(Westerwelle 2011a). At the same time, the Chancellor and the foreign minister 
underlined that Germany was not neutral and that they fully supported the political 
objectives on UNSC resolution 1973 (Westerwelle 2011a; Merkel 2011).  
The abstention in the vote on UNSC resolution 1973 ranges amongst the most 
controversial decisions in post-unification German foreign policy (Hansel and 
Oppermann 2013). There was a strong domestic consensus that Germany should not 
play an important military role in the conflict (Think Tank Expert A 2013). Opinion 
polls in March 2011 showed that a majority of Germans were in favour of NATO 
intervention but against German participation (Emnid 2011). The questions that 
stirred the domestic debate were (a) whether Germany could have supported the 
resolution without participating in its military implementation,74 and (b) whether it 
was necessary to withdraw Germany’s assets from NATO’s operations in the 
Mediterranean (Senior NATO Official A 2013; German Diplomat 2013). The debate 
oscillated between two sets of principles of German foreign policy: multilateralism 
                                                
74 An approval of UNSC resolution 1973 would not have entailed any obligations of military 
participation in its implementation (Nachtwei 2011: 4).  
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and alliance solidarity on the one hand, and the culture of military restraint on the 
other.  
The key driver behind the decision to abstain was the smaller coalition partner, the 
liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) led by foreign minister Guido Westerwelle 
(Hansel and Oppermann 2013).75 The opposition soon accused the latter of 
presenting himself as a “prince of peace” in the light of his party’s plummeting 
popularity rates and proximate local elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland 
Palatinate (Gabriel 2011). In both cases, the FDP faced the risk of not clearing the 
five per cent hurdle (Miskimmon 2012: 399). The hypothesised causal relationship 
between local elections and the decision to abstain is “inherently unfalsifiable” 
(Hansel and Oppermann 2013: 5). But as a European Diplomat (2013) put it, “the 
question is not so much whether there truly is a link between foreign policy decisions 
and electoral results. It is a more a question of the minister’s perception. He knows 
very well that a small error in foreign policy can come at a high price and is thus 
concerned about the potential risks of such decisions”.  
There are, however, indicators that electoral calculation was not the sole determinant 
of Germany’s abstention. Hansel and Oppermann (2013) present a credible 
alternative explanation. They argue that Westerwelle’s position on Libya was in line 
with the foreign policy tradition of former liberal foreign minister and honorary FDP 
Chair Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was a strong advocate of military restraint. The 
fact that Westerwelle consistently advocated a ‘Genscherist’ stance of military 
restraint in different contexts in the past, such as decisions concerning operation 
EUFOR RDC or the UN mission in Lebanon UNIFIL in 2006, provides substance to 
their argument (Hansel and Oppermann 2013: 25-26).  
                                                
75 The leading role of the Liberal Party in Germany’s decision to abstain in the vote on the Libyan 
intervention was conditioned by concurrent international developments and coalition politics. 
Chancellor Merkel’s top priorities at the time were Euro crisis management and the nuclear turn-
around after the Fukushima disaster. Contradicting the foreign minister on an issue which was not of 
primary importance and in his remit would have further undermined the stability of the coalition 
(Hansel and Oppermann 2013: 27; Miskimmon 2012: 400, 405).  
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Another relevant factor was the US’s initial reservation about military intervention 
and its unexpected change in position. During the first two weeks of March 2011, 
German policy-makers thought that the Americans would veto UNSC resolution 
1973 and calculated that they were “on the safe side” with an abstention (European 
Diplomat D 2013). Berlin was caught by surprise when the Americans decided to 
shift their position in favour of draft resolution 1973 one day ahead of the UNSC 
vote (Miskimmon 2012: 398).76 But despite the US’s last minute shift and ensuing 
pressure by the French and the British, Germany stuck with its decision to abstain 
(Miskimmon 2012: 398). While the initial adherence to the American position was in 
line with Merkel’s Altanticist outlook, the subsequent reluctance to adapt the 
position resonated with Germany’s traditional culture of military restraint.  
Germany did not veto NATO Operation Unified protector. According to Think Tank 
Expert A (2013), a veto would have been the “weapon of mass destruction of alliance 
politics”. A German Diplomat (2013) described the country’s behaviour within the 
Alliance as a “difficult balancing act”, which became apparent in words and deeds. 
When justifying the abstention in the UNSC, German politicians emphasised the 
country’s strong engagement in NATO’s operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan 
(Westerwelle 2011a). Only days after the withdrawal of the AWACS and warships 
from NATO operations in the Mediterranean, defence minister Thomas de Maizière 
pushed through a decision in the Bundestag allowing for the transfer of the AWACS 
to Afghanistan. He justified the decision as a sign of Alliance loyalty, which became 
necessary against the backdrop of the Libyan intervention (De Maizière 2011). 
Furthermore, Germany did not withdraw its officers from NATO’s command 
structures, 103 of which actively participated in the Alliance’s targeting for Libya 
(Kossendey 2011). In June 2011, De Maizière agreed to deliver precision weaponry 
components to its NATO partners in support of the Libyan air campaign and 
                                                
76 The shift in the American position reportedly resulted from joint pressure by former Secretary of 
State Clinton, former National Security Council member Samantha Power, and former American UN 
Ambassador Susan Rice (Cooper and Myers 2011). Clinton allegedly even threatened to resign unless 
President Obama supported the resolution (Senior NATO Official A 2011; German Diplomat 2013). 
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downplayed the domestically contested decision as “established Alliance routine” 
(Fried and Winter 2011).   
Considering Germany’s stance of military restraint, it seems surprising that it agreed 
to operation EUFOR Libya. “The difference”, European Diplomat A (2011) 
explained, “was that resolution 1973 was about military intervention against the 
regime while EUFOR Libya was a humanitarian assistance operation”. The character 
of EUFOR Libya as a humanitarian operation with bounded objectives and a limited 
time frame was also more acceptable for the German public than an open-ended 
military operation without a clear exit strategy. In fact, a narrow majority of polled 
Germans was in favour of the country’s participation in operation EUFOR Libya 
(Infratest dimap 2011).77  
Nevertheless, foreign ministry representatives were cautious in their elaborations on 
EUFOR Libya in the Bundestag in April 2011: “This is not about the approval of 
military action. (...) We want to enable the implementation of humanitarian action” 
(Pieper 2011). Meanwhile, German diplomats in Brussels were instructed to push for 
the designation of EUFOR Libya as a ‘mission’ rather than an ‘operation’. “This was 
a very important point for many members of the Bundestag” (European Diplomat D 
2013). While these instructions had repercussions for some of the Union’s planning 
documents, the Council Decision and website were unambiguous about the military 
nature of operation EUFOR Libya.  
4.4 Institutional overlaps and tensions  
When the Libyan crisis broke out, HR Ashton had been in the office for just one year 
and the EEAS had only been operational for one and a half months. The crisis thus 
constituted a very early test for the Union’s post-Lisbon crisis management 
machinery. This section assesses the role and influence of the Union’s institutional 
                                                
77 According to a survey conducted in mid-April 2011, 50 per cent of the Germans were in favour of 
participation in operation EUFOR Libya while 45 per cent opposed it (Infratest dimap 2011).  
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players. It starts by evaluating the factors associated with the rational game and then 
turns to explanations in the realm of sociological institutionalism. 
The struggle for competences and resources  
Competence overlaps between different institutional actors led to tensions and 
competition for turf. One of the areas of overlapping competences is external 
representation. While there were no open turf wars between the EU’s representatives, 
EEAS Official D (2013) described the Union’s multiplicity of voices in the Libyan 
crisis as “embarrassing”. He explained that there was no protocol in terms of the 
sequencing of diplomatic statements and stressed the need for increased coordination 
between the respective cabinets.  
The tensions surrounding the new department for crisis response originated from 
overlapping competences and unclear leadership. In a speech at the Irish Institute of 
International and European Affairs (IIEA) in March 2012, the Director of CROC 
himself explained that he faced an “extremely difficult task” (Miozzo 2012). He 
described the situation as one where everyone agreed to coordination, but nobody 
wanted to be coordinated (Miozzo 2012). EEAS Official E (2013) commented: “The 
problem in the crisis management structures is that everyone is trying to do 
everyone’s job. The Crisis Response Department was very new and tried to find its 
own role in this constellation”. Tensions were further fuelled by personal animosities 
between the leading officials in the Union’s crisis management structures (EEAS 
Officials D and E 2013). 
In the case of inter-institutional coordination between Commission DG ECHO and 
the department for crisis response, relations were fraught due to interdependence and 
resource scarcity. The structural division between strategic guidance in the EEAS 
and resources in the Commission created a need for constant inter-institutional 
coordination. In the Libyan crisis, the department for crisis response, with few staff 
and resources, was dependent on DG ECHO. But ECHO refused to be coordinated 
by the new department (Senior Commission Advisor 2011; Senior EEAS Official A 
2011).  
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Clashing organisational cultures  
Another source of inter or intra-institutional tension was the difference in 
organisational cultures. Clashes of organisational cultures within EU institutions 
were particularly salient during the Libyan crisis as it was preceded by a substantial 
re-organisation of departments leading to the blending of institutional traditions. In 
the EEAS review (2013b: 1), Ashton explained: “For Brussels based staff there 
followed a period of enormous uncertainty about their role in the new organisation 
and how they would relate to its new culture”. 
One of the traditional organisational clashes within the EU foreign policy machinery, 
but also in national contexts, concerns the role and degree of integration of 
humanitarian aid. ECHO’s desire for independence has to be seen against its 
adherence to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, 
and neutrality. According to EEAS Official D (2013), “ECHO would be happy to get 
rid of the EU stickers on their agencies and cars. But they needed to be associated 
with us because they did not have access to Gaddafi-controlled areas. There is 
always a tension between being too closely associated with foreign policy goals and 
being isolated”. 
In his speech at the IIEA, Miozzo (2012) explained that he attempted to introduce a 
“culture of coordination” and a “culture of emergency” to the EEAS. Miozzo himself 
has a background in civil protection, which can at times contrast with the military or 
diplomatic backgrounds of other EEAS officials (Senior Commission Advisor 2011). 
He illustrated the cultural barriers he was facing: “I tried to introduce a code of 
communication in a totally different language that is not always understood by my 
colleagues. I tried to introduce a time frame, a reaction time that is totally different 
from the diplomatic reaction time” (Miozzo 2012).  
One important structural change foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty was the transfer of 
the crisis management structures from the Council Secretariat to the EEAS. When 
asked about the EEAS, an EU Official (2011) described the EEAS as a Commission-
dominated institution where “procedure overrules strategy”, and in which crisis 
management structures, are being “marginalised”. She added that the identity of the 
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Commission was much “stronger” than that of the Council Secretariat. The latter had 
only existed for one decade and lacked “real continuity” as it served the incoming 
Council presidencies (EU Official 2011).  
The anticipated marginalisation within the EEAS had conduced some officials from 
the Council Secretariat’s crisis management structures to change position, that is, to 
move to different departments within the Secretariat before the transfer (French 
Diplomat B 2011). Meanwhile, others that had been transferred to the EEAS were 
frustrated and were trying to return to the Council Secretariat. This phenomenon also 
explained the EEAS’s initial lack of expertise in the field of crisis management 
(European Diplomat A 2011).  
The lack of coordination and socialisation  
Interviewees in Brussels reported two obstacles to coordination between the EEAS 
and the Commission. First, the HR was said to be “often absent from college 
meetings (due also to her crowded agenda)” (Senior Commission Advisor 2011). In 
addition, she failed to convene the dedicated External Relations Group of 
Commissioners created in early 2010. Second, relations between the EEAS and 
Commission suffered from a lack of communication and interaction. EEAS official 
A (2011) that had previously worked in the Commission criticised the 
bureaucratisation of information exchange with his former colleagues. When asked 
about the added value of the EEAS, French Diplomat A (2011) commented: “Before, 
DG RELEX was part of the Commission. Now, there is something like an extra layer 
between the Commission and the EEAS”.  
Between March and October 2011, the EEAS Crisis Platform was regularly 
convened to ensure overall coherence of the Union’s response to the Libyan crisis. 
EEAS officials described the Platform as a useful coordination mechanism as it 
brought all the relevant players from the crisis management structures together and 
facilitated communication and coordination (EEAS Official C 2011). However, 
coordination at the top did not necessarily encompass officials at lower levels 
(EUMS Official 2012). “They often do not want to seek the higher hierarchical layer 
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to sort things out. They do not feel they need to find a compromise and simply move 
on with their own ideas of how things should go” (EEAS Official D 2011).    
A number of factors prevented the triggering of more informal socialisation 
dynamics, and thus, the development of a shared esprit de corps throughout the 
EEAS. The recent creation of the new institutional actor did not yet provide for 
intense and sustained interaction amongst its component parts. The lack of contact 
was reinforced by the fact that EEAS staff continued to be geographically scattered 
across eight different buildings in Brussels until February 2012 (Juncos and 
Pomorska 2012: 4).  
In addition, interviewees criticised the initial composition of the HR’s cabinet or 
described it as lacking direction (Senior Commission Advisor 2011; EU Official 
2011; EEAS Officials A 2011 and D 2013). Some interviewees held that the cabinet 
did not comprise enough Commission experts and thus lacked relevant know-how in 
terms of Commission policies and procedures (EEAS Official D 2013). Others 
criticised the absence of national security and foreign policy experts, and thus the 
lack of strategic expertise (EU Official 2011). It is unlikely that such perceptions of 
the EEAS’s leadership fostered its acceptance as a force for cohesive socialisation or 
enhanced its capacity to lower cognitive barriers within and across institutions.  
Finally, the ability of the HR to increase vertical coherence was limited. Throughout 
the Libyan crisis, national representatives and EU officials voiced their discontent 
with the HR’s inability to lead or ensure coherence. In December 2011, the foreign 
ministers of twelve EU member states addressed a joint letter to the HR, in which 
they implicitly criticised the preparation of the FAC Meetings and deficient 
coordination between the EEAS, the Commission, and the Council Secretariat 
(Reynders et al. 2011). However, during the Libyan crisis, the member states were 
not willing to empower the HR. As a Senior Advisor to the Commission (2011) put 
it, “Libya was ‘Chefsache’”. The crisis was “too important and too dramatic for the 
EU to be a real protagonist” (Italian Official 2011). European Diplomat C (2011) 
mentioned that the British and French even tried to prevent Ashton from travelling to 
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Libya after the fall of Tripoli. The HR thus operated under heavy constraints (Helwig 
2013: 248).  
Conclusion  
The Libyan crisis showed that relevant crisis management players were aware of the 
common standards of appropriateness related to coherence and consistency in EU 
external action. A general sense of disappointment about the Union’s incapacity to 
speak with one voice; continuous criticism of the HR and the EEAS for failing to 
ensure coherence and consistency; and the member states’ discontent when faced 
with unilateral actions or inactions testify to norm influence. However, awareness did 
not prevent single players from deviating, leading to a relatively low degree of 
coherence. The latter can be seen as a result of the complex interplay of norms and 
interests at various levels of the EU’s post-Lisbon crisis management machinery.  
The context of the Arab uprisings and Gaddafi’s violent reaction and rhetoric led to 
high public salience and politicisation, which brought domestic perspectives and 
electoral horizons to the fore. Germany’s abstention illustrated the relevance of 
electoral stakes in light of the public’s calculable adherence to pacifism. Lucrative 
economic prospects might have contributed to France’s sustained, partly unilateral 
support to the NTC as well as Germany’s siding with the emerging economies in the 
UN vote. The Libyan case thus offers confirming evidence for the negative effect of 
conflicting societal interests on the degree of coherence in EU crisis management 
(H1a).  
Nevertheless, UK crisis decision-making seemed rather detached from domestic 
interests. Its military leadership was in line with its traditional sense of international 
responsibility and activist approach to the use of force. In addition, Britain’s distinct 
preference for a NATO role corresponded its traditional predispositions on modes of 
international cooperation. The French insistence on a European contribution and the 
German adherence to military restraint can equally be traced back to ingrained 
national norms. There are thus instances of incoherence in the Libyan crisis response 
that can be traced back to vertical norm contestation, as suggested by hypothesis 1b. 
National predispositions largely prevailed over EU-level coherence norms. Yet the 
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German case also presents us with a situation where economic and electoral interests 
carry the same behavioural implications (abstention) as the domestically ingrained 
norm of military restraint. Cross-case comparison in chapter 7 will allow for a more 
informed discussion on the underlying logics of action.  
As the crisis demanded a quick and forceful reaction, there was little time for inter-
governmental bargaining and negotiation. France’s unilateral recognition of the NTC 
and the UK’s calculated push to make operation EUFOR Libya dependent on a 
request of UN OCHA are examples of competitive (H2a) rather than consensual or 
cooperative intergovernmental interaction (H2b). Furthermore, Germany openly 
justified its abstention – and thus divergence from European partners – on the 
grounds that the risks exceeded potential benefits of collective action. In line with 
liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, all three cases led to lowest common 
denominator outcomes.  
The high stakes associated with the reaction to the Libyan crisis induced the member 
states to restrain the role of EU institutional players in ensuring vertical coherence. 
Contextual factors further limited their potential contribution to horizontal 
coherence. The recent institutional re-shuffling created new competence overlaps and 
resource dependencies within the EEAS and with the Commission. In addition, the 
absence of a clear division of labour in the area of external representation led to a 
multiplicity of ‘European voices’. In accordance with hypothesis 3a, competence 
overlaps generated competition for turf and bureaucratic resistance to coordination. 
As the Libyan crisis was a very early test for the post-Lisbon institutional 
infrastructure, the impact of socialisation and learning dynamics was still limited and 
sub-organisational norms continued to prevail over a unifying ‘culture of 
coordination’. There was thus little evidence for hypothesis 3b.  
The Libyan crisis also reflected broader trends. While the French repeatedly 
emphasised that the Europeans were in the lead, critical observers rather described it 
as “following from the front” (Vaïsse and Kundnani 2012: 15). The crisis unveiled 
the gradual decline of European military capabilities, a trend accelerated by the 
economic and debt crises. As a result, the Americans had to provide 90 per cent of 
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the strategic enablers for the air campaign (Biscop 2012: 1308). However, the US is 
less and less willing to support expensive operations in Europe’s backyard. On 10 
June 2011, outgoing US Defense Secretary Robert Gates (2011) prominently 
declared, “there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress – and in 
the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on 
behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or 
make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense”. 
At the same time, the crisis illustrated that the Europeans have to be prepared for 
strategic surprises in their neighbourhood, which might require the use of hard 
power. The multitude of complex and interlinked short, medium, and long-term 
challenges emanating from it confirmed the need for a comprehensive approach. 
Some European member states may still be able to spearhead a military intervention. 
But sustaining it and embedding it in a multidimensional longer-term crisis response 
requires more unified and coherent European action.  
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 Somalia – coherent crisis Chapter 5:
management and collective interests 
On 18 November 2011, the EU launched its first post-Lisbon crisis management 
simulation exercise, based in Brussels and member state capitals. The exercise was to 
incorporate ‘lessons learned’ from the Union’s crisis management in Libya and it 
was the first time that the EEAS took the lead (EEAS 2011a). It started four days 
after the adoption of an EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The crisis 
took place in a fictitious country named ‘Alisia’. The African Union and 
neighbouring countries Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda were involved. It took 
little imagination to guess that the exercise was modelled on Somalia. The fact that 
the first theoretical test of post-Lisbon comprehensive crisis management was based 
on a Somalia-type conflict is indicative of the level of ambition and direction of EU 
crisis management. Observers have described the scenario as over-ambitious and 
“frankly too complex” (Dowdall 2011). 
However, in recent years, Somalia has become a focus of EU crisis management and 
a showcase example for the implementation of the comprehensive approach. The 
present chapter shows that – despite limitations – the degree of coherence was 
relatively high. It argues that the EU’s engagement in Somalia was subject to a 
comparably low degree of interest polarisation among the member states. While 
embedded foreign policy principles played a role in domestic and intergovernmental 
discussions, they did not prevent European compromise outcomes. Meanwhile, 
institutional actors actively pushed for the implementation of the comprehensive 
approach and informal, bottom-up cooperation compensated for institutional tensions 
and rivalries.   
This chapter starts by introducing relevant contextual information on the Somali 
conflict and international responses. Section two evaluates the degree of coherence 
of the Union’s engagement and illustrates why it can be classified as relatively high. 
Sections three and four present underlying reasons at the level of the member states 
and the EU institutions.  
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5.1 Conflict causes, symptoms, and reactions 
In the past decades, Somalia turned into a safe haven for jihadist terrorists and pirates 
and acquired the reputation as the world’s worst failed state. This section provides an 
overview of the country’s multiple challenges before moving to overlapping 
international responses. While the present case study focuses on the Union’s post-
Lisbon crisis management, earlier international and European responses are outlined 
to provide the necessary context.  
State failure and the rise of piracy   
A former British and Italian colony, Somalia’s history is one of chronic unrest.78 In 
1991, a coalition of clan-based armed opposition groups put an end to two decades of 
dictatorial rule by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. The dissolution of Somalia’s 
central government plunged the country into a state of perpetual civil war. Since 
2000, international peace conferences endorsed various transitional governments, but 
their authority and legitimacy was limited (ICG 2012b: 3). In 2004, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) was established and became Somalia’s sole 
internationally recognised interlocutor. Two years later, the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), an Islamist umbrella group, emerged victorious from fighting with an alliance 
of warlords and rapidly extended its authority from Mogadishu to South Central 
Somalia (Bradbury 2010: 21). A US-backed Ethiopian intervention forcibly ousted 
the ICU from the capital in December 2006. 
However, the ICU’s disintegration propelled the radicalisation of jihadist insurgent 
organisations. One of its main splinter groups – al-Shabaab – retained control of 
large parts of South and Central Somalia.79 In 2009, a merger of four Islamist groups, 
named Hizbul Islam (Islamic Party), joined the fight against the transitional 
authorities. Both organisations explicitly targeted the West and its peace efforts. In 
                                                
78 Somalia was divided into British and Italian Somaliland. After independence in 1960, the two 
regions united and became the Somali Republic.  
79 The full name is Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Striving Youth).  
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2010, the TFG only controlled around 20 per cent of the Somali territory and was 
beleaguered in Mogadishu (Observatoire de l’Afrique 2010: 4). While the regions of 
Puntland and Somaliland had been de facto autonomous since the 1990s, the 
remainders were governed by warlords, clans, and armed insurgents. 
In addition to political and security-related challenges, Somalia faced extreme 
poverty, periodic drought, and recurrent famines. In 2008, the number of people in 
need of humanitarian assistance rose from 1,8 to 3,25 million (Council Secretariat 
2010). The combination of humanitarian emergency and perpetual violence triggered 
massive displacement. In 2011, one quarter of the Somali population was uprooted – 
either internally displaced or fleeing to neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2011). Due 
to the intensity of economic, political, and social grievances, the Fund for Peace 
(2014) has consistently classified Somalia as the world’s worst failed state since 
2008. 
Among the symptoms of state failure was a dramatic surge in maritime piracy. In 
2008, the number of pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa increased 
tenfold (Weber 2009: 70). Somali pirates targeted daily food shipments by the World 
Food Programme (WFP). Following a deadly attack on a WFP ship off the Somali 
coast in 2007, the organisation issued an appeal for international action against 
piracy. It warned that piracy threatened relief deliveries to over one million Somalis 
(UN News Centre 2007). In addition, more than 15 per cent of global annual trade 
passed through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal (Helly 2009: 192). In 2011, the 
costs of Somali piracy to the global economy were estimated at $7 billion (One Earth 
Future Foundation 2011).80 In the same year, UN representatives reported growing 
links between piracy and terrorism as al-Shabaab was becoming “more desperate for 
funding” (Reuters 2011b). 
After prolonged stagnation in the Somali peace process, there were first signs of 
progress in 2011 and 2012. Supported by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops, the African 
                                                
80 Costs inter alia included costs of rerouting, security equipment, ransoms, and prosecutions.   
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Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) had gained ground in the fights against al-
Shabaab and gradually pushed it out of Mogadishu. In September 2011, Somalia’s 
federal and regional authorities agreed on a Roadmap for the End of Transition. 
Developed under the auspices of the UN, the Roadmap set benchmarks leading 
towards the establishment of permanent democratic institutions by mid-2012. The 
National Constituent Assembly accordingly adopted a provisional constitution in 
August 2012 and elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as Somalia’s new President. But 
despite claims that the country had “turned a page” and embarked upon “a new 
political era”, the institutions remained fragile and the security and humanitarian 
situations precarious (EEAS 2013a: 2). In 2013, the country still ranked last on the 
Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2014).  
Figure 5: Political map of Somalia (2012 vs. 2013):  
Source: (AFRICOM 2013) 
International responses  
Throughout Somalia’s bloody history, the interest of the international community 
waxed and waned (Bradbury 2010: 8). UN and US interventions in the early 1990s 
led to large numbers of victims on both sides. A turning point was US operation 
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‘Irene’ in 1993, which became known as the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident. Within 
little more than 12 hours, 18 American soldiers and 350 to 1,000 Somalis were killed 
in Mogadishu. The incident prompted President Bill Clinton to withdraw forces. Ever 
since, Western governments have been reluctant to deploy ground troops to Somalia 
(ICG 2012b: 2). The incident was followed by a period of international neglect.  
The attacks of 9/11 and the beginning of the US-led ‘war on terror’ reignited 
international attention. However, the 2000s generally saw a preference for African 
solutions to Somali problems. Following the ouster of the UIC, the UN-authorised 
AMISOM replaced Ethiopian troops in 2007.81 AMISOM was mandated to use all 
necessary means to support and protect the transitional authorities in the exercise of 
their governmental functions, to train Somali security forces, and to facilitate the 
provision of humanitarian aid.  
In 2008, international attention shifted towards maritime piracy. In the course of the 
year, the UNSC adopted six resolutions on the deteriorating security situation in 
Somali waters.82 With resolution 1816, approved on 2 June 2008, the Security 
Council declared Somali piracy a threat to international peace and authorised foreign 
warships to use “all necessary means” and to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia 
for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery”.83 On 7 October 
2008, the UNSC agreed resolution 1838, intensifying the plea for collective action.84 
And resolution 1851, adopted on 16 December 2008, extended the authorisation of 
all necessary means to the Somali territory.  
International attention also translated into a number of international counter-piracy 
operations. In October 2008, NATO launched operation Allied Provider responsible 
for naval escorts of WFP vessels and deterrence. The Combined Task Force 151, a 
                                                
81 UNSC, S/RES/1744 (2007).  
82 See UNSC resolutions 1801, 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851.   
83 UNSC, S/RES/1816 (2008). 
84 UNSC S/RES/1838 (2008).  
 
  137 
US-led multinational naval force, started to patrol Somali waters in January 2009. In 
the following years, other international players, including China, Russia, Iran, India, 
and Japan have at one time or another sent ships, surveillance aircraft, or personnel 
to Somalia’s coastal areas. The UN established a Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Somali Coast in January 2009 to coordinate international counter-piracy efforts.  
In 2012, the international community stepped up its diplomatic, economic, and 
military support to the Somali peace process. On 22 February 2012, the UNSC 
decided to raise AMISOM’s troop ceiling to 17,731.85 The decision came one day 
before the London conference on the future of Somalia bringing together 55 Somali 
and international delegations. The conference aimed at fostering greater international 
coordination and concentrated on the root causes and symptoms (such as famine, 
refugees, piracy, and terrorism) of Somali instability. A second high-level Somalia 
conference, focusing on the post-transition period, took place in Istanbul on 31 May 
and 1 June 2012. By then, the Horn of Africa had “become the military theatre with 
the widest array of international forces after Afghanistan” (Khanfar 2012). 
The EU’s response: aid and counter-piracy  
The EU supported international efforts for an inclusive Somali peace process and 
conducted political dialogue.86 Piracy became an increasingly salient topic in the 
dialogue with the federal and Puntland authorities (EEAS 2011: 1). However, the 
dialogue was largely conducted from abroad. Until 2013, neither the EEAS nor the 
member states had diplomatic representations in the country due to the dire security 
situtation (Holzer and Jürgenliemk 2012: 3).87 
The EU has been the biggest aid donor in Somalia. Between 2008 and 2013, the 
Commission allocated €412 million under the 10th European Development Fund to 
                                                
85 UNSC, S/RES/2036 (2012).  
86 Political dialogue was conducted in accordance with article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.  
87 At field level, EU activities were coordinated through the Somalia Unit within the EU Delegation in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The UK was the first member state to reopen an embassy in Mogadishu in April 
2013.   
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the focal sectors of governance, education, and economic development (EEAS 2012). 
Between 2008 and 2012, DG ECHO pledged another €243 million to support short-
term relief in the fields of food security, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, 
hygiene promotion, shelter, protection, and livelihoods support (EU Delegation 
Kenya 2013). To enhance stability and security in Somalia, the Union made 
substantial contributions to the chronically under-funded and under-staffed 
AMISOM. Between 2007 and 2013, it provided €444 million under the APF 
(Council 2013d). Funds mainly covered allowances, but also operational running 
costs, transportation, and medical expenses. The Union provided another €4,75 
million for the establishment and functioning of the AU Strategic Management 
Planning Unit under the IfS. In total, the Union thus disbursed more than €1,1 billion 
to Somalia between 2007 and 2013. 
France, Denmark, and the Netherlands bilaterally escorted WFP convoys in 2007 
(Helly 2009: 393). In May 2008, Spain sent an informational note to the Council 
requesting increased attention to Somali piracy, which affected “the legitimate 
interests of the member states” (Spanish Delegation 2008). Taken up by a dynamic 
French Council Presidency, the note eventually led to the adoption of Council Joint 
Action 2008/851/CFSP on 10 November 2008, establishing the Union’s first 
maritime operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta. Based on UNSC resolutions 1814, 1816, 
and 1838, Atalanta’s primary aim was to protect and escort WFP vessels. Secondary 
aims were the protection – on a case-by-case basis – of vulnerable merchant vessels 
and the prevention and deterrence of acts of piracy and armed robbery.88 With its 
Operational Headquarters in Northwood, Atalanta was the first CSDP operation 
under British lead. It was launched on 8 December 2008 and had an initial duration 
of 12 months. It was later extended until December 2014.89 Typically comprising 
around 1,200 personnel, it is among the largest CSDP operations to date (Atalanta 
2014).  
                                                
88 See Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP. 
89 See Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP. 
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Atalanta was very successful in deterrence and protection. It had a 100 per cent 
success rate in the protection of WFP and AMISOM vessels (EU NAVFOR Somalia 
2014). In addition, the number of attempted and successful pirate attacks 
significantly dropped since 2008 (see Table 20).90 However, the Union’s counter-
piracy operation merely tackled symptoms and did not provide a sustainable solution 
to the problem of piracy (Weber 2009: 71). Aid deliveries may have arrived at the 
coast, but often disappeared on the mainland. Due to the dire security situation, only 
few reached South Central Somalia (Ehrhart 2013).  
Table 20: Pirate attacks in Somali waters (January 2008 - December 2013) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total attacks 24 163 174 176 35 7 2 
Of which 
successful 
14 46 47 25 5 0 0 
Source: EU Naval Force Somalia (2014) 
In addition, the Union faced problems with the prosecution of pirates. Neighbouring 
and European countries were reluctant to take the lead in this costly and complex 
task. The Union signed transfer agreements with Kenya (2009), the Secheylles 
(2009), and Mauritius (2011) but their judicial systems were soon overstretched. As a 
result, nine out of every ten captured pirates were later released (The Guardian 
2011).91 Weber (2009: 81) noted the discrepancy between the Union’s counter-piracy 
action at sea and its political action on land and criticised the glaring absence of “a 
coherent overall concept for Somalia”. 
Towards a more strategic approach  
Shortcomings propelled the Union’s narrative of a comprehensive approach to 
Somalia, “linking security with development, rule of law and respect for human 
                                                
90 The decrease in pirate attacks did not only stem from international military counter-piracy efforts, 
but also from increased adherence to best management practices and the use of armed security 
services (Ehrhart 2013). 
91 Whereas there were 581 pirate attacks between 2008 and 2014, only 149 suspects of piracy were 
transferred to competent authorities with a view to their prosecution (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2014).  
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rights, gender related aspects and international humanitarian law” (Council 
Secretariat 2010). On 14 November 2011, the Union adopted the Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council 2011a). Its second comprehensive 
regional strategy promised a more pronounced focus on the “underlying challenges”.  
In line with the Framework, the Council appointed an EU Special Representative for 
the Horn of Africa on 8 December 2011 and tasked him initially to focus on Somalia 
and on piracy. His mandate included enhancing coherence, effectiveness, quality, 
and visibility of the EU’s engagement and coordinating with international and 
regional interlocutors (Council 2011b). In September 2012, the EU further 
strengthened its diplomatic profile by appointing Special Envoy Michele Cervone 
d’Urso. He became the first (Nairobi-based) EU ambassador to the Republic of 
Somalia in two decades (EU Delegation Kenya 2012).  
Furthermore, the EU substantially reinforced its engagement in the framework of the 
CSDP. On 15 February 2010, the Council established the military training mission 
EUTM Somalia.92 The objective of the mission, located in Uganda, was to contribute 
to the training of Somali security forces. It was the first time that the mandate of a 
military CSDP operation explicitly mentioned the security-development nexus 
(Ehrhart and Petretto 2012: 20). The operation counted around 120 military trainers, 
had a reference amount for common costs of €4,8 million and an initial duration of 
12 months.   
At a meeting on 23 March 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council extended Atalanta’s 
mandate and broadened it to include Somali coastal areas. The operation was 
authorised to target the pirates’ logistic dumps on the shore. At the same meeting, the 
Council, for the first time, activated the EU Operations Centre.93 It was tasked to 
support the planning process for the foreseen regional maritime capacity building 
                                                
92 See Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP. 
93 The European Council decided to set up the EU Operations Centre in December 2004. The body 
was to enable the Union to plan and conduct an operation – in particular in situations where no 
national Headquarters was identified and a civil-military crisis response was required.  
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mission EUCAP NESTOR. The Operations Centre was also mandated to “coordinate 
and increase synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa” 
(Council 2012f). In addition to four core officers, the activated Operations Centre 
comprised 16 seconded staff from the EUMS, the Brussels-based support cell for 
EUTM Somalia and liaison team of operation Atalanta as well as member state 
personnel (Council 2012f).  
EUCAP Nestor, a civilian mission augmented with military expertise, was launched 
on 16 July 2012. The aim of the mission, which initially focused on Somalia, 
Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles, was to strengthen sea-going maritime 
capacities. It also aimed at supporting the rule of law sectors in Puntland and 
Somaliland, notably through the creation of a Coastal Police Force (Council 2012e). 
The mission employed 137 international staff and had an annual budget of €23 
million (EEAS 2013c).  
Complementing CSDP activities, the Union provided additional funds to the rule of 
law dimension of counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. The Commission financed 
the Regional Maritime Security programme (2012-2017) supporting regional 
capacity building in the rule of law sectors through the European Development Fund. 
Under the IfS, roughly €15 million was pledged for the Critical Maritime Routes 
Programme (2010-2015). And for the period between 2012 and 2016, another €22,3 
million was earmarked for capacity-building in the areas of counter-terrorism, money 
laundering, resilience, and the recovery of “newly accessible areas” in Somalia 
(Council 2013d). Table 21 provides an overview of key events in the Somali peace 
process and of the Union’s above-described crisis responses. 
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Table 21: Somali crisis and EU response (2008-2012) 
Date Crisis and reaction  
15 May 2008 Spanish informational note calls for EU action against 
Somali piracy  
2 June 2008 UNSC resolution 1816 authorises all necessary means in 
fight against Somali piracy  
7 October 2008 UNSC resolution 1838 intensifies call for collective action  
10 November 2008 Adoption of Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on operation 
Atalanta 
8 December 2008 EU launches operation Atalanta  
16 December 2008 UNSC resolution 1851 extends authorisation of all 
necessary means to Somali territory  
15 February 2010 EU launches EUTM Somalia  
6 September 2011 Roadmap on the End of the Transition adopted by 
signatories 
14 November 2011 Council adopts Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa  
8 December 2011 Council appoints EU Special Representative for the Horn of 
Africa  
22 February 2012 UNSC resolution 2036 raises AMISOM’s troop ceiling to 
17,731 
23 February 2012 London Conference on the Future of Somalia  
23 March 2012 EU broadens mandate of Atalanta and activates the 
Operations Centre  
1 June 2012 Istanbul conference on Somalia’s post transition phase  
16 July 2012 EU launches EUCAP NESTOR  
1 August 2012 Somali Constituent Assembly adopts Provisional 
Constitution  
20 August 2012 Official end of Somali transition  
10 September 2012  New President of Somalia elected  
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Date Crisis and reaction  
26 September 2012 EU appoints Ambassador to Somalia  
6 October 2012 New Prime Minister of Somalia appointed 
13 November 2012 Federal Somali Parliament endorses Council of Ministers  
Source: own compilation  
5.2 A relatively high degree of coherence  
The positive assessment of EU crisis management in Somalia is based on the 
multitude of EU instruments and activities. But it also reflects a relatively low level 
of polarisation in the aims and interests of Europe’s various stakeholders. This 
section shows that the degree of coherence in EU crisis management was relatively 
high, but not without limitations.  
Aligned interests without strategic guidance     
According to the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa the Union’s objective is 
to “support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, stability, security, 
prosperity and accountable government” (Council 2011a: 4). In relation to Somalia, 
common objectives specifically included the eradication of the root causes of piracy. 
To pursue these objectives, the document identified five focal areas for EU 
engagement:  
• democratic and accountable state structures;  
• peace, security, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution;  
• mitigation of the effects of insecurity in the region (piracy, organised crime, 
terrorism, migration); 
• poverty reduction, economic growth, and prosperity; and regional 
cooperation (Council 2011a).  
In addition to the comprehensive approach, which can be seen as the leitmotif of the 
document, guiding principles for EU action included regional ownership and mutual 
responsibility (Council 2011a: 13).  
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The Framework identified a variety of common interests: “the region’s geo-strategic 
importance, the EU’s historic engagement with the countries of the region, its desire 
to support the welfare of the people and help lift them from poverty into self-
sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own citizens from 
the threats that emanate from some parts of the region and address common 
challenges” (Council 2011a: 13). Somali-based terrorism and – above all – piracy 
stood out as collective priorities. Smith (2012: 1) describes operation Atalanta as the 
first CSDP operation, which directly defends EU rather than third party interests. The 
collective priority of counter-piracy is also reflected in material terms. The member 
states’ annual costs for operation Atalanta were estimated at €1-1,5 billion (Ehrhart 
2013; Holzer and Jürgenliemk 2012: 10). This is more than the amount of 
development funds spent in a period of six years (see above).  
The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa outlines collective European 
objectives and interests, but it does not provide strategic political guidance. One third 
of the document’s text is a summary of existing measures and initiatives (Council 
2011a: 8-12). It identifies future areas for action, but specific measures and sub-
strategies are left in the hands of the Commission, Council, and member states. There 
is no concrete guidance on the implementation of the different strands of action 
(Ehrhart and Petretto 2012). Pirozzi (2013: 15), therefore, suggests that the strategy 
is “more a reverse engineering exercise, consisting in the development of a 
conceptual umbrella aimed at providing ex post coherence to a number of different 
and often non-aligned activities”. Hagström et al. (2012: 4) call it a “descriptive 
document, explaining and communicating what type of actor the EU wants to be 
rather than giving clear directions on how the EU should act”. And despite the 
Framework’s comprehensive outlook, its first review concluded that linkages 
between conflict drivers and risks to development remained to be addressed (EEAS 
2013f: 4).  
Vertical coherence and compromise outcomes  
Sporadic Somali piracy attacks had been recorded since the 1990s (Ehrhart 2013). 
They partly constituted reactions to the foreign exploitation of Somali fishing 
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grounds. In 2005, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization reported that 700 
trawlers, mainly of European and Asian origin, were illegally fishing in Somali 
waters (in Geise 2009: 5). In addition, European firms dumped toxic and nuclear 
waste in Somali waters. Silently tolerated for decades, these practices caused severe 
environmental damage and affected the livelihood of many Somalis depending on the 
fishing industry. While they were certainly not the sole causes of the rise of piracy, 
they stood in stark contrast with the Union’s objectives with regard to Somalia.  
Beyond these basic contradictions, there were no major inconsistencies between EU 
and national responses to the Somali crisis. However, tensions arose in three issue 
areas: the allocation of resources to AMISOM; the activation of the Operations 
Centre; and the strengthening of operation Atalanta. In 2012, the APF came under 
pressure as it was also considered a potential source of funding for the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) (Daemers 2014: 2). APF funds 
were limited and repeated calls to other non-traditional donors to share Europe’s 
financial burden with respect to AMISOM remained unanswered. The situation led 
to tensions between the UK and France. The former was in favour of raising 
allocations to Somalia while the latter was pushing for a transfer of funds to Mali.94 
UK Diplomat B (2013) described the rivalry as “silly business. (…) On both sides, 
there was anxiety that there would not be enough money for either dossier. There 
was mistrust towards the French and the fear that they would earmark all the money 
for Mali.” A compromise was eventually found permitting the allocation of funds to 
both dossiers. UK Diplomat B (2013) candidly commented: “We love to argue but 
after all it’s the Germans who pay”.  
A second bone of contention between France and the UK was the activation of the 
Operations Centre. The activation was a political compromise, which has to be seen 
against the backdrop of the UK’s rejection of a permanent civil-military headquarters 
in mid-2011. The French strongly pushed for the activation and the British 
                                                
94 According to the corresponding decision-making procedure, requests of APF funds above €10 
million have to be approved by the member states at the level of the PSC (Poulton et al. 2010).  
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reluctantly agreed. However, they imposed limitations: the Operations Centre 
remained outside of the formal command chain; its staff was limited to 20 out of a 
maximum of 103; and its activation was to end after two years (Biscop 2012: 1304). 
Furthermore, the body – initially conceived as a cell capable of planning and running 
a civil-military operation – was only staffed with military personnel. Its potential to 
foster civil-military synergies was thus restricted from the outset. Though a 
compromise was found, it was not in line with original objectives of the Operations 
Centre.     
A third controversial issue was the broadening of Atalanta’s mandate. France, the 
UK, and the Netherlands were in favour of extending the mandate to the Somali 
shore to prevent pirates from easy retreat. However, other member states, led by 
Germany, Spain, and Austria, were concerned about the risks of onshore operations 
for the Somali civilian population and their own military (Dempsey 2012). The 
prospective use of helicopter attacks and the fear of being dragged into ground 
operations evoked painful memories of the 1993 ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident 
(Gebauer 2012). The reluctant member states eventually agreed, but introduced 
limits on land-based operations. Soldiers were only allowed to enter Somali territory 
by air and within 2km from the shoreline. In addition, attacks were limited to pirate 
logistics and the use of rockets was excluded.  
Institutional coherence despite tensions  
Prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission and the Council had 
different policy frameworks for their engagement with Somalia (Greco et al. 2010: 
60). The Treaty provided the “theoretical foundation” for the comprehensive 
approach to Somalia, which was codified in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of 
Africa (European Diplomat D 2013). But, despite generally positive assessments, the 
institutional implementation of the comprehensive approach was not without 
tensions.  
According to European Diplomat D (2013), the more established crisis management 
institutions “rejected” the Operations Centre. Senior EEAS Official B (2013) 
illustratively described the body as a “miscarriage” resulting from a “rotten 
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compromise”. The relationship between the civilian crisis management bodies and 
the Operations Centre and their respective command chains remained unclear 
(EUMS Official 2012).  
Tensions also arose between the EEAS and the Commission DG for Development 
and Cooperation/EuropeAid (DEVCO) in the field of development cooperation. 
According to Soliman et al. (2012: 24), DEVCO staff were concerned that their 
EEAS counter-parts would shift the priorities of development cooperation with 
Somalia towards security-related or economic objectives. In line with these concerns, 
the Commission refused to fund equipment for the EU-trained Somali army 
(European Diplomat F 2013). More generally, interviews with Brussels-based 
officials indicated the need for “more effective communication and clear guidelines 
on workflows between” the EEAS and DEVCO (in Soliman et al. 2012: 25). 
Overall assessment 
The Union’s crisis management in Somalia was based on a set of common objectives 
and underpinned by collective interests. Over the years, European countries – 
individually and collectively – dedicated large amounts of resources to the pursuit of 
these objectives. The interaction among EU member states and between institutional 
players was largely consistent. However, the Union’s crisis management has to be 
seen against the backdrop of decades of illegal business practices in Somali waters. 
Whilst there were no open divisions among the member states, tensions surrounding 
the use of force slowed down collective counter-piracy efforts. Institutional 
mechanisms, aimed at fostering synergies and coherence, were described as rotten 
compromises. And, finally, there was a perceived and material imbalance between 
the Union’s counter-piracy efforts and its development objectives. 
German Official B (2013) rejected the depiction of Somalia as a showcase example 
of coherent EU crisis management. He insisted that it only had the potential of 
becoming one: “The various activities could still be orchestrated in a more effective 
way and cooperation could be smoother.” This statement reminds us that perfect 
policy coherence is elusive and that it is only possible to compare varying degrees of 
coherence. The analysis therefore contents itself with concluding that – compared to 
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other cases of EU crisis management – the degree of coherence in the Somali case 
was relatively high.  
5.3 The ‘Big Three’: concurrent interests and 
compromised norms 
How did one of the most complex international conflicts become the most-quoted 
example of coherent EU crisis management? And what explains the series of 
variably consistent compromises? This section evaluates British, French, and 
German national interests in Somalia exemplifying the relatively low degree of 
polarisation. It further illustrates how national norms and foreign policy principles 
fed into European compromise outcomes.  
France: economic interests and Europeanist drive  
France was the first nation to answer the WFP’s call for assistance in 2007. It was the 
key driving force behind the establishment of operation Atalanta and became one of 
its most important contributors. In addition, it bilaterally trained Somali soldiers in 
Djibouti. France pushed for the creation of the other two CSDP operations and for 
the activation of the Operations Centre. But at the same time, it was reluctant to 
provide European funds to AMISOM. What are the underlying reasons for France’s 
puzzling role? 
When asked why their country played a proactive role in the Somali crisis, French 
Diplomats C, D, and E (2013) primarily highlighted piracy and its important impact 
on commercial interests. Piracy off the Somali coast affected the fishing trade, and 
thus an important French economic interest (Helly 2009: 394). The Indian Ocean 
tuna industry alone was estimated to be worth up to $6 billion (BBC 2009). In 2008, 
piracy in the Horn of Africa cut the usual tuna catch of the French and Spanish 
fishing fleets based in the Seychelles by half.  
The hi-jacking of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant in April 2008 additionally 
illustrated the potential security threat to citizens. Sarkozy’s government reacted by 
authorising Special Forces to pursue pirates on land. The rescue operation, which led 
to the release of the hostages and the death of one pirate, signalled the resolve of the 
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French authorities (Germond and Smith 2009: 580). The threat to French nationals 
was not confined to Somali waters as several kidnappings by jihadist insurgents in 
following years demonstrated.  
French Diplomats C, D, and E (2013) also related France’s proactive role in the 
Somali conflict to threats emanating from terrorism and regional destabilisation. 
However, terrorism was only of secondary importance, as France was not considered 
a “first target” for Somali jihadists. And while Djibouti (host to the largest French 
military base in Africa) was a regional focus, Somalia was not. According to French 
Diplomat C (2013), “you have to distinguish between the Horn of Africa and 
Somalia. Africa in general is of course a French priority. But in Africa we 
concentrate on our former colonies”. The relatively lower threat perception of 
terrorism and of regional destabilisation explains the French tendency to focus on the 
symptoms, rather than the root causes of the Somali conflict.  
Overall, Paris was in favour of multilateral engagement with Somalia (French 
Diplomat D 2013). Operation Atalanta constituted an attempt to “Europeanise” 
counter-piracy efforts. It served the dual purpose of facilitating burden-sharing and 
substantiating France’s traditional push for l’Europe de la défense. A visible push 
was particularly relevant in light of Sarkozy’s controversial decision to return France 
to NATO’s integrated command structure by 2009 (Willett 2011: 21). Domestic 
critics feared a loss of French and European independence. Extending the military 
CSDP to a new global threat could be presented as a sign of continued European (and 
French) autonomy. A leaked 2009 cable from the US mission to the EU mentioned 
that the French circulated a non-paper on a potential training mission for the 
“europeanization of France’s pledge to train Somali military forces in Djibouti” 
(USEU 2009c). Paris thus had an important “European interest” in Somalia, which 
was strongly embedded in the trio of CSDP operations (French Diplomat D 2013).  
France’s push for the activation of the Operations Centre was in line with this 
“European interest”. Paris had been a fervent supporter of the establishment of an 
independent EU operational Headquarters since 2003. However, considering the UK-
imposed limitations, the activation of the Operations Centre could only constitute a 
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‘second best’. Nevertheless, the French expected that Somalia would create a 
precedent: “We hope that the Operations Centre will be able to transmit the expertise 
gained in Africa. It is a model for the future that needs to be reinforced.” (French 
Diplomat C 2013) 
While Paris provided important political and material support to the CSDP missions 
and operations in the Horn of Africa, it was less willing to finance AMISOM. 
Following the UNSC’s decision to raise the troop ceiling in February 2012, the 
French UN representative underlined that Europe could not carry all the financial 
implications and called for new contributors. Similar calls were reiterated throughout 
2012. In October, French Permanent Representative to the UN Gérard Araud (2012) 
warned that the Union would not be able to keep up the level of financing in 2013 in 
light of AMISOM’s high costs and “needs expressed in other parts of the African 
continent”. Though not explicitly mentioned, these needs included the Malian crisis, 
which clearly was a French priority (see chapter 6).    
UK: national interests and calculated Europeanism  
The UK played a major role in the diplomatic, humanitarian, and military responses 
to the Somali conflict. It did not only lead international crisis responses but also 
European efforts. Atalanta was the first CSDP operation under British command, and 
the UK pushed for the maintenance of EU funding to AMISOM. What are the 
reasons behind British leadership? What role did London foresee for the EU? And 
why did it impose strict limitations on the Operations Centre? 
The UK had important historical, security-related, and economic reasons to take the 
lead on Somalia. Bilateral relations date back to the 19th century when Northern 
Somalia became the British protectorate of Somaliland. After the Second World War, 
Britain also took control of Italian Somaliland before both territories were released 
into independence in 1960. Due to historical ties the UK hosts the largest Somali 
diaspora in Europe.95  
                                                
95 Estimates range from 350,000 to 1 million (in Muir 2012). 
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Furthermore, counter-piracy constituted an important domestic economic interest. 
Annually, the British shipping industry contributes £10,7 billion to the UK’s GDP 
(Wintour 2012). Additionally, £192 million had been paid in ransoms to Somali 
pirates between 2008 and 2012. Representatives of the shipping industry and 
seafarers Unions (such as Nautilus International) pushed for a greater UK 
engagement in counter-piracy and for better multilateral coordination (House of 
Commons 2012b; Redfern 2011).  
Somalia was also increasingly perceived as a threat to UK’s security interests. In 
2011, Somali terrorism was moving up on the agenda of the National Security 
Council. Among the reasons were increasing numbers of British citizens known to 
have joined al-Shabaab’s training camps. Intelligence services warned that that these 
‘foreign fighters’ would – sooner or later – bring terrorism back to their homeland 
(Norton-Taylor and Hopkins 2012; Rifkind 2012). In November 2011, Cameron 
stepped up his rhetoric and spoke of Somalia as “a failed state that directly threatens 
British interests” (in Sengupta 2012). Meanwhile, 14 per cent of British citizens 
considered “failed and weak states such as Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan” the 
number one threat to the “British way of life” in 2012 (Chatham House and Yougov 
2012). The fact that one of the men involved in the deadly 2013 machete attack on a 
British soldier had been detained earlier – suspected of being on his way to an al-
Shabaab training camp – substantiated domestic concerns.  
A traditional maritime power with a strong navy lobby, the UK was expected to take 
a leading role in counter-piracy. As France, it favoured multilateral solutions, but 
unlike France it initially preferred NATO engagement (UK Diplomat C 2013). In 
line with its Atlanticist leanings, the UK was concerned that an EU engagement 
would entail duplication and challenge NATO’s primacy in this important new area 
of engagement. However, London agreed to operation Atalanta when it became clear 
that the Alliance was overstretched and that the CSDP operation would only start 
after termination of NATO operation Allied Provider (Page 2011: 47). Taking 
command of the operation presented the UK with an opportunity to show 
commitment to the military CSDP. And though Atalanta was not the optimal 
solution, “it was still preferable to doing nothing or – even worse – allowing the 
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French to take the lead in a high-profile multilateral anti-piracy operation that clearly 
affected British shipping interests” (Smith 2012: 17-18). But due to the downscaling 
of the Royal Navy and other international commitments, the UK only rarely 
committed a ship to the CSDP operation (Willett 2011: 23). It was thus leading the 
EU’s counter-piracy efforts militarily, but not materially.  
In a speech in June 2012, UK Europe minister David Lidington acknowledged that 
the Union was leading counter piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. He underlined 
that NATO remained “the bedrock of Britain’s national security”, but that the EU’s 
advantage was its broad range of complementary civilian and military tools 
(Lidington 2012). However, he also added that there were “no institutional barriers to 
a more effective CSDP and no need for renewed debate over structures” (Lidington 
2012). The speech came three months after the activation of the Operations Centre.  
When asked about his country’s perspective on the activation, UK Diplomat C 
(2013) answered: “We don’t like it. There are eight people sitting in a room looking 
at each other and wondering what they are doing. (…) The Operations Centre makes 
no difference. We agreed to it because everyone else wanted it. But it has done 
nothing to enhance coordination. (…) And that confirms our belief that no European 
Headquarters is needed.” Presented with the French view that the imposed 
limitations curbed the body's effectiveness, he claimed that the UK simply “restricted 
the damage: it is better to have eight people wasting their time than 24”. Britain thus 
endorsed a robust EU role in counter-piracy, but clearly maintained its traditional 
scepticism about further integration in the area of security and defence.   
Germany: commercial interests and compromised restraint  
Berlin made substantial humanitarian and military contributions to the management 
of the Somali conflict. It provided approximately 20 per cent of the EU’s assistance 
to Somalia and has been among its top ten bilateral humanitarian aid donors for over 
a decade (Auswärtiges Amt 2014). Germany was a driving force behind operation 
Atalanta and one of its largest and most permanent contributors (Weber 2009: 71). 
Initially opposed to the broadening of the operation’s mandate towards a more robust 
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role, Berlin eventually agreed. Why did it make these important contributions and 
what explains its changing position on Atalanta?  
The Gulf of Aden is the most important commercial shipping route between Europe 
and Asia. And in 2008, Germany was the world’s largest exporting economy. Over 
92 per cent of its overseas trade was transported by sea (Flottenkommando der 
Marine 2008: 31). It ran the world’s biggest container fleet and its third biggest 
merchant fleet (Weber 2009: 71). Germany was thus among the economies worst 
affected by Somali piracy.  
In the parliamentary debate on continued participation of German soldiers in 
Atalanta in November 2011, foreign minister Westerwelle underlined the important 
humanitarian contribution of operation Atalanta. But – in contrast to Germany’s 
traditional restraint when it comes to interest-based foreign policy – he also stressed 
that securing the Gulf of Aden was a vital economic interest (Westerwelle 2011b). 
Influential domestic interest groups – notably the German Shipowners Association 
and the Association of German Industry – actively lobbied for the defence of this 
interest (German Official C 2013). Their influence could be derived from various 
meetings with politicians and their repeated mentioning in parliamentary debates on 
operation Atalanta (see for example Deutscher Bundestag 2012a).  
But Berlin’s support to counter-piracy also went beyond particular interests. The 
political backing of operation Atalanta was largely consensual. The operation 
permitted Germany to fulfil its multilateral obligations against the backdrop of troop 
reductions in the Balkans (Weber 2009: 71). An EU engagement was more popular 
with the German public than yet another controversial US-led or NATO operation 
(Germond and Smith 2009: 585). And Germany was also a strong advocate of a 
comprehensive approach to counter-piracy including a rule of law dimension, which 
NATO could not provide (German Official B 2013). Accordingly, politicians 
carefully portrayed Atalanta as only one instrument within the broader EU crisis 
response. They emphasised the need to go beyond symptoms and to tackle the root 
causes (European Diplomat I 2013). When the UK and France started to push for the 
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extension of Atalanta’s mandate to include land-based operations in late 2011, 
Germany was reluctant and slowed down Brussels discussions.  
However, in the first quarter of 2012, the German governing coalition gradually 
shifted position towards endorsing a more robust Atalanta mandate. This shift 
reopened the political battleground between the principles of multilateralism and 
military restraint. The governing parties emphasised the importance of being a 
credible and reliable partner and accused the opposition of isolationism (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2012b). Opposition representatives, in turn, criticised the government’s 
lack of assertiveness in European negotiations and its renunciation of responsible 
politics in favour of risky adventurism (Deutscher Bundestag 2012a).   
Both sides used Germany’s abstention in the 2011 UN vote on the Libyan no-fly 
zone as a rhetorical weapon. Opposition representatives insinuated that the 
government attempted to atone for the Libyan foreign policy failure. Meanwhile, 
foreign minister Westerwelle criticised the lack of European solidarity and 
emphatically reprimanded the opposition: “Never remind us of Alliance solidarity 
again. (…) Never again!” (in Deutscher Bundestag 2012b). On 10 May 2012, a 
majority of Social Democrats and Left Party members voted against the broadening 
of Atalanta’s mandate, while most Greens abstained. This was the first time in the 
history of the German Federal Republic that a military operation was approved 
against the will of the opposition (mp/AFP/dpa 2012).  
Even if the decisions on the use of force in Libya and Somalia substantively differed, 
the inversion of the same politicians’ positioning with regard to multilateralism and 
military restraint speaks for a strategic use of foreign policy norms rather than for a 
principled approach. The government’s wavering and gradual shift might have 
resulted from pressure by European partners on the one hand and by economic 
interest groups on the other. Meanwhile, the government accused the opposition of 
“political opportunism” in light of the proximate regional elections in North Rhine-
Westphalia (Jungholt and Sturm 2012). Regional elections in the most populous 
German state are traditionally seen as a harbinger of the federal election. Aware of 
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the traditionally pacifist German public, the opposition had electoral incentives to 
demarcate itself from the government.   
Meanwhile, internal unity prevailed regarding Germany’s pro-integrationist and 
Europeanist stance. It supported France’s quest to activate the Operations Centre. 
The support was also in line with Berlin’s long-standing advocacy for an 
autonomous civil-military EU operational Headquarters. The activation was initially 
seen as a first step towards this objective. However, the UK-imposed limitations had 
a sobering effect. When asked whether the activation of the body represented a 
model for the future, German Diplomat A (2013) conceded that it had a useful 
coordinating function. “But”, he continued, “it is also a homunculus that nobody 
needed. It’s simply not a civil-military Headquarters.”  
5.4 Institutions and bottom-up coordination  
Senior NATO Official A (2012) described the Union’s engagement in Somalia as a 
positive example of the implementation of the comprehensive approach. He also 
noted, that “Ashton often talks about Somalia, sometimes even so often that you start 
to wonder about the Union’s other operations.” Why did EU institutional actors 
recurrently present Somalia as a success story? What contribution did they make to 
this apparent success? And what explains remaining limitations and challenges to 
inter-institutional coordination?  
Institutional influence and contending explanations 
There was a notable institutional push for the implementation of a comprehensive 
approach to the Somali conflict. On 28 May 2009, the then High Representative 
Javier Solana wrote a letter to EU foreign and defence ministers urging them to 
address the root causes of Somali piracy (USEU 2009b). He proposed to build on the 
success of operation Atalanta and to consider six new areas of work:  
• Appointment of an EUSR to the region;  
• regional maritime capability development;  
• reinforced support to the African Union;  
• capacity building for the Somali security sector; 
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• long-term development assistance strategy; and 
• reinforcement of international legal framework to change the cost benefit 
calculus of would-be pirates (Solana 2009; USEU 2009c). 
Most of the proposed initiatives were implemented in the course of the following 
years.  
There were also signs of institutional influence beyond the HR. Leaked cables from 
the US Mission to the EU (2009c; 2009a) for instance highlighted the role of the 
former Head of the Council Secretariat’s Operations and Exercises Unit, Didier 
Lenoir.96 The reporting American diplomat described Lenoir as a “savvy operator in 
the EU system” and as “a key actor in forming the EU’s successful counter-piracy 
mission” (USEU 2009a). In 2009, Lenoir informally proposed a model of 
transatlantic cooperation, in which the US would provide logistical support and 
funding to Somali soldiers while the EU be responsible for training. And, in fact, a 
similar division of labour was later implemented: EUTM Somalia did the training 
and the US paid the allowances of trained soldiers (German Official B 2013). This 
compromise was perhaps not solely based on Lenoir’s proposal. But the fact that he – 
and not member state officials – was repeatedly mentioned in US cables can be seen 
as an indicator of his influence. More generally, the 2013 EU Foreign Policy 
Scorecard noted that the EEAS had played a “significant role in coordinating 
European strategy towards Somalia” in the post-Lisbon era (Vaïsse et al. 2013: 127).  
In interviews with EU and national officials, two explanations for the observed 
autonomous influence of EU institutional actors appeared. The first highlighted their 
superior ability to link various strands of EU action. According to Senior EEAS 
Official A (2012), “EU crisis management in Somalia was coherent because the 
challenges are so complex. The member states simply do not have the national or 
bilateral instruments to tackle them.” Institutional actors thus had the ability to 
increase collective gains and had acquired an informational advantage through 
                                                
96 From 2010 to 2013, Lenoir was Head of the EEAS’s Integrated Strategic Planning Division before 
becoming Director of the CMPD.   
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learning processes since 2008. The second explanation rather emphasised the 
congruence of national interests. The argument was that the member states’ 
collective will to act on Somalia empowered institutional actors in their coordinating 
function (EU Official 2011). From this perspective, the institutions’ repeated 
mentioning of Somalia was seen as a “craving for success stories” at a time where 
the new institutional actors faced a great deal of public criticism (European Diplomat 
H 2013; German Diplomat A 2013). An overarching explanation could be that the 
low degree of interest polarisation among the member states also made it easier for 
EU institutions to acquire a sense of ownership in the process (Academic Expert B 
2013).  
‘Structural restraints’ and ‘cultural reluctance’  
Despite the positive impact of the post-Lisbon institutional framework, Ehrhart and 
Petretto (2012: 11) noted that “struggles about the meaning, the direction and the 
institutional prerequisites of a comprehensive approach” continued. In a seminar of 
the EU Institute for Security Studies on operation Atalanta and EU counter-piracy 
policies, experts attributed these struggles to institutional rivalry, “structural 
restraints”, and “cultural reluctance” (Helly 2011). Structural restraints included the 
separation of geographic and operational DGs as well as the disparity in short- and 
long-term planning cycles between the EEAS and the Commission (European 
Diplomat F 2013). Within the EEAS, civil-military cooperation was challenging due 
to continued stove-piping (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012: 11). Furthermore, the EEAS 
lacked the resources to provide funding for the equipment of the soldiers trained by 
EUTM Somalia. The aforementioned US-EU compromise on funding thus 
represented a necessity.  
Cultural reluctance could, once more, be observed at the interface between DG 
ECHO and other EU crisis management actors. Maritime piracy called for the 
military escort of humanitarian vessels. The EU repeatedly framed humanitarian aid 
as one element of its overall comprehensive approach to Somalia. An example was a 
Commission press release (2012a), which spoke of “the comprehensive approach 
including security support, development assistance and humanitarian aid”.  
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Humanitarian aid practitioners criticised the Union’s rhetoric for conveying the 
perception that the different measures all shared the same objectives (Pontiroli et al. 
2013). They underlined the importance of respecting the humanitarian principles. A 
member of the Humanitarian Aid Department of the German Foreign Office (2013) 
shared these concerns and explained that his department continuously insisted on 
rhetorical separation of humanitarian escorts and counter-piracy operations. The fact 
that Somalia has been among the countries with the highest number of attacks on aid 
workers throughout the past decade shows that the risks of aid politicisation are real 
(Humanitarian Outcomes 2013).  
Coordination and its mixed effects 
A large number of EU institutional players were involved in the Union’s response to 
the Somali conflict. In addition to the traditional players – the crisis management 
structures, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO – it involved maritime security-related 
bodies such as DG Mobility and Transport, DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 
and private sector interlocutors (Helly 2011). The combination of old and new actors 
called for unprecedented levels of inter-institutional coordination. However, Ashton 
did not play a leading role in coordination (European Diplomat A 2013). And the 
EEAS and Commission reportedly lacked “proper coordination mechanisms at 
project level” (Pirozzi 2013: 15).  
Analysts suggest that the relatively high degree of coherence rather resulted from 
informal modes of communication and coordination. Summarising expert 
discussions, Helly (2011) reported that there was “interactive influence between 
CSDP and other instruments”. He added that the EU’s institutions “learned 
comprehensiveness ‘by doing’” (Helly 2011). One example was interdepartmental 
discussion on draft Council Conclusions. Similarly, Pirozzi (2013: 15) mentioned 
that the CMPD and DG DEVCO held various meetings during the planning phase of 
EUCAP Nestor. Inter-institutional coherence thus emerged bottom-up rather than 
top-down.  
Institutional actors and member states were in favour of the appointment of an EUSR 
for the region (Soliman et al. 2012: 28). Assessments of his coordinating role have 
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been positive (Pirozzi 2013: 15). Even the British commended the EUSR’s work. 
Europe Minister Lidington (2013) noted that he had “fully met his mandate” and 
enabled the Union to play a “full role in regional stability” and Somalia's Peace 
Process.  
Meanwhile, assessments of the Operations Centre were less positive. Its foreseen 
civil-military coordinating role was limited due to its exclusive military staffing. The 
body was formally subordinated to EUCAP Nestor’s civilian command, but the fact 
that the political compromise prevented the establishment of formal relationships 
between the command chains led to tensions (EUMS Official 2012). According to 
UK Diplomat C (2013), staff in the three Somali CSDP operations “reported that 
they did not hear anything from the Operations Centre”. He explained that 
operational coordination and communication between the mission and operations 
worked very well and that they did not need to go through the Operations Centre 
(UK Diplomat D 2013). According to Senior EEAS Official B (2013), institutional 
players were aware of the UK’s strategic intention to close the new body down “after 
two years – for reasons of inefficiency”.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that one of the key reasons for the relatively high degree of 
coherence was the low level of interest polarisation among the member states (H1a). 
Each of the ‘Big Three’ had important national economic interests in responding to 
the Somali conflict. And counter-piracy undoubtedly constituted a collective priority. 
Contrary to previous examples of EU crisis management, all of the ‘Big Three’ 
played a leading role. France was the ‘engineer’ behind the Union’s CSDP missions. 
The UK was leading international diplomatic efforts and operation Atalanta. And 
Germany provided crucial aid and military resources. In the latter case, influential 
economic interest groups visibly pushed for a more robust national engagement in 
counter-piracy. The collective interest in counter-piracy also included other member 
states, as their initial bilateral initiatives in the Gulf of Aden illustrated.  
Domestic political contexts and electoral incentives had a less immediate impact on 
the degree of coherence, but helped explain British and French leadership. The UK 
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was aware of its important Somali diaspora, which pushed for international 
engagement and bore a (perceived) risk of domestic backlash. France’s leading role 
in extending the CSDP to counter-piracy assuaged domestic critics of NATO 
reintegration. In Germany, electoral calculation might explain the opposition’s 
decisive positioning against a reinforcement of operation Atalanta. 
Embedded national foreign policy principles and norms played a role in the forging 
of intergovernmental compromises. However, the UK slightly deviated from its 
traditional euro-sceptical stance and Germany from its position of military restraint. 
In both cases, rational considerations seemed to prevail. Evidence from the Somali 
case thus favours hypothesis 1a over 1b and points to the prevalence of the logic of 
consequences.  
The case also displays a relatively high degree of institutional coherence and signs of 
autonomous institutional influence on the degree of coherence. A number of 
proposals put forward by institutional players were eventually implemented. 
However, these proposals did not contravene member state preferences. It is 
therefore hard to conclude whether socialisation processes, informational 
asymmetries, or simply unified preferences of the member states – as ‘collective 
principal’ – were the pivotal explanatory factors.  
Some argued that Somalia finally translated “Brussels theory” on the comprehensive 
approach into practice (Senior NATO Official A 2012). Others concluded that the 
CSDP had come of age or that the Union was finally ready to play a more robust 
military role (Page 2011; Smith 2012). However, the imbalance between the Union’s 
commitment to Somalia’s development and maritime counter-piracy remains. And its 
robust engagement through operation Atalanta has to be seen in light of the specific 
attributes of maritime counter-piracy: risks are comparatively low and benefits are 
not only high and visible, but also largely shared. Collective action can thus be seen 
as a positive-sum game with calculable payoffs. These attributes crucially distinguish 
naval from ground operations. The German case was illustrative in this regard: Berlin 
was the first to provide a vessel for Atalanta, but the option of targeted terrestrial 
interventions triggered a long and difficult domestic debate. The Union may thus be 
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modelling crisis management exercises on Somalia, but comprehensive and robust 
intervention still remains Brussels theory, as opposed to Brussels practice.  
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 Mali – between collective strategy Chapter 6:
and individual action  
The EU has increasingly been dealing with the Sahel zone since 2008. Growing 
awareness of a set of complex and interlinked security challenges led to the 
development of the Union’s first comprehensive regional strategy with a particular 
focus on Mali (EEAS 2011b). But the strategy was soon overtaken by events on the 
ground. A coup d’état in March 2012 uncovered Mali’s democratic facade. In 
January 2013, Islamist rebels marched towards the capital and threatened the 
country’s national sovereignty. The French reacted immediately by launching a 
forceful military intervention.  
Europe diplomatically backed the French intervention and sped up preparations for a 
military training operation. However, it failed in conflict prevention and the member 
states were reluctant to complement political with operational support. Policy 
analyses and media reports described Mali as yet another setback for the military arm 
of the CSDP (Faleg 2012; Stephens 2013; Witney 2013). The EU was, once again, 
criticised for evading its responsibility in the neighbourhood (Faleg 2013). Whereas 
the US stayed in the background and NATO reacted with ‘deafening silence’, the 
Malian crisis caught the EU “asleep at the steering wheel” (Godement 2013). 
Reflecting the discrepancy between collective strategy and mostly unilateral 
implementation, the degree of coherence is classified as intermediate.  
France’s proactive stance was in line with its national strategic interests and threat 
perception. But Mali was not of vital interest to other EU member states whose threat 
perceptions diverged from that of France. Despite the existence of numerous 
coordination mechanisms, there were inter-institutional tensions over the distribution 
of funds. France’s activism restrained the HR’s room for manoeuvre and reduced the 
role of the EEAS to a filtering mechanism for national interests. Mali showed that 
collective regional strategies might provide Europeans with a common narrative, but 
not necessarily with incentives for collective action in the face of an emergency. 
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This chapter begins by presenting background information on Mali’s crises and 
international responses. Section two evaluates the degree of coherence of the Union’s 
crisis response, which it classifies as intermediate. The subsequent analysis identifies 
underlying causes at the national (section three) and EU levels (section four).  
6.1 Malian crises and international responses  
In 2012, Mali – previously considered a model of African democracy – turned into 
the “epicentre” of regional instability (Bello 2012). A rebellion by the Tuareg tribe (a 
minority ethnic group of nomadic Berbers with longstanding grievances), a coup 
d’état, and the gradual Islamist takeover of Northern Mali uncovered a set of 
complex and interlinked security and development challenges. This section provides 
an overview of the subsequent and interlinked crises and international responses.  
The ‘model democracy’ and its hidden challenges  
Although Mali’s democracy was never entirely stable, some essential elements were 
in place (Wing 2013: 477). There was a civilian government holding regular 
elections, which were generally considered free and fair. The political system was 
decentralised with an independent constitutional court and various participatory 
mechanisms (Perry 2013: 3-4). The political landscape was characterised by a 
multitude of political parties and civil society organisations which generally enjoyed 
freedom of expression and association (Wing 2013: 477). In 2006, the American 
development agency USAID portrayed Mali as “one of the most enlightened 
democracies in all of Africa”. Due to its reputation as peaceful, stable, and 
democratic country it became a ‘darling’ of the Western aid establishment 
(Bergamaschi 2013: 10).  
Nevertheless, Mali remained one of the world’s poorest countries. In 2011, it ranked 
175th on the UN’s Human Development Index. The country’s core development 
challenges included low levels of education, poor health and social services, and 
rapid demographic growth (Perry 2013: 2). These challenges were exacerbated by 
strenuous climatic conditions including sporadic rainfall, periodic droughts, and 
frequent flooding. The results were rising food prices triggering recurrent regional 
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food crises (Perry 2013: 2).  
Underneath the democratic facade, Mali’s political and security institutions were 
weak and corruption flourished (Bergamaschi 2013: 4). In 2011, the country ranked 
118th on the Corruption Perceptions Index.97 Since Mali’s independence in 1960, the 
Tuareg called for enhanced economic development and political inclusion of the 
North (Bergamaschi 2013: 2). However, the failure of subsequent governments to 
respond to these calls triggered vicious cycles of violent uprisings and hard-handed 
repression during the 20th century and deepened the country’s North-South-divide 
(ICG 2012b: 2). In November 2011, the MNLA, an organisation advocating the 
creation of an independent Tuareg territory in the Sahara, was established.  
Meanwhile, Northern Mali was gradually turning into a sanctuary for terrorist groups 
and criminal networks. By 2012, it had become an operating basis for Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJWA), and the largely Tuareg Ansar Dine.98 These groupings financed their 
activities through ransom payments and drug trafficking while profiting from 
“opportunistic alliances” with sectors of the administration and the population 
(Marchal 2013: 493).      
Coup d’état and international reactions  
The Libyan conflict escalated the brewing crisis in Mali (Kuperman 2013). By 
December 2011, around 30,000 returnees from Libya had crossed Mali’s borders 
(UN 2012). Mostly young and under-educated, they represented an additional 
challenge to the impoverished communities in Northern Mali (UN 2012). The 
returnees included large numbers of Tuareg fighters who had served the Gaddafi 
regime as mercenaries (Simon et al. 2012). With them came “unspecified and 
unquantifiable numbers of arms and ammunition” (UN 2012).  
                                                
97 Transparency International publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index annually. It ranks 177 
countries in ascending order “by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys” (Transparency International 2014). 
98 Ansar Dine means ‘helpers of religion’.  
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Spill over from Libya precipitated a Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali in January 
2012. Initially led by the MNLA, the insurgency rapidly spread from Gao to the 
Kidal and Timbuktu regions (Simon et al. 2012). In March 2012, the MNLA and 
Ansar Dine pushed the government forces out of Northern Mali. Disgruntled by the 
inability of the incumbent government, led by Amadou Toumani Touré, to handle the 
Tuareg rebellion in the North, a group of junior officers staged a coup d’état in 
Bamako on 21 March 2012. The MNLA sensed the power vacuum in the capital and 
proclaimed the independence of the Azawad state – a territory the size of France – on 
5 April 2012 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Political map of Mali (as of 6 April 2012) 
 
Source: Political Geography Now (2012) 
The reaction of the international community to the coup d’état was unified. The 
UNSC (2012) strongly condemned it and called “for the immediate restoration of 
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constitutional rule”. The Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) suspended Mali and put its Standby Force “on high alert for all 
eventualities” (ECOWAS 2012). It also imposed economic, financial, and diplomatic 
sanctions. International pressure led to the signing of a framework agreement on 6 
April 2012, whereby the military junta agreed to hand power over to an interim 
government led by Dioncounda Traoré (Simon et al. 2012).  
Islamist takeover and military intervention 
In late May 2012, the MNLA agreed to join forces with Ansar Dine with the aim of 
transforming Northern Mali into an Islamic state. However, fighting between the two 
groups broke out in late June 2012, and the Islamists subsequently evicted the 
MNLA from Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. On 28 June 2012, Ansar Dine declared full 
control of Northern Mali. It imposed a strict version of sharia law and started to 
destroy ancient Sufi shrines in Timbuktu.  
Within a week, the UNSC declared the situation in Mali “a threat to international 
peace and security” and called for targeted sanctions against Islamist fighters.99 
Following a request for military assistance by Mali’s interim authorities, the UNSC 
passed resolution 2071 on 12 October 2012, tasking ECOWAS and the African 
Union to develop a detailed plan for military intervention. 100 The resolution also 
called on regional and international organisations, including the EU, to provide 
training and support to the Malian security sector. On 20 December 2012, the UNSC 
unanimously adopted resolution 2085 authorising the deployment of an African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year.101 
However, the resolution did not include a timetable or commitments for troop 
generation (Marchal 2013: 488). UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, 
                                                
99 S/RES/2056 (2012). 
100 S/RES/2071 (2012). 
101 S/RES/2085 (2012).  
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predicted that a deployment of AFISMA before September or October 2013 would 
not be feasible (Hammond 2012).  
Aware of the unpreparedness of the African force, Ansar Dine started to prepare for a 
military offensive. On 4 January 2013, the group suspended a ceasefire agreed in 
December 2012 (Chatham House 2013). Five days later, the Chairman of the African 
Union called NATO’s assistance for a joint operation with African forces. However, 
the call remained unanswered.102 On 10 January 2013, the Islamists started a military 
offensive on the South and captured the town of Konna situated around 600 km from 
Bamako. Malian President Traoré immediately requested assistance from France. 
Within 24 hours, the French President, François Hollande, authorised and launched a 
military operation codenamed Serval.  
Shortly after, on 16 January 2013, a terrorist incident illustrated the international 
dimensions of the crisis. AQIM-linked terrorists took 800 people hostage in a gas 
plant near In Amenas in South-Eastern Algeria. In return for the safety of the 
hostages, the Islamists demanded an end to French military operations in Northern 
Mali (DPA 2013b). The hostage crisis ended four days later when Algerian Special 
Forces raided the site. By then, 39 foreign hostages had been killed (BBC 2013).  
Three weeks later, the French-led operation had re-captured all major cities in 
Northern Mali and dispersed the Islamist rebels (Francis 2013: 2). Numbering 4,000 
French troops, operation Serval was divided into two stages. During the first ten 
days, the objectives were “to secure Bamako, stop the terrorist offensive, strike the 
enemy’s rear bases and prepare for the arrival of African forces” (Heisbourg 2013: 
11). During the second stage, the objectives were broadened to include the 
restoration of territorial integrity and the fight against terrorism (Heisbourg 2013: 
11). The operation was supported by ECOWAS troops who arrived on the ground in 
January 2013 and operated under the mandate of AFISMA. It received broad 
international backing and logistical support from several European countries, 
                                                
102 According to Senior NATO Official A (2013), Mali was not substantially discussed and fell under 
“any other business”. 
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including the UK, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark as well as from the US, Canada, and the United Arab Emirates.  
The process of political transition was re-launched on 29 January 2013 when the 
Malian authorities adopted a Transition Roadmap. They committed to hold elections 
in July 2013 and to negotiate with the North (ISIS 2013). On 25 April 2013, the 
UNSC passed resolution 2100 authorising the deployment of the Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA was to comprise 
a total of 11.200 military personnel and 1,440 police. It was authorised to use all 
necessary means to support the political process and execute various stabilisation 
tasks and replaced AFISMA on 1 July 2013. Presidential elections were held, as 
scheduled, on 28 July 2013. In a second round on 11 August 2013 the Malians 
elected Ibrahim Boubacar Keita with a solid majority of 78 per cent. The presidential 
elections were widely seen as a milestone on Mali’s path towards political 
normalisation (UN News Centre 2013a).  
EU responses to Mali’s crises  
The EU started to acknowledge the complex challenges emanating from the Sahel in 
2008. After several fact finding missions in the region, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat presented a joint options paper on 1 October 2010. In light of the 
deteriorating security situation and kidnapping of European nationals, the Foreign 
Affairs Council of 25 October 2010 tasked the HR and the Commission with the 
elaboration of a regional strategy. On 8 March 2011, the EEAS (2011b) presented the 
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.  
On 22 March 2012, Ashton (2012a) condemned the coup d’état in Bamako and 
called for “the reestablishment of the constitutional order and the holding of 
democratic elections as soon as possible”. One day later, the Foreign Affairs Council 
(2012c) tasked the HR to “accelerate implementation of the Sahel Strategy” (Council 
2012c). In the following months, the HR and the Foreign Affairs Council repeatedly 
called for the restoration of constitutional order and the cessation of hostilities in the 
North (Ashton 2012b; Council 2012a). They expressed the Union’s concern about 
 
  169 
the humanitarian and human rights situations and condemned the destruction of 
cultural heritage. 	  
Aside from diplomatic declarations, the Union’s reaction to the coup included the 
immediate suspension of development aid (with the exception of humanitarian aid) 
(Piebalgs 2012). The gradual resumption of aid was made conditional on the 
presentation of “a credible and consensual roadmap for the restoration of 
constitutional and democratic order” (Council 2012b). On 11 April 2012, 
Commissioner for humanitarian aid, Kristalina Georgieva (2012), warned of “a 
major humanitarian disaster which could spill over to neighbouring countries” and 
announced an increase in EU humanitarian funding by €9 million. In June 2012, the 
Commission further raised humanitarian aid for the Sahel by €40 million to address 
the food crisis and provide emergency assistance to the 400,000 Malians displaced 
by conflict (European Commission 2012c).  
The EU’s more political engagement only started after the UN General Assembly in 
September 2012 (Bello 2012: 16). On 15 October 2012, EU foreign ministers 
declared the situation in Northern Mali “an immediate threat to the Sahel region (…) 
as well as to West and North Africa and to Europe”. It invited the HR and the 
Commission to provide financial and planning support to the AU and ECOWAS. The 
Council requested that the planning of a military CSDP operation for the training and 
reorganisation of Mali’s security forces be pursued “as a matter of urgency” (Council 
2012d). A draft crisis management concept (CMC) for the EU Training Mission 
(EUTM) in Mali was adopted on 10 December 2012. The CMC foresaw the 
deployment of around 200 instructors for an initial period of 15 months and excluded 
involvement in combat operations (Council 2012b).  
France’s unilateral intervention in January 2013 received Europe’s full diplomatic 
backing. On 11 January 2013, Ashton (2013b) condemned the Islamist offensive “in 
the strongest terms” and announced the acceleration of preparations for EUTM Mali. 
On 17 February 2013, the foreign ministers held an extraordinary Council meeting. 
They established EUTM Mali and raised personnel numbers to 500 non-combat 
troops and 200 soldiers (Council 2013a). The operation’s budget was doubled and its 
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mandate was made more robust (Marchal 2013: 492). EUTM Mali deployed on 2 
April 2013 with contributions from 23 EU nations. France was in the lead, “followed 
by Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Britain and Belgium” (Benitez 2013). In 
addition, the Union pledged €50 million to support AFISMA. 
After the presentation of Mali’s Transition Roadmap, the EU fully resumed its 
development cooperation (European Commission 2013b). On 15 February, the 
Commission (2013a) approved a short-term stabilisation package of €20 million 
under the IfS to provide immediate support to local authorities and to prepare for 
elections. The high-level international donor conference in Brussels co-organised by 
the EU and France in mid-May 2013 marked the transition to longer-term support. 
The international community pledged a total of €3,25 billion to help rebuild Mali 
(European Commission 2013d). The EU allocated €1,35 billion, of which €523,9 
from the Commission. European donors underlined that the disbursement of funds 
was tied to the implementation of the Transition Roadmap, including the holding of 
free and fair elections. To this aim, the EU launched an election observation mission 
headed by former Development and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Louis Michel 
on 5 July 2013 (EEAS 2013d). In a preliminary assessment, he described the 
elections as “a successful first step on Mali’s path towards democratic renewal” 
(Michel 2013). 
Table 22: Malian crises and EU response  
Date Crisis and reaction  
January 2012 MNLA-led Tuareg rebellion in the North  
21 March 2012  Coup d’état in Bamako  
22 March 2012 UNSC, Ashton, ECOWAS, and the AU condemn the coup 
23 March 2012 EU suspends development aid to Mali  
28 March 2012 ECOWAS suspends Mali’s membership   
3 April 2012 ECOWAS imposes economic sanctions on Mali  
5 April 2012 MNLA proclaims independence of the Azawad state 
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Date Crisis and reaction  
6 April 2012 Framework Agreement for restoration of constitutional order 
signed 
12 April 2012 Dioncounda Traoré becomes interim President 
28 June 2012 Ansar Dine declares full control of Northern Mali  
5 July 2012 Adoption of UNSC resolution 2056 
28 September 
2012 
Traoré agrees to host ECOWAS troops  
12 October 2012 Adoption of UNSC resolution 2071 
15 October 2012 EU starts planning for EUTM Mali  
10 December 
2012 
Adoption of CMC for EUTM Mali  
20 December 
2012 
Adoption of UNSC resolution 2085 
4 January 2013 Ansar Dine suspends ceasefire  
9 January 2013 African Union Chairman calls on NATO for assistance 
10 January 2013 Islamist offensive on Konna  
11 January 2013 France launches operation Serval 
15 January 2013 UNSC declares unanimous support for French intervention 
16-19 January 
2013 
In Amenas hostage crisis  
17 January 2013 Foreign Affairs Council establishes EUTM Mali; first AFISMA 
troops deployed 
29 January 2013 Transition Roadmap adopted; EU pledges €50 million for 
AFISMA  
15 February 2013 EU decides IfS short-term stabilisation package of €20 
million  
15 May 2013 High-level international donor conference on Mali 
2 April 2013 Deployment of EUTM Mali  
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Date Crisis and reaction  
25 April 2013 Adoption of UNSC resolution 2100 
1 July 2013 AFISMA merges into MINUSMA 
5 July 2013 EU launches election observation mission  
28 July 2013 First round of presidential elections   
11 August 2013 Second round of presidential elections  
Source: own compilation  
6.2 An intermediate degree of coherence 
Having reviewed the Malian crises and the EU’s response, we now focus on the 
dependent variable, the degree of coherence with which European resources were 
mobilised. This section starts by assessing the extent to which the Sahel Strategy 
provided the Union with collective objectives, principles, and priorities. It then 
addresses the interaction of key European players at the national and supranational 
levels to evaluate whether their actions and contributions were in line with the 
Union’s stated objectives.  
A comprehensive and collective strategy?     
The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel represents the Union’s first 
attempt to design a comprehensive regional strategy. It is based on the assumptions 
that security and development are inextricably linked and that the complex 
challenges in the Sahel demand a regional response (EEAS 2011b). The strategy 
underlines the principles of African responsibility and ownership as well as the need 
to coordinate with other international organisations and global partners (EEAS 
2011b).  
The Strategy outlines the Union’s common interests in relation to the Sahel region, 
namely the prevention of terrorist attacks, the containment of drug trade, the 
protection of trade and communication links (roads and pipelines), and the 
preservation of existing and prospective economic interests (EEAS 2011b). The fight 
against AQIM and other terrorist and criminal networks stands out as a priority. The 
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document summarises the region’s core challenges, the Union’s main objectives as 
well as its lines of action and committed resources (see  
).  
Table 23: The Sahel Strategy at a glance  
Challenges • Governance, development, and conflict resolution  
• Regional and international coordination challenges  
• Security and the rule of law 
• Fight against/prevention of violent extremism and 
radicalisation  
Objectives • Reducing insecurity 
• Improving development 
• Strengthening governance and stability 
Lines of action • Development, good governance, and internal conflict 
resolution  
• Political and diplomatic  
• Security and the rule of law 





• 10th European Development Fund   
• IfS  
• European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument  
• Thematic programmes and budget lines  
Source: EEAS (2011b)  
However, several analysts questioned the Strategy’s comprehensiveness. Bello 
(2012: 17) argued that there was an over-emphasis on development instruments to 
the detriment of a more “serious and direct security commitment”. He criticised the 
Union’s piecemeal approach to crisis diplomacy and its inability to go beyond “soft 
power” (Bello 2012: 8). Faleg (2013: 3) agreed that “you cannot turn a 
comprehensive strategy (…) into comprehensive action if you neglect or deny the 
use of military power.” 
The extent to which the member states shared the Strategy’s objectives and priorities 
was also questioned. Some argued that the strategic document, which was negotiated 
over the course of three years, represented a lowest common denominator outcome 
(Think Tank Expert B). While the Sahel region represents a key strategic priority for 
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France, this was much less the case for the UK or Germany – let alone for smaller 
Eastern European countries (German Official B 2013; European Diplomat B 2013).  
Vertical coherence: more words than deeds  
There were few reports of inconsistencies or unilateral deviations in the Malian 
crises. One exception was national ransom payments to Islamist groups, which 
contradicted the Union’s declared aim to fight terrorism and criminal networks in the 
Sahel. A New York Times article of February 2013 ascribed part of the responsibility 
for crisis escalation in Mali to the Europeans who had “knowingly bankrolled 
Islamist radicals” (Weddady 2013). Since 2003, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, 
Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands reportedly transferred over $130 million to 
African terrorist organisations to liberate hostages (Weddady 2013). For instance, in 
July 2012 Spain and Italy paid ransom to AQIM-affiliated Islamist groups for the 
release of aid workers. The decision was controversial, but the EEAS and the 
Commission remained silent, illustrating the absence of a common strategy on 
ransom payments (Bello 2012: 4).  
In the diplomatic and aid arenas, the EU’s activities were largely coherent even if 
French contributions visibly stood out. The member states generally displayed a 
preference for a political solution and underlined the principle of “African solutions 
for African problems” (ISIS 2013: 10). Even France long rejected direct military 
involvement and pushed for an African lead. In mid-December 2012, French foreign 
minister, Laurent Fabius (2012b), still claimed that France would “not at all be first 
in line”. The Sahel Strategy designated Mali as the most important aid recipient in 
the Sahel region and urged the member states to gear their bilateral aid towards the 
Strategy’s objectives (EEAS 2011b). Before aid suspension, France was Mali’s 
primary European donor, followed by the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark 
(OECD/DAC 2011). The gap between France and its European partners broadened at 
the high-level donor conference on Mali in May 2013. France pledged €280 million, 
which amounted to almost three times the contribution of any other EU member state 
(European Commission 2013c).  
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France was also in the driving seat concerning preparations for EUTM Mali. It 
pushed for military involvement in the CSDP framework starting in mid-2012, but 
received little support from European partners. Few of them demonstrated real 
interest in the planning of EUTM Mali (Coolsaet et al. 2013: 3; Marchal 2013: 492). 
An exception was Spain, which was keen to stabilise the Sahel zone to prevent 
potential migratory consequences (European Diplomat E 2013).  
Prior to its military intervention in January 2013, France informed its key 
international and European partners, including Germany, Britain, and HR Ashton. 
Other member states were only notified after the launch of the operation (European 
Diplomat D 2013). However, there was little resentment about this selective 
procedure as most Europeans were glad that France reacted to the emergency 
(European Diplomat F 2013). They knew that intra-European consultations would 
have taken too much time and that France was the only member state capable of 
rapid intervention (German Official A 2013). France’s unilateral intervention thus 
received strong and unified European backing. Prodi (in Kirk 2013) described the 
Union’s accord as unprecedented: “I can say it’s a miracle that all the 27 member 
states agree. I never before found such a level of agreement. This is different from 
Libya. This is different from any other case we had before”.  
While some member states provided logistic support, none offered ground troops. 
The French intervention sped up preparations for EUTM Mali, but the Europeans 
faced difficulties in identifying a 50-soldier team for the protection of trainers 
(Marchal 2013: 492). In February 2013, preparations stalled as Belgium failed to 
provide clearance for the use of its medical evacuation helicopters due to budgetary 
constraints (Gros-Verheyde 2013; Marchal 2013). It called for an increase in 
EUTM’s common costs. But certain large contributors – notably Germany and the 
Netherlands – were reticent. Eventually, the common costs were raised from the 
initial reference amount of €12,3 million to an estimated €23 million (EEAS 2013e). 
But the common costs still amounted to less than 4 per cent of the total costs of 
operation Serval, estimated at €647 million by the end of 2013 (AFP 2013a).  
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Another discussion that was mainly held behind closed doors concerned the potential 
deployment of a civilian CSDP mission parallel to EUTM Mali (European Diplomats 
D and F 2013). France tabled various options in the area of SSR and policy training 
in spring/summer 2013. However, other EU member states rejected them on the 
grounds that a civilian mission would lead to duplication with MINUSMA and that 
Mali lacked the ‘absorption capacity’ (European Diplomats D and F 2013; UK 
Diplomat B 2013). The question of prioritisation in light of an increasingly strained 
CFSP budget also played a role. 
Institutional coherence: implementation gaps 
The Sahel strategy was published two months after the EEAS had been declared 
operational. With its comprehensive outlook it was in line with the new Service’s 
core mission of enhancing the coherence of EU external action. Academic Expert B 
(2013) described the Sahel Strategy as the “golden child of the EEAS. It is like 
saying: ‘this is why we are here.’ (…) It is a flagship project.” Comprehensive 
regional strategies provide direction and a benchmark for assessment. Although they 
do not automatically bring about greater institutional coherence, they foster timely 
and comprehensive engagement with a region and permit different EU-level actors to 
sit at a table and to “throw around ideas” (Academic Expert B 2013).  
However, the strategy turned out to be less preventive and less regional than planned. 
The Libyan crisis delayed its implementation by six months (Godement 2013). The 
institutions did not use the delay to adapt the document to the changing strategic 
context created by the Arab Spring (Rouppert 2012: 6). It did not help prevent the 
creation of a de facto theocracy in Northern Mali or the deterioration of security 
conditions in 2012. Furthermore, the strategy neglected pivotal regional players such 
as Algeria and Nigeria (Bello 2012). Godement (2013: 2) traced some of the 
strategy’s implementation gaps back to the “usual internecine ‘wars’ inside the EU 
bureaucracy” and to the “lack of adequate military expertise within the EEAS.” In 
addition, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures slowed down institutional 
coordination (Rouppert 2012: 6).  
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The EP joined in on the criticism of the Union’s Malian crisis response. In January 
2013, MEPs in the defence and foreign affairs Committees (2013) judged it 
“astonishing” that the Islamist offensive had surprised the Union and argued that – in 
light of recurrent warnings – it should have been prepared. They criticised the 
member states for their “lack of solidarity” with France and urged them to provide 
support on the ground (EP-AFET/SEDE 2013). They MEPs further stressed that the 
HR and EEAS should have exerted more pressure on the member states. In its 
subsequent report on the EEAS review, the EP (2013: 4) used Mali as prime example 
for overly slow decision-making procedures and implementation in the area of the 
CSDP and CFSP.  
Overall assessment  
The EU’s response to the Malian crises offers a rather mixed picture in terms of 
coherence. Europe displayed few open inconsistencies and contradictions. It disposed 
of a comprehensive strategy, outlining collective objectives and priorities, and 
providing ‘agreed language’ for crisis management activities in the region. The 
Union adhered to the Strategy’s key principles. By yielding diplomatic backing to 
ECOWAS crisis management activities, it acted in line with the principles of African 
responsibility and ownership. Europe also engaged with international and regional 
players in the UN and more specific coordination bodies in line with the principle of 
effective multilateralism. In line with the Strategy’s objectives, the Sahel states – and 
Mali in particular – became focal points of EU financial assistance.  
But despite the existence of a common strategy and recurrent warnings, the Union 
failed in conflict prevention. Strategy implementation was slow and displayed an 
imbalance towards development instruments. Meanwhile, the pooling of member 
state resources was heavily biased. The French led Europe in all arenas: diplomatic, 
military, and economic. When they intervened unilaterally in January 2013, Europe’s 
unified diplomatic support did not entail equivalent operational backing. Subsequent 
decisions on EUTM Mali were made relatively quickly, but deployment was fraught 
with unilateral reluctance. And though EUTM Mali was celebrated as an important 
contribution to international crisis management, it did not represent a direct response 
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to the emergency situation in January 2013. Discussions on a civilian CSDP 
contribution ended in non-decision. Due to the discrepancy between the Union’s 
strategic commitment on the one hand and the reluctance to provide common 
resources for timely and preventive implementation on the other, the degree of 
coherence of the EU’s crisis management is classified as intermediate.  
6.3 The ‘Big Three’: French interests and loyal 
partners   
If preventing the creation of an Islamist safe haven at Europe’s doorstep was a 
collective priority, why was Europe not more assertive? And what explains the 
asymmetry of member state contributions? This section examines the roles and 
interplay of the ‘Big Three’ in the EU’s Malian crisis management and the balance 
between collective and national interests and norms.  
France: preventing ‘Sahelistan’ and preserving interests 
France clearly led international and European crisis management efforts in Mali. The 
division of labour between Africans and Europeans was worked out in Paris. All 
drafts for UNSC resolutions on Mali between March 2012 and August 2013 were 
French. Paris was also the key driver behind the development of the Sahel strategy 
and operation EUTM Mali. Why did France play such a proactive role? And why did 
it react to the January 2013 emergency unilaterally?  
France’s immediate economic interests in Mali were limited. However, regional 
destabilisation held potential implications for interests in neighbouring Niger 
(Ahluwalia 2013; Francis 2013). The latter accounted for 33 per cent of the French 
uranium supply (Bresler 2013). France is highly dependent on uranium imports as 80 
per cent of its electricity production comes from nuclear power (Bresler 2013). In 
addition, there were clear ties between political decision-makers and domestic 
economic players. The French government held over 80 per cent of the shares of 
nuclear multinational Areva, which was heavily invested in Nigerien uranium mines 
(EurActiv 2014). The fact that France ordered its Special Forces to these mines in 
February 2013 testifies to the salience of these economic interests.  
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The Sahel also constituted a French priority in terms of security interests. France had 
been a target of Islamist terrorist attacks since the 1990s (Francis 2013: 12). It 
declared war on AQIM in July 2010, which retaliated by declaring war on France. In 
2012, the terrorist organisation held six French hostages in the Sahel region. Further 
security concerns included potential domestic repercussions of regional 
destabilisation emanating from France’s large Malian and Algerian Diasporas 
(German Official A 2013). In addition, the Islamist offensive in January 2013 posed 
a direct threat to approximately 6000 French citizens living in Bamako (Rettman 
2011). The combination of these factors contributed to a high national threat 
perception.  
Mali was already a growing priority for Hollande’s government in 2012. However, 
military intervention was initially not an option for the French President who had 
promised his voters a clean break from old patterns of Françafrique. In his Dakar 
speech on 12 October 2012, he announced a re-balancing of Franco-African relations 
and declared that the times when France played the role of Africa’s “gendarme” were 
definitely over (Hollande 2012b). Accordingly, Hollande and foreign minister Fabius 
advocated an African-led intervention in Mali throughout 2012, and repeated that 
there would be no French troops on the ground. They underlined that the French role 
was one of a facilitator willing to provide logistical support and training (for 
example: Fabius 2012a; Hollande 2012a). However, in January 2013, fear of regional 
destabilisation and its repercussions prevailed over the announced departure from 
Françafrique. But even then, the political elite was keen to portray the French 
intervention as an essentially African undertaking.  
Hollande launched operation Serval at a time when his approval ratings were at a low 
point of 37 per cent (AFP 2013b). The intervention represented an opportunity to 
contravene domestic criticism of his perceived indecision. IFOP polls of 21 January 
2013 showed that popular support for the intervention (65 per cent) was comparable 
to that of the Bosnian (1994) and Libyan (2011) ones (Guibert and Revault 
D’Allonnes 2013). Demonstrating decisiveness in foreign and security policy also 
matched Hollande’s electoral promise to re-balance the distribution of power vis-à-
vis Germany’s dominant role in the economic arena (Wiegel 2013a).  
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In the month after the launch of operation Serval, Hollande’s approval rate rose by 6 
per cent (Europe1.fr/Reuters 2013). Considering the precedent cases of Georgia 
(2008) and Libya (2011), the French President was certainly aware of the positive 
impact decisive crisis management could have on popularity ratings (Revault 
D’Allonnes 2013). But these precedent cases also showed that the positive impact 
tends to be short-lived. It was likely that domestic political attention would rapidly 
return to the country’s pressing economic problems. In addition, the French public 
was wary of engagement in a protracted conflict after years of military involvement 
and significant French casualties in Afghanistan (Revault D’Allonnes and Wieder 
2013). The increase in presidential popularity was thus rather a “collateral benefit” of 
operation Serval than a pivotal factor behind Hollande’s decision to intervene 
(Lemarié and Revault D’Allonnes 2013). And the positive effect of the intervention 
on the President’s popularity ratings was indeed short-lived (Tessier 2013).   
According to official declarations, the key objective behind France’s proactive 
approach to Mali was to prevent the creation of a ‘new Afghanistan’ at Europe’s 
borders. French politicians already warned of the emergence of ‘Sahelistan’ and of 
the creation of a safe haven for ‘narco-terrorism’ in mid-2012 (see for example 
Fabius 2012c). The political discourse resembled American narratives on the 
international “war on terror” (Marchal 2013). Political analysts denounced these 
narratives as examples of securitisation brushing over the complexity and specificity 
of the Malian situation (Francis 2013; Dowd and Raleigh 2013; ICG 2012a).103  
The official justification for unilateral intervention in January 2013 was that intra-
European decision-making would have taken too long (Fabius 2013c). But, marking 
the difference in style from the previous government, Fabius (2013b) underlined that 
prior consultations with most European partners had taken place. Government 
representatives also asserted that France was “not alone”. They repeatedly mentioned 
African operational support, Europe’s engagement in the fields of logistics and 
                                                
103 Securitisation is a constructivist concept associated with the Copenhagen School of security 
studies. It designates an extreme version of politicisation, purposively used to confer legitimacy on the 
use of extraordinary measures under the cover of ‘security’ (Buzan et al. 1998).  
 
  181 
training, and unified diplomatic backing by the international community (Fabius 
2013a; Hollande 2013). However, the opposition soon criticised France’s “solitude” 
and “isolation” and denounced the intervention as improvised and ill-prepared 
(Anon. 2013). They compared the Malian with the Libyan intervention and blamed 
the President for his failure to prepare a broad multilateral coalition (Anon. 2013). 
Former Secretary of State for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Pierre Lellouche 
(2013), argued it was “like going to Afghanistan alone” and that the French were 
acting like Europe’s “mercenaries” paying the “price of blood” for the security 
interests of the whole continent.  
UK: calculated support and division of labour  
Britain’s role in the Malian crisis was not pronounced. Before January 2013, it 
displayed little interest in the Sahel region. The UK supported the French 
intervention in January 2013 logistically with two C-17 transport aircraft and a small 
technical team. They also made a substantial contribution to EUTM Mali. But why 
did the UK not side with France as in the Libyan case and what role did they play in 
the European context? 
Mali was not of immediate economic or strategic interest for the UK. Bilateral trade 
was negligible and the country was not an important national security concern. There 
was a potential risk that regional destabilisation and a proliferation of armed Islamist 
groups in the Sahel would affect strategically important areas, including Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone (Nougayrède et al. 2012). But the fact that no British Foreign Secretary 
had paid a visit to Mali before March 2013 can be seen as an indicator for the 
relatively low foreign policy salience of Mali. UK Diplomat B (2013) confirmed: 
“Before 2013, we were simply absent from the region. (…) We did not start from a 
low base – we started from zero”. 
The absence of immediate national interests in the Sahel explains Britain’s reluctance 
to shift EU resources and attention away from the strategically more relevant Horn of 
Africa region. The UK was not pleased with the appointment of political 
heavyweight Prodi – a former Italian Prime Minister and President of the EU 
Commission – as UN Special Envoy for the Sahel in October 2012 (Marchal 2013: 
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491). The largely French-inspired appointment was perceived as an attempt to divert 
EU funds away from Somalia. But at the same time, the British gave the French “a 
free hand” in the Mali dossier (European Diplomat D 2013). The laissez-faire 
strategy was not only related to strong Franco-British ties in security affairs, but also 
a matter of strategic calculation. According to European Diplomat D (2013), the 
‘deal’ struck with France was: “We support you in the Sahel if you support us in 
Somalia”.  
Beyond national calculation, the Sahel and Mali did not receive much public or 
political attention until early 2013. A review of 2012 parliamentary debates in the 
House of Commons shows that only three of them addressed Mali. The Sahel region 
was generally framed as a humanitarian rather than a security issue (House of 
Commons 2012a). Public attention rose with the French intervention in January 
2013. But while the UK provided immediate diplomatic backing, it clearly excluded 
a combat role for British troops (Cameron 2013b). The refusal to put ‘boots on the 
ground’ was backed by a majority in the House of Commons and was in line with 
British public opinion. A YouGov survey of January 2013 showed that 63 per cent of 
the polled rejected a deployment of British troops to Mali while only 15 per cent 
were in favour (Nelson 2013).104 UK Diplomat C (2013) illustrated the domestic 
constraints his country was facing: “It is very sensitive for us to send ground troops 
after the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. (…) In January 2013, it was politically 
necessary to publicly declare that we are not going into another intervention.” 
However, the In Amenas crisis triggered a noticeable shift in political discourse and 
threat perception (Marchal 2013: 492). When it was clear that six British nationals 
had been killed in the kidnapping, Mali and AQIM rose to the top of the political 
agenda. On 18 January 2013, Cameron (2013a) compared the threat from the Sahel 
region to that from Pakistan and Afghanistan. At a National Security Council 
meeting on 22 January 2013, he ordered a shift in resources and attention away from 
                                                
104 Meanwhile, almost half of the polled approved of Britain’s logistical support to France (Nelson 
2013). Later in 2013, of course, the UK government lost a motion in the House of Commons to 
respond militarily to the use of chemical weapons in Syria (see chapter 8). 
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the UK’s counter-terrorist focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East, and 
towards what he called a “’a generational struggle’ against al-Qaida-inspired 
militants in north Africa” (in Wintour & Borger 2013). He added that Mali could not 
become “another Afghanistan or even another Libya” and that “the world needs to 
come together to deal with the threat in North Africa” (in Francis 2013: 13). He thus 
adopted the French narrative of the ‘international war on terror’.  
The In Amenas kidnapping also pushed the UK to “ally itself closely with a broader 
European effort” (Dennison 2013). Following the Algerian crisis, Britain pledged 
additional surveillance support to France and offered up to 200 military personnel for 
the training of Anglophone West African troops (Prime Minister’s Office 2013). In 
January 2013, the press reported that the Prime Minister put the forces on “high 
alert” for a potential emergency deployment to Mali in support of the French (The 
Week 2013). The Foreign Office later dismissed these reports. The UK became the 
fifth biggest contributor to EUTM Mali by contributing 37 military personnel (EEAS 
2013e).  
According to UK Diplomat B (2013), the rationale behind the British contributions to 
crisis management in Mali was to demonstrate loyalty with France within the 
confines of domestic constraints: “We could support EUTM Mali – that would not 
involve combat troops. We could contribute with airlift – that would not involve 
combat troops. We could send civilians to Mali – that would not involve combat 
troops”. UK Diplomat B (2013) added: “We are in favour of the EU acting more 
effectively in this part of the world. This is good news, especially as we don’t want 
to do it ourselves.”   
The latter statement illustrates the boundaries of the UK’s engagement in the region. 
On 21 January 2013, Hague downplayed Britain’s role in francophone West Africa, 
referring to its minor diplomatic presence and stating that it was not “omnipotent” (in 
Wintour 2013). He alluded to a division of labour between France and the UK with 
regard to East and West Africa (Buchsteiner 2013). A French diplomat confirmed 
this perspective: “Sudan is an American responsibility. The British take care of 
Somalia, and we take care of francophone Africa” (in Scheen 2013). In line with this 
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division of labour, the UK’s short-term support did not entail longer-term financial 
commitment (European Diplomat F 2013). The UK’s pledge at the Mali donor 
conference on 15 May 2013 amounted only to one fifth of the German and one 
fourteenth of the French contributions.  
Germany: restraint and Alliance solidarity  
Before the coup d’état in March 2012, Germany had already been involved in the 
training of Malian security forces for several decades. Nevertheless, Berlin was 
reluctant to follow the French lead after the coup and clearly rejected any 
involvement in combat operations. In 2013, it offered logistical support to operation 
Serval, became the second biggest contributor to EUTM Mali, and made significant 
aid contributions. Why was Berlin initially reluctant and what explains the apparent 
shift in position? 
Mali was not a priority in terms of Germany’s economic interests. The Foreign 
Office (2013) described bilateral trade as “relatively insignificant” and added that 
there was no important German investment in Mali. In November 2012, foreign 
minister Westerwelle proposed to mediate between the interim government and 
Tuareg groups in the North. Unlike Paris or Washington, Berlin was not associated 
with important economic or geo-strategic interests (Sattar 2012b).  
Mali remained rather absent from the German domestic discourse until late 2012. 
When asked for the reasons, European Diplomat F (2013) explained that “Africa is 
not an important topic for the German public”. “It is different in France where 
interests in Africa are an integral part of the public agenda”, European Diplomat E 
(2013) added. German politicians even explicitly mentioned the indifference of the 
public concerning Mali in parliamentary debates (Mißfelder 2013; Stinner 2013). 
The debate only became more animated when Merkel (2012) announced Germany’s 
willingness to contribute to a military European training operation during a speech in 
Strausberg on 22 October 2012. The possibility of a military engagement tends to 
raise the domestic political salience of any issue in Germany (European Diplomat F 
2013).  
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The announcement to contribute to European crisis management in October 2012 
coincided with the adoption of the French narrative of ‘Sahelistan’ and an increasing 
depiction of the situation in Mali as a threat to Europe. In Strausberg, Merkel (2012) 
declared that free and democratic states could not accept the creation of a safe haven 
for international terrorism in Northern Mali. One day later, development minister 
Dirk Niebel warned that Mali could turn into a “second Afghanistan” (Sattar 2012b). 
Foreign minister Westerwelle soon joined the chorus, stating: “If northern Mali falls, 
then terrorist schools will be created there… and then not only Mali and the region, 
the North African nations, will be threatened, but also us in Europe” (Daryl 2012).  
But beyond official narratives, Germany’s threat perception remained much less 
alarmist than that of France. At a briefing on 23 October 2012, German intelligence 
chief, Gerhard Schindler, told the Bundestag that jihadists in Northern Mali would 
only pose a threat to Europe within some years (Sattar 2012a). Meanwhile, the 
German Armed Forces Association cautioned against an unreflective “military 
adventure” in West Africa (DPA 2012). A German Diplomat (2013) argued that 
Berlin was reluctant to be “dragged into another African adventure” aimed at the 
protection of French national interests. He explained that three precedent cases 
contributed to this perception: the operations EUFOR RDC in 2006; EUFOR 
Chad/CAR in 2008-2009; and EUFOR Libya in 2011 (German Diplomat 2013).  
Until January 2013, Germany thus adhered to its traditional stance of military 
restraint. Government representatives were cautious in their support for a European 
engagement. In intra-European consultations, Germany insisted on the clarification 
of the political aims and operational requirements of EUTM Mali (German Officials 
A and B 2013). Less than a week before the Islamist offensive, Westerwelle (2013) 
still refused to discuss the German contribution, unless these preconditions were 
clarified.  
According to European Diplomat E (2013), “it was primarily the Franco-German 
relationship that brought Mali on Germany’s agenda”. January 2013 brought the 
principle of Alliance solidarity to the fore. The Franco-German dimension became 
particularly salient, as the French intervention coincided with preparations for the 
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50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty (European Diplomat D 2013). Germany’s swift 
provision of two Transall aircraft for the transport of ECOWAS troops to Bamako 
thus represented an important political signal (Think Tank Expert B 2013).  
But Germany’s alleged solidarity with France soon became subject to domestic 
contention. A number of government and opposition representatives argued that 
Germany’s support was deficient. On 19 January 2013, Bundestag President Norbert 
Lammert told the press that he considered the provision of the Transall aircraft a 
“first demonstrative signal that Germany is not positioning itself as in the Libyan 
case”. But he added that he could not imagine that “anybody would take this for the 
German contribution” (DPA 2013a). The latter was one of several statements linking 
Mali to the Libyan case. Support to the French in Mali was seen as an opportunity to 
rectify Germany’s reputation of unreliability in the eyes of the most important 
European partner (Gebauer & Wittrock 2013).  
Germany thus provided an additional Transall aircraft and an air-to-air refuelling 
plane in support of operation Serval later in January 2013. In late February 2013, the 
Bundestag authorised further logistical and air-to-air refuelling support and 150 
troops for AFISMA as well as 180 troops for EUTM Mali. Germany was also the 
second most important European donor at the international aid conference in 
Brussels in May 2013. It accounted for one fifth of the European Commission 
contribution and pledged another €100 million bilaterally for the period of 2013-
2014 (FAZ 2013). According to Think Tank Expert A (2013) Germany’s gradually 
increasing engagement in Mali showed that it had learned its lessons from Libya. 
This time, the government opted for a “middle-way” between the principles of 
military restraint and Alliance solidarity.  
6.4 Institutions: between tensions and French 
leadership 
The Sahel Strategy was presented as a flagship project for the EEAS. However, 
analysts criticised implementation gaps and heavy bureaucratic procedures 
(Godement 2013; Rouppert 2012). This section explores potential causes in the 
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realms of bureaucratic politics and organisational cultures. It then evaluates the role 
of institutional coordination mechanisms for horizontal and vertical coherence.   
Resources for security and development  
The Sahel Strategy emphasised the inextricable link between security and 
development. But the emphasis did not translate into an equivalent allocation of 
funds. The Council and the Commission faced recurrent tensions about the use of 
development funds for the implementation of security-related measures (Rouppert 
2012: 7-8). One example was the discussion on Commission funds for counter-
terrorism measures. In a speech at the EP in November 2012, EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove expressed concern about the reduction of funds 
under the IfS dedicated to counter-terrorism (in Rouppert 2012: 8). In a 2012 
reflection paper, he argued that the Union should use EDF and Development 
Cooperation Instrument funds for certain counter-terrorism measures (EPLO 2012).  
Another example concerned operation EUTM Mali. The EU set out to train Malian 
security forces, but could not provide them with much-needed military equipment 
(European Diplomats E and F 2013). In February 2013, EUTM Operations 
Commander General François Lecointre urged the Europeans to provide equipment, 
which would cost “much more” than the operation’s foreseen common budget 
(Fletcher 2013).  
Coherence meets humanitarian space 
In December 2012, Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Georgieva urged all parties 
involved in the Malian crisis to respect humanitarian principles (European 
Commission 2012d). “Without safe and secure access for humanitarian workers our 
aid cannot save those whose lives are now hanging in the balance”, she added. The 
fragility of the humanitarian space had been highlighted in October 2012 when Al 
Qaeda-linked militants kidnapped six aid workers in Niger. To protect the 
humanitarian space, DG ECHO did not require any visible indication of EU funding 
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from its implementing partners in Mali.105 In April 2013, after the French 
intervention and the deployment of EUTM, the Council reiterated calls for the 
respect of the humanitarian space in Mali.  
Humanitarian principles were also relevant at the national level. A Member of the 
Humanitarian Aid department of the German Foreign Office (2013) explained that all 
documents related to Mali had to pass over his desk: “If a governmental declaration, 
for instance, stated that we are supporting the Malian government with moral, 
military, humanitarian, and development-related measures, we would argue that 
these measures have to be clearly separated. We do not want to be mentioned in the 
same breath with politically controlled instruments or measures”.  
The practical impact of such rhetorical intricacies might be limited. But they are 
indicative of the inherent tensions between the humanitarian aid principles and the 
integrative dynamic of the comprehensive approach to crisis management. Three 
humanitarian aid practitioners argued that the Malian/Sahel crisis represented a 
crucial test for the Union’s commitment to humanitarian principles (Pontiroli et al. 
2013). They admonished the loss of these principles in the search for coherence and 
emphasised that humanitarian aid is one form of “crisis response”, but not “a means 
of crisis management” (Pontiroli et al. 2013). They further outlined the “potential 
dangers of EU coherence”, namely the risks for aid workers and limitations to access 
to people in need if humanitarian aid is viewed as a political tool (Pontiroli et al. 
2013). Perceived politicisation is more likely if individual action by one member 
state, parallel to EU action, suggests interest-based intervention. The reference to 
France’s role in Mali is implicit. These aid practitioners commend the European 
Commission for its respect of the humanitarian principles, but call on the member 
states to follow suit. Their article clearly illustrates that the epistemic norms of the 
                                                
105 The concept of humanitarian space usually refers to four aspects: physical access to people in need; 
the respect of the humanitarian principles; the security conditions in the working environment; and the 
ability of affected populations to reach assistance and protection (Overseas Development Institute 
2014).  
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humanitarian community clash with the Union’s coherence-related norms and these 
clashes transcend various governance levels.  
Coordination mechanisms and their limitations  
The capacity of the HR to ensure vertical coordination was limited. Analysts noted 
that Ashton kept “strangely quiet” on operation EUTM Mali until January 2013 and 
failed to provide “decisive leadership” (Coolsaet et al. 2013: 3; Faleg 2013: 2). But 
her potential for leadership was also confined by France’s vital national interests and 
unilateral actions (Bello 2012: 4). Ashton’s vertical coordination efforts largely 
constituted a reaction to the French intervention in January 2013. She convened the 
Crisis Platform twice in the weeks following the French intervention. After the 
extraordinary FAC Council on 17 January 2013, she also activated the ‘Clearing 
House’ mechanism – a dedicated platform within the EUMS – to facilitate the 
pooling of EU and international logistical support to AFISMA (Ashton 2013a). 
Meanwhile, the EEAS played a role of “softener” in Mali (European Diplomat E 
2013). It adapted the mainly French drafts for Council Conclusions and made them 
more coherent. “The EEAS thus acted as a kind of filter for particular interests of the 
member states” (European Diplomat E 2013). This role is not negligible, as a number 
of member states perceived the French push for EU crisis management in Mali as 
arrogant and ungrounded (Marchal 2013: 491). However, soft-washing national 
interests does not correspond to the EEAS’s foreseen role as a coordination hub for 
the Union’s various crisis management measures and activities.  
The Sahel Strategy also led to the creation of a number of formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms. In 2012, the HR appointed Peteris Ustubs as EEAS 
Director for West and Central Africa and Senior Sahel Coordinator. His mandate was 
to promote a common vision for the Sahel countries and to engage with regional 
partners and other international players (Bello 2012: 3). He coordinated the Sahel 
Task Force responsible for the evaluation of the Strategy’s implementation. The Task 
Force was an informal coordination group, meeting twice or three times a month. It 
was composed of various EEAS officials (crisis management structures and 
geographic departments), relevant Commission services (Service for Foreign Policy 
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Instruments, DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, and DG Home Affairs), and the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator (Pirozzi 2013: 16).  
But in March 2013, the Council appointed another coordinating figure. The member 
states appointed senior diplomat and former French ambassador to Mali, Michel 
Reveyrand-de Menthon, as EUSR for the Sahel. His mandate included regional and 
international coordination and the implementation of the comprehensive approach in 
line with the Sahel Strategy, and thus overlapped with that of the Senior Sahel 
Coordinator (Council 2013b). UK Diplomat A (2013) noted that these overlapping 
responsibilities caused tensions and “institutional oddities”, as the member states 
preferred to interact with the EUSR: “The EUSR is much more responsive to the 
member states. (…) He only responds to the HR and is not answerable to other 
EEAS institutions or the Sahel Coordinator” (UK Diplomat A 2013). The member 
states were thus advocates of a comprehensive EU approach to the Sahel, but used 
institutional overlaps to their advantage.  
Conclusion  
Though Mali was a good example of diplomatic unity, it was not the Union’s best 
demonstration of collective action. This result is partly due to the intra-European 
distribution of interests. The Sahel Strategy listed a range of collective security and 
economic interests (EEAS 2011b). But, as our analysis has shown, the only member 
state with tangible economic and security-related stakes in the region was France. 
Aware of this asymmetry, the other member states also viewed the Sahel as an 
essentially French responsibility. They accepted French leadership within the EU, 
but did not make comparable contributions. Mali thus confirms the link between 
national interests and coherence posited by hypothesis 1a and draws specific 
attention to the distribution of national stakes. If the latter is highly asymmetric, truly 
collective and coherent action is unlikely.  
The influence of electoral calculation on the degree of coherence was mixed. 
Evidence suggested that the French President was aware of the short-lived positive 
impact decisive crisis management behaviour could have on popularity ratings. Yet 
President Traoré’s call for emergency assistance was certainly a more important 
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factor in the decision for rapid intervention. Mali was not very salient in the British 
and German public discourse. However, politicians in London and Berlin cautiously 
avoided the impression of involving their country in an open-ended African 
‘adventure’. Caution was important in light of war-weary constituencies with little 
appetite to see their countries engaged in another Afghanistan. This was particularly 
the case for the German government, which was preparing for federal elections in 
September 2013.  
Despite a preference for limited involvement, both Britain and Germany felt 
compelled to demonstrate loyalty with France. In the UK’s case, support for Mali 
was presented as a trade-off for French backing in the Horn of Africa and can thus be 
interpreted as an intergovernmental bargain (H2a). Meanwhile, Germany opted for a 
middle way between its traditional foreign policy principles of alliance loyalty and 
military restraint. It was cautious and reluctant at first, but gradually provided 
substantial logistic and financial support. Germany’s change in position can be seen 
as a response to French expectations and to demands of a domestic political elite 
eager to restore the country’s image of reliability after Libya. The shift thus 
represents an example of norm-based, rather than strategic behaviour.  
According to Think Tank Expert B (2013), “EU crisis management in Mali was 
coherent because of France’s strong engagement”. However, France’s leadership 
also restrained the autonomous influence of EU-level actors. And while the member 
states subscribed to a comprehensive strategy for the Sahel, they preferred to interact 
with institutional players that were more responsive to them than to the wider EU 
crisis management system. 
More generally, the Union’s crisis response to Mali underlined Europe’s collective 
preference for “African solutions to African problems”. In other words, it showed 
that European decision-makers prefer to use African forces as proxies when national 
security interests on the ‘Dark Continent’ are at stake (Olsen 2014). But Mali 
illustrated the practical limitations of this strategy. The preparations for AFISMA 
were too lengthy to deter an Islamist offensive or to provide immediate responses. In 
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addition, the African-led operation heavily relied on external planning assistance and 
funding.  
Mali also confirmed the American tendency to leave the stage to Europeans when it 
comes to African theatres. Yet the French heavily relied on American support in 
terms of reconnaissance and strategic enablers (such as airlift and air-to-air 
refuelling). The Americans initially planned to issue a bill for their support, 
illustrating once more their dwindling appetite to fill in for European capability 
gaps.106 Ultimately, Mali demonstrated that ‘strategic surprises’ in Europe’s 
neighbourhood cannot be tackled with ‘soft power’ alone and that neither African 
proxies nor ‘Uncle Sam’ will provide Europe with the necessary sharp edge.  
                                                
106 In January 2013, the Washington announced it wanted to charge Paris $20 million for the use of its 
C-17 transport aircraft. It later withdrew the claim arguing that there was a misunderstanding and that 
transport support would be provided free of charge (Wiegel 2013b).   
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 Comparing crisis responses and Chapter 7:
explaining variation  
Coherence in EU crisis management is a matter of degree. This is one of the obvious 
findings that emerge from the analysis of three post-Lisbon cases of EU crisis 
management. The cases displayed substantial variation in terms of the degree of 
coherence. The Union’s response to the Libyan crisis was often inconsistent, leading 
to the assessment of a low degree of coherence. In comparison, Europe’s collective 
reaction to the Somali conflict displayed a relatively high level of coherence. The 
response to Mali’s crises fell in between and was thus evaluated as demonstrating 
medium coherence.  
This chapter draws the findings of the case studies together, providing systematic 
explanations for the observed variation. The contextual sections of the case studies 
showed that the conflicts and international responses differed in many important 
respects. However, this thesis chose to focus the comparison on three guiding 
questions:  
• How did the interaction of domestic interests and embedded norms influence 
the degree of coherence in EU crisis management? 
• How did norms and calculation interact at the intergovernmental level in 
influencing the degree of coherence in EU crisis management? 
• How did EU institutional interests and norms interact in influencing the 
degree of coherence in EU crisis management? 
The chapter compares findings across cases to evaluate the explanatory power of the 
structured answers proposed by the hypotheses. Sections 1 to 3 address the domestic, 
intergovernmental, and EU institutional levels respectively. Section 4 turns to the 
role of embedded analytical units and situates the players’ actions and interaction 
within a broader contemporary context. The conclusion summarises the findings of 
comparative analysis in light of the hypotheses. 
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7.1 When domestic interests trump norms  
The three case studies showed that domestic constituencies and contexts were crucial 
to understand variation in the degree of coherence in EU crisis decision-making. This 
section evaluates the role and influence of domestic factors comparatively across 
cases. It starts with economic interests and then moves to electoral considerations 
and embedded norms.  
Coherence meets market power  
Each of the analysed conflicts created positive or negative economic externalities for 
European domestic players. However, their nature and distribution varied. The 
Libyan crisis affected the economic interests of various EU member states. While 
those were not the sole reasons behind the Libyan intervention, they held substantial 
explanatory power when it came to unilateral member state actions or inactions and 
their timing. As outlined in chapter 4, France’s unilateral moves partly coincided 
with lucrative perspectives in the Libyan energy sector. UK Diplomat C (2013) also 
acknowledged Britain’s “dividends of the intervention. Our relations with the 
Libyans are certainly better than those of countries who played a less immediate role 
in 2011”.  
European Diplomat C (2011) underlined the importance of the private sector for 
intergovernmental decision-making in the field of restrictive measures: “The 
question for the member states was how to implement sanctions without damaging 
domestic companies”. While not at the centre of the present analysis, Italy represents 
an important example in this regard. Rome “had high stakes in Libya”, which was its 
most important energy supplier (Italian Official 2011). In 2010, the desert nation 
provided 22 per cent of Italian oil imports and 13 per cent of its gas imports 
(International Energy Agency 2011). In March 2011, the director of Italian energy 
giant ENI urged Europe to refrain from further sanctions and warned that they 
amounted to “shooting ourselves in the foot” (in Dinmore and Chaffin 2011). 
European Diplomat C (2011) explained: “ENI was a major player because it had 
strongly invested in the Libyan energy sector. It was clear that it had most to lose”. 
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ENI’s pressure was certainly one factor behind Rome’s initial reluctance to impose 
sanctions on the Libyan energy sector.  
However, the impact of sanctions on the energy sector was not devastating, as Italy 
had three main energy suppliers aside from Libya: Russia, Norway, and Algeria. In 
addition, the crisis escalated in the spring and summer months when energy 
requirements are reduced (European Diplomat C 2011). The asset freeze was 
seemingly more important. The Libyan Central Bank and the Libyan Investment 
Authority held around 7.5 per cent of the shares of Italian Bank UniCredit SpA 
(Castonguay 2011). These shares explain why Italy initially insisted on a “narrow 
interpretation” of the asset freeze on the Libyan finance sector (Castonguay 2011).  
The distribution of economic interests in the Malian case was clearly more 
asymmetric. Potential regional destabilisation indirectly affected a major French 
economic interest, namely the security of uranium supply from neighbouring Niger. 
These interests help explain why France adopted a proactive approach to the Sahel 
region, and a forceful unilateral approach to the Malian crisis in January 2013. 
Conversely, the relative absence of economic interests of other member states are in 
line with their reluctance to follow France’s lead in 2012 and to provide substantial 
operational and economic support. While French politicians cautiously denied the 
existence of a ‘hidden economic agenda’, other European decision-makers did ask 
themselves whether they should support the country’s efforts to secure its uranium 
supply (Academic Expert B 2013; European Diplomat E 2013; German Official C 
2013).  
The contrast with Somalia is striking. When asked which member states were 
particularly interested in the EU’s Somali crisis management, European Diplomat F 
(2013) simply replied, “all of them”. Maritime piracy was a collective priority for the 
member states and the international community at large. The Union is a global trade 
power and the Gulf of Aden one of its major trading routes. The influence of 
economic interest groups on the political decision-making process was also more 
visible than in the other two cases (Germond and Smith 2009; Pohl 2012). Calls by 
shipping and economic associations for a more robust European role in counter-
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piracy were openly discussed in parliamentary debates. One reason for the open 
involvement of economic interest groups might be that the negative externalities of 
maritime piracy as well as the potential benefits of robust counter-piracy operations 
were calculable. The specificity of maritime operations further allowed for the 
protection of economic interests without inflicting immediate damage on the local 
population.   
Overall, the three cases indicate that the existence and distribution of economic 
interests and stakes influences the degree of coherence in EU crisis management. The 
empirical evidence is in line with the causal link posited by hypothesis 1a and thus 
proves the applicability of liberal intergovernmentalist explanations to the hard case 
of EU crisis management. The Somali case, in particular, shows that EU crisis 
management can represent a positive-sum game with calculable, collective pay-offs 
(politics of scale) and few individual risks. These conditions increase the likelihood 
of coherent EU crisis management. Conversely, deviations and unilateral measures 
are likely if economic interests compete, in a zero-sum fashion, or if the distribution 
of potential losses among member states is asymmetric.  
The pressure of the principal  
Libya, Somalia, and Mali also differed in terms of political salience. Table 24 
provides an overview of the numbers of parliamentary plenary sessions containing 
substantial debates on the conflicts within the case study time frames.107 Based on 
this indicator, Libya stands out as most salient. While the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprisings had sensitised national publics and political elites, the controversial, 
difficult, and lengthy NATO intervention kept the political debate alive. Mali comes 
second in terms of political salience. It invaded the debate in January 2013 with the 
Islamist offensive and the In Amenas hostage crisis. However, once the success of 
                                                
107 All protocols of plenary sessions in the British, German, and French parliaments that contained 
references to the three conflicts within the given time frames were carefully screened. Single protocols 
were classified as ‚substantial’ if the conflicts or corresponding national/EU measures were (a) subject 
to discussion (not only mentioned in passing) and (b) mentioned more than twice. Table 24 lists the 
number of protocols containing ‘substantial’ parliamentary debates.  
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operation Serval became increasingly certain, the political attention rapidly dropped. 
Finally, the Somali conflict was most insulated from domestic political debates. The 
relatively low salience reflects the fact that Somali piracy was on a course of steady 
decline during the studied time period.108 In addition, only few controversial crisis 
management decisions were taken at the European level.  
Table 24: Debates on conflicts in parliamentary debates 
Conflict / parliaments of France UK Germany Total 
Libya (15.02.2011-31.10.2011) 24 40 15 79 
Somalia (14.11.2011-13.11.2012) 1 12 9 22 
Mali (21.03.2012-11.08.2013) 32 14 18 64 
Total 57 66 42 165 
Source: own compilation  
Variations across member states are also worth noting. The Libyan crisis received 
substantial political attention in France, the UK, and Germany. The differences in the 
Malian and Somali cases were more pronounced. Mali was at the very top of the 
French political agenda. It became quite prominent in Germany once Merkel 
declared a general willingness to make a military contribution in October 2012. 
Meanwhile, the House of Commons only really dealt with Mali in January 2013 – in 
particular after the In Amenas hostage crisis. Conversely, Somalia was much more 
salient in the British and German parliaments than in the French one, where it was 
barely mentioned. Finally, the variation shown in Table 24 reflects Germany’s 
relatively lower public interest in Africa as well as the apparent ‘division of labour’ 
between France and the UK with regard to East and West Africa respectively.  
                                                
108 The number of total pirate attacks in the waters off the Somali Coast fell from 176 in 2011 to 35 in 
2012 (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2014).  
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Overall, questions on the use of force received disproportionate domestic attention. 
The Libyan case offered an interesting picture in this regard. In France, the public 
and the political elite were in favour of intervention. Decisive action in the military 
domain was unlikely to endanger perspectives for the 2012 presidential elections. In 
the UK, there was a clear disconnect between a supportive political elite and a rather 
sceptical and opposed public. But, no major elections were at the horizon and the 
government and opposition were not divided. In Germany, the topic divided 
government and opposition, who were facing important and proximate local 
elections. Meanwhile, polls indicated that the German public was opposed to a 
participation in the intervention. It is likely that potential electoral risks were factored 
in to Berlin’s decision to abstain in the vote on the UNSC resolution 1973. In line 
with hypothesis 1a, diverging median voter interests and corresponding electoral 
calculation negatively influenced the degree of EU-level coherence.  
The Malian and Somali crises were generally less salient in the domestic arena. And 
indeed, the respective case studies displayed fewer observable links between public 
opinion and governmental behaviour. The positive, but short-lived effect of 
Hollande’s decisive intervention in Mali on public opinion was a ‘collateral benefit’, 
but not a key underlying motive. The UK’s relatively restrained attitude in the Mali 
case could be traced back to a combination of a rather war-tired public and the 
absence of significant national economic and security interests. Meanwhile, Berlin’s 
shift in position towards a more robust role in Somalia occurred in spite of a 
traditionally pacifist public and approaching local, as well as presidential elections.  
Political salience thus stands out as a major intervening variable between the 
preferences of the principal and the agent’s actions. This finding is in line with one 
of the hypothesised scope conditions of this study. Strategic electoral calculation 
seemingly only influenced political behaviour if public salience, relevant opinion 
polls, and party competition implied potentially high stakes for political decision-
makers in proximate elections.   
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Variable norm games  
Embedded norms influenced national behaviour and rhetoric across the three cases, 
but the ‘norm games’ played out differently. In the Libyan case, the ‘Big Three’ 
adhered to their traditional stances. The French and British leadership in the military 
intervention was in line with their sense of international responsibility and their 
proactive attitude to the use of force. France pushed for a European role while the 
UK adhered to NATO’s primacy. Meanwhile, Germany acted in line with its 
traditional stance of military and political restraint. Its uneasy position between 
Atlanticism and Europeanism translated into a rather reluctant endorsement of 
operation EUFOR Libya on the one hand, and attempts to compensate for the lack of 
Alliance solidarity on the other.  
The picture was more blurred in the Malian crisis. Only France clearly acted in line 
with its traditional principles. It intervened forcefully, demonstrated its sense of 
international responsibility, and tried to Europeanise its effort once the emergency 
situation in January 2013 was overcome. Meanwhile, Britain refrained from a 
proactive stance and left the international responsibility to France. And Germany 
balanced the principles of multilateralism and military restraint. It initially adhered to 
a position of restraint, but alliance solidarity became more salient in January 2013. 
Conforming to the latter, Berlin provided military and logistic support. But it also 
minimised related risks by rejecting any involvement in combat operations.  
In the Somali case, traditional national positions shifted. France pushed for the 
engagement of the military CSDP in counter-piracy, but Europeanism and 
international responsibility did not extend to the Somali mainland. The UK agreed to 
EU, rather than NATO leadership in counter-piracy for pragmatic reasons. Germany, 
instead, compromised its traditional stance of military restraint by giving in to British 
and French demands for a more robust engagement of operation Atalanta.  
Deviations from embedded national norms thus mostly occurred in the Malian and 
the Somali cases. Pursuant to constructivist, sociological institutionalist assumptions, 
the higher degree of political insulation may have facilitated a shift of loyalties 
towards the European level. The important role of the Franco-German friendship in 
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Berlin’s considerations of support in Mali can be seen as an example. But, in the 
Somali case, it seems more likely that important economic interests and strategic 
considerations motivated the shift away from long-standing embedded norms.   
A matter of stakes and certainty  
The empirical evidence confirms that the influence of domestic constraints depends 
on the scope conditions. The most immediate impact of economic interests on the 
degree of coherence could be observed in the Somali case. The stakes were high, the 
costs were calculable and the payoffs of coordinated and robust counter-piracy 
operations were measurable. Similar clarity existed for the Libyan case in the field of 
economic sanctions. The repeated coincidence of high stakes and national deviations 
from long-standing foreign policy principles suggests the conclusion that important 
economic interests (H1a) have, in fact, prevailed over embedded norms (H1b) in 
explaining varying degrees of coherence. 
The line between the influence of electoral calculation and embedded norms is 
admittedly hard to draw. As Pohl (2012: 15) rightly points out, European electorates 
expect decision-makers to pursue national norms and interests. But generally, 
electoral calculation only seemed to influence the degree of coherence in EU crisis 
management under very specific circumstances. The median voter interest mattered 
for politically salient decisions on the use of force, if government and opposition 
were divided, and if there was an electoral horizon. Under these circumstances, 
cross-case comparison showed that politicians variably used national norms in 
political discourse. Electoral calculation thus seemed to have prevailed over 
embedded national norms.  
But beyond the few situations that presented decision-makers with calculable 
economic or electoral stakes, national norms had an important impact on the 
coherence of crisis decision-making. This could be seen in the strong Atlanticist 
orientation of the UK, the consistency of France’s Europeanist drive, and the 
recurrence of Germany’s culture of military restraint. The analysis of political 
rhetoric further showed that decision-makers attempted to conceal deviations from 
their national constituencies. One example was France’s continued emphasis on 
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Europe’s leadership in the Libyan crisis, despite de facto NATO lead. Other 
examples included the UK’s omission of operation EUFOR Libya in parliamentary 
debates as well as the repeated insistence of German politicians on the civilian and 
humanitarian character of operations EUFOR Libya and Atalanta. The de-coupling 
of rhetoric from reality points towards a strategic manipulation of embedded national 
norms. But it also shows that the latter continue to yield a higher degree of 
legitimacy than EU-level norms of coherence. To put it more bluntly, domestic 
interests trump domestic norms; but domestic norms trump coherence.  
7.2 Intergovernmental competition and cooperation   
The analysis shows that the ‘Big Three’ are the key actors in EU crisis management. 
But Italy’s important role in the Libyan crisis indicates that other member states with 
particular historical or economic ties to the conflict country or region can be equally 
relevant for the degree of coherence. Under consensus rules, liberal 
intergovernmentalism predicts lowest common denominator outcomes, whereas 
sociological institutionalism expects mutual compromise outcomes. This section 
provides an overview of intergovernmental outcomes and discusses underlying 
dynamics of competitive or cooperative bargaining. 
Lowest common denominator outcomes  
Lowest common denominator outcomes can be observed in all three cases. In the 
Libyan case, operation EUFOR Libya was described as a minimal consensus 
between the French and Italian push for an involvement of the CSDP and the more 
reluctant other member states. The result was a planned operation that was not in line 
with the preferences of the UN or of the Libyan opposition. Interviews indicated that 
there was an element of calculation behind this compromise outcome. The insistence 
of the UK to make its activation dependent on a call by UN OCHA significantly 
lowered the chances of deployment and thus also of potential risks.  
Another lowest common denominator outcome was the declaration by the 
extraordinary European Council on 11 March 2011, which welcomed the NTC as a 
rather than the legitimate interlocutor. By recognising the NTC as the sole 
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interlocutor the day before, France attempted to push the other member states to 
deviate from their more cautious positions. Overall, Europe failed to agree on a 
common diplomatic line towards the NTC. Italy was the next EU member state to 
unilaterally recognise the NTC. An Italian Official (2011) commented: “If others do 
not play by EU rules, we find our own way. But this should have been decided at the 
EU level”. This statement shows that the member states are indeed aware of 
coherence-related norms. But, if one member state deviates, strategic considerations 
come in its stead. 
In the Somali case, the decision to activate the Operations Centre for the 
coordination of the CSDP missions and operations was described as a lowest 
common denominator outcome. The decision was a political compromise between 
the UK and the other member states, led by France and, in the words of German 
Diplomat A (2011), “the UK won”. The result of this compromise was an 
institutional entity with few and exclusively military staff, a limited operation period, 
and no command responsibility. By restricting the scale and scope of the Operations 
Centre, the UK drew the other member states closer to its own preference, which 
consisted of rejecting additional European institutional structures (UK Diplomat B 
2013). 
Mali was a special case as France was in the driving seat and did perhaps not demand 
as many compromises from the other member states. But the dragging preparations 
of EUTM Mali, and the failure of conflict prevention in 2012, can also be seen as a 
lowest common denominator outcome. France failed to draw the other member states 
closer to its own preferences. In addition to the asymmetry of economic interests, 
discussed in the previous section, this failure can be assigned to the initial divergence 
in national threat perceptions. Until January 2013, France was the only member state 
truly preoccupied by potential security-related threats emanating from the situation in 
Mali.  
Mutual compromise outcomes 
In all three cases, there were also examples where the member states moved away 
from initial preferences and towards mutual compromise outcomes. They either 
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overcame existing divisions or acted collectively in spite of them. In the Libyan case, 
the member states agreed to open an EU liaison office in Benghazi in May 2011 
despite their differences on the approach to the NTC (European Diplomat C 2011). 
The fact that the corresponding decision was taken behind closed doors, and had few 
repercussions in the media might have facilitated consensus on this particular 
measure. The latter is line with hypothesis 2b, which posits that insulation from 
international and societal pressures facilitates cooperative bargaining and the forging 
of mutual compromise outcomes.  
In the Somali case, one of the viable compromise outcomes was the strengthening of 
operation Atalanta in March 2012. In line with the preference of France, the UK, and 
the Netherlands, the operation was amended to include robust on-shore operations. 
But, reflecting the positions of Germany, Spain, and Austria, the scope and scale of 
land-based operations was restricted. The amendment thus represented a mid-way 
between the desire for forceful intervention of some member states and the risk 
adversity of others.  
As for Mali, a mutual compromise was reached after the start of France’s unilateral 
operation. The Islamist offensive showed that the threat emanating from the Sahel 
zone was real and that the French warnings had to be taken seriously. The member 
states thus agreed to fast-track the planning procedure for the operation EUTM Mali, 
and to increase the number of its personnel. Aware of the incoherent image the EU 
delivered in the Libyan crisis, national decision-makers were keen to project an 
image of unity. The French President informed key European partners and Ashton 
prior to unilateral intervention in Mali. The other member states showcased a 
textbook example of European coherence by yielding unified diplomatic support to 
the French intervention. In return, the French government praised its European 
partners for their solidarity. The adherence to these procedural coherence-related 
norms in the diplomatic realm seemingly occurred in the absence of material or 
strategic incentives.  
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Towards ‘European domestic politics’  
The above suggests that EU foreign policy is not as insulated from issue linkage and 
competitive bargaining as some scholars suggest (see for example Smith 1998; M. E. 
Smith 2004). The analysed cases show that intergovernmental outcomes are crucially 
dependent on the interplay of national economic, electoral, and security-related 
interests (H2a). However, national preference functions also include domestically 
ingrained national norms. When decisions are relatively insulated from domestic 
audiences and not directly relevant for influential economic players, ideational 
factors even prevail. The differing national positions on the Operations Centre 
represent a good example in this regard. The decision to activate the body presented 
policy-makers with low economic stakes and risks on the one hand, and ingrained, 
determinate norms on modes of international cooperation on the other. It is thus 
likely that the lowest common denominator outcome stemmed from the latter, rather 
than from strategic considerations. In some cases, EU-level coherence norms 
tempered intergovernmental interaction. Generally, this tempering effect was more 
salient when deliberations occurred within EU channels and behind closed doors 
(H2b). 
The analysis of parliamentary debates and political speech acts further suggested that 
precedent cases had an important mediating influence on perceived costs, risks, and 
threats. In the Libyan case, experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan fuelled fears of yet 
another complicated, open-ended, and potentially illegitimate intervention in an 
Islamic country. In the Somali case, the reluctance to get involved on the mainland 
also stemmed from the memory of the failed and bloody international interventions 
in the early 1990s. Finally, the French narratives of ‘Sahelistan’ and of the ‘war on 
terror’ created a direct link between Mali and Afghanistan, which few now consider 
an example to follow. A question on Mali by Labour Party member David Winnick 
in the House of Commons on 29 January 2013 illustrates the link between 
precedents, threat perception, and the willingness to act: “After 11 years of warfare 
in Afghanistan, does the Secretary of State [for Defence, Philip Hammond] accept 
that there is no appetite whatever in this country for British troops to be sucked into a 
new war, a war far away, and a war that could easily escalate?” 
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Finally, the Franco-British wrangling on the distribution of APF funds between Mali 
and Somalia showed that processes of socialisation and rational learning are often 
hard to separate (Levy 1994). The eventual compromise between France and the UK 
may be related to EU-level coherence-related norms and the socialising effects of 
repeated interaction. But, it may equally reflect processes of rational learning in 
repeated games. Leaders of both countries know that they have to rely on each 
other’s support for future security and defence projects – within or without the EU. 
Overall it seems that intergovernmental bargaining is increasingly evolving into a 
new form of ‘European domestic politics’. National preferences do not necessarily 
converge over time. However, compromises – even if ‘rotten’ – become socially and 
rationally desirable in light of repeated and multidimensional cooperation.  
7.3 EU institutions: limited impact and divisions  
The analysed case studies occurred during a period of difficult institutional 
consolidation. They constituted early tests for the post-Lisbon crisis management 
‘machinery’ and a basis of valuation for the performance of the HR as well as for the 
2013 EEAS review. This section analyses the role of exogenous and endogenous 
factors behind institutional influence and interaction and links them to the Union’s 
own evaluations. It thus addresses the third and last question of structured, focused 
comparison: how did EU institutional interests and norms interact in influencing the 
degree of coherence in EU crisis management? 
Agents under close constraints  
Across the three cases, the autonomous influence of institutional players generally 
depended on the levels of delegated sovereignty, determined by the legal division of 
competences.109 It was substantial in humanitarian aid and development cooperation 
where the level of delegation is high. Institutional influence in diplomacy and 
defence varied across cases, but was generally more restrained. 
                                                
109 See articles 2-6 TFEU.  
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Institutional players arguably had least autonomous influence on the Union’s crisis 
management in the Libyan case. Their backstage role has two main reasons. The first 
was the timing and unexpected nature of the Arab uprisings (EEAS Official A 2011). 
With the EEAS barely operational and several important posts still vacant, the events 
put Brussels in “a state of shock” (European Diplomat A 2011). The second reason 
was the combination of relatively high stakes and intergovernmental divisions. 
Commenting on the criticism of the HR’s performance in the Libyan crisis, European 
Diplomat B (2011) underlined: “Ashton cannot be the scapegoat if the member states 
all have their stakes”. An Italian Official (2011) also dismissed the criticism as 
hypocritical: “Her room for manoeuvre crucially depends on the political will of the 
member states to delegate power – to empower the EU. Without this, Ashton cannot 
be in the driving seat.” The relatively high stakes did not only stem from the general 
context of the Arab uprisings, but were also related to the involvement of a broad 
range of international and regional players and the military and political challenges 
of interfering in a full-fledged civil war.  
In the case of Mali, the influence of institutional players on the degree of coherence 
was also limited. By drafting the Sahel Strategy, the Commission and the EEAS had 
some leverage on the Union’s overarching collective narrative for crisis management 
in the region. But, once the crisis escalated in early 2013, France acted unilaterally. 
The EEAS played the role of a filtering mechanism between France’s particular 
interests and the other member states. By enhancing the level of trust at the 
intergovernmental level, it had slightly more influence on the degree of coherence 
than in the Libyan crisis. But when comparing the two cases, European Diplomat E 
(2013) also pointed out that “Libya was more important”. 
The Union’s crisis management in Somalia offered most evidence of institutional 
influence. Institutional players might not have been the key drivers. However, they 
presented proposals for the Union’s crisis management, which were not only 
incorporated, but also discussed by external players such as the US. The influence of 
institutional players can be explained by three factors: the high degree of complexity, 
the congruence of national preferences, and the institutions’ superior ability to link a 
broad range of civilian and military EU instruments.  
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Somalia was the most protracted and complex of the three analysed conflicts and no 
EU member state voiced a preference to tackle its challenges bilaterally. NATO was 
overstretched in Afghanistan and unable to deal with the civilian and rule of law 
dimensions of the conflict and its symptoms. The Union thus represented a default 
option for collective action. It was in the member states’ very interest to empower its 
institutional actors. On the link between national preferences and institutional 
coherence, an EU Official (2011) commented: “If there is a strong political will on 
the side of the member states, certain administrative hurdles can be overcome. But if 
the political will is lacking, administrative hurdles continue to stand in the way”.  
Overall, case comparison suggests that institutional influence depends on the degree 
of delegated sovereignty, and on ad hoc delegation in the areas such as diplomacy or 
defence.110 The latter is contingent on the level of stakes and the congruence of 
national preferences. If larger EU member states have high stakes and divergent 
preferences, the influence of institutional actors is likely to be under close 
constraints. If preferences converge, member states are more likely to empower the 
Union’s institutions. But even then, their room for manoeuvre is confined as the 
absence of examples in which institutional players acted contrary to national 
preferences indicates. This study did not include cases where none of the larger 
member states had important stakes. Such cases would be interesting in terms of 
institutional influence, but without their stakes, substantial and comprehensive EU 
engagement would also not be very likely.  
The security-development nexus  
Having discussed the factors determining the degree of institutional influence, let us 
now turn to the nature of this influence. Institutional players had greater leverage on 
horizontal than on vertical coherence, but their ability to link the various elements of 
the Union’s crisis response suffered from competence struggles. Across cases, 
                                                
110 Ad hoc delegation is a form of delegation, which is limited in time and scope. It allows the 
principal to broaden or narrow the agent’s autonomy flexibly depending on contextual conditions 
(Elsig 2007: 10; 2010: 500).  
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tensions most frequently occurred at two interfaces: between the EEAS and the 
Commission, and within the EEAS’s crisis management structures.  
The former mainly concerned the distribution of resources between development and 
security objectives or activities. In the Libyan case, bureaucratic tensions arose 
between the EEAS’s new crisis response department DG CROC and Commission 
DG ECHO. In Somalia, Commission DG DEVCO was wary of the diversion of 
resources from development towards security-related objectives. For both EUTM 
Somalia and EUTM Mali, the Union provided training through the CSDP, but failed 
to provide the necessary (Commission) resources to equip and pay the trained 
soldiers. Furthermore, the EP criticised the slow pace, with which funding decisions 
were adopted in response to the Malian crisis (Gualtieri and Brok 2013). 
The question of the use of Commission funds for security-related measures lies at the 
heart of the comprehensive approach. In the discussions preceding the joint 
Communication on the “Comprehensive Approach” (2013b), the member states and 
the EEAS called for a more flexible use of the Commission’s financial instruments 
(Academic Expert A 2013). They pushed for an increase in open-ended budget 
earmarks and for their extension to non-civilian measures. However, in these 
discussions, the Commission was reticent. It viewed proposals for a more flexible 
use of its instruments as attempts to gain control over its budget (Senior EEAS 
Official B 2013).  
Within the EEAS crisis management structures, tensions particularly surrounded the 
new institutional player with coordinating responsibility, namely DG CROC. They 
could be traced back to responsibility overlaps. The problem was one of contested 
organisational leadership rather than one of scarce resources. Overall, the three case 
studies validate the hypothesised link between competence overlaps and resource-
based interdependence on the one hand and institutional incoherence on the other 
(H3a). However, as they were largely without financial implications, competence 
quarrels within the crisis management structures were also less relevant for the 
overall degree of coherence than divisions along the security-development nexus.  
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Epistemic professionalism and cultural diversity  
Embedded organisational norms and cultural clashes also influence the degree of 
institutional coherence. The case studies illustrate how the comprehensive approach 
conflicts with the apolitical character of aid (Zwolski 2012a). The EP’s Development 
Committee took up these cultural dividing lines in its recommendation for the EEAS 
review and specifically pointed to the tension between PCD and the comprehensive 
approach to crisis management. It urged “the EEAS and the Commission to make 
sure that the ‘comprehensive approach’ does not undermine the specific objectives 
and principles of development cooperation or divert scarce resources away from 
poverty reduction” (Gualtieri and Brok 2013: 13). The statement confirms that 
coherence very much depends on ‘where you sit’. It also underlines the difficulty of 
separating strategic and principled institutional behaviour in practice. Both a rational 
interest in fencing development funds and an adherence to embedded professional 
epistemic norms clash with the pursuit of overarching political or security objectives.  
The humanitarian aid community constitutes an even more articulate proponent of 
the norm prescribing apolitical aid. While coherence implies common objectives, the 
protection of the humanitarian space demands a clear positioning outside of these 
objectives. In each case study and at different governance levels, representatives of 
the humanitarian community defended the neutrality, impartiality, and independence 
of aid. They admonished any meshing with political objectives or military means. At 
the same time, realities on the ground rendered a neat separation difficult. In 
Somalia, the humanitarian aid community even called for military protection of WFP 
vessels. Other crisis management players generally accepted the distinctiveness of 
humanitarian aid. Nonetheless, the tension between integrating and isolating 
humanitarian players in the implementation of the comprehensive approach is likely 
to persist.  
Within the EEAS, the blending of organisational cultures raised cognitive barriers. 
Commission officials and procedures initially dominated the new institution. EEAS 
Official D (2013) and previous Commission official described the interaction with 
officials coming from the Council Secretariat as follows: “The Council people have 
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no idea about the EU’s cooperation policies. They only think in terms of the CFSP 
and in an ad hoc fashion. The Commission has much longer time horizons and 
prepares the programs and budgets well in advance. You notice immediately when 
you are working with a person that comes from the Council. It is really hard to 
understand their procedures and they speak a different language. There are still 
distinct identities.” Asked how national diplomats blended in, he added, “with them 
the cultural cleavage is even bigger” (EEAS Official D 2013). These cognitive 
barriers may not have a visible impact on the overall degree of coherence in EU 
crisis management, but they impair the EEAS’s ability to coordinate its various 
component parts. 
Top-down and bottom-up coordination   
The case studies offer mixed evidence with regard to the hypothesised positive 
impact of coordination mechanisms on institutional and horizontal coherence (H3b). 
Considering the described inter-institutional tensions and cultural divides between 
the EEAS and the Commission, the intended bridging function of the HR could have 
had a tempering effect. However, throughout the three case studies, Ashton was 
criticised for her relative absence from the Commission. The EEAS Review (2013b: 
8) acknowledged that the HR had not convened the External Relations Group of 
Commissioners often enough.  
The Crisis Platform, which was activated for Libya and Mali, provided an interface 
for targeted exchange between top officials of the EEAS and the Commission. 
However, the unclear division of competences in crisis management also fuelled 
tensions at this level (European Official 2012; Senior EEAS Official 2011). Only 
activated temporarily and for specific crises, the Platform did not provide for 
sustained inter-institutional interaction. Short-term crisis coordination at the top of 
the hierarchy did not entail increased coordination at lower levels or further down the 
lane of the crisis response cycle. European Diplomats (D and F 2013), for instance, 
reported problems of sequencing between CSDP operations or missions and ensuing 
Commission measures. Accordingly, the Joint Communication on the 
Comprehensive Approach called for a “more systematic use” of the Platform to 
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facilitate coordination and “intelligent sequencing” (European Commission and HR 
2013b: 6).  
Evidence from the three case studies thus disconfirms the established link between 
formal institutional coordination mechanisms and policy coherence. From a 
sociological institutionalist perspective, this finding is not surprising. By uprooting 
existing institutional structures, the Lisbon Treaty temporarily increased institutional 
fragmentation within the Union’s crisis management machinery. The officials 
brought together in the EEAS were not novices without prior ingrained beliefs, but 
came from diverse institutional and professional backgrounds and identities.  
Furthermore, attempts to introduce a culture of coordination top-down have, so far, 
failed. These attempts date back to 2003 when, the Council (2003b) agreed the 
concept of Civil-Military Co-ordination. It encouraged a culture of co-ordination as 
opposed to a working culture of ‘stove-piping’, referring to the compartmentalised 
ways of operating of EU staff in the field of crisis management (Drent, 2011: 4). 
When asked about the effectiveness of these attempts, Senior EEAS Official A 
(2012) argued that, “coherence should be part and parcel of how people work and 
think. We are setting up new institutions and think that coherence should be in their 
genes. (…) But then realism comes in. In crisis management, we are still very much 
working in a stovepipe way”. 
Dynamics of bottom-up coordination had a more positive effect on the degree of 
coherence. Informal modes of coordination as well as personal communication and 
people-to-people contacts attenuated inter- and intra-institutional tensions. Examples 
were the informal separation of responsibilities between the HR and the 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy in the area of 
external representation. Other examples included informal inter-institutional 
coordination mechanisms in the case of Somalia, as well as informal staff-to-staff 
contacts between EEAS officials and their former Commission colleagues.  
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7.4 EU players: converging and diverging  
The above sections provide a comparative synthesis of the first three years of post-
Lisbon crisis management. However, to gauge the influence of norms and 
socialisation processes, a diachronic dimension is necessary. Broadening the time 
frame allows for a more nuanced perspective on the evolution of the EU as an 
international security actor, as discussed in the concluding chapter. This section thus 
situates the observed behaviour within a broader context and time frame: How did 
the role of single players evolve throughout cases? And to what extent do relevant 
norms and interests converge or diverge? The section starts by reviewing the role of 
the ‘Big Three’ before moving to institutional players.  
French, European, and African activism  
France had an activist approach to all three analysed conflicts. Together with Britain, 
it was leading the Libyan intervention. It was the engineer behind the European crisis 
management efforts in Somalia. And it conducted the emergency intervention in 
Mali. France’s activism also went beyond the analysed cases, as support to UN 
forces in Ivory Coast (2011), willingness to join US-led air strikes on Syria (2013), 
and the unilateral intervention in the Central African Republic (2013) demonstrated. 
The European Foreign Policy Scorecard consequently classified France as the most 
activist EU member state in 2013 (European Council on Foreign Relations 2014). 
French Diplomat E (2013) explained that other EU member states generally do not 
share “the same sense of international responsibility”, which he related to France’s 
past as a colonial and global power.  
But French leadership is also built on permissive domestic conditions. The position 
of the President as chef des armées allows for a much more immediate and reactive 
approach to international crises than is the case in other member states, notably 
Germany. In addition, the French public values decisive presidential crisis 
management. French Diplomat E (2014) explained this appreciation as follows: “If 
there is a challenge, the President has to live up to it. If he doesn’t, he will always be 
accused of indecision or lack of courage. The President thus has the choice between 
good and bad. This is what we understand by the representation of power”.  
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France also pushed for a European role in crisis management in all three cases. 
French Diplomat D (2013) noted: “Every time we decide something, we ask 
ourselves, which role Europe could play – what the European product could be”. 
However, France’s partners tend to view its Europeanist push with scepticism. 
Several interviewees depicted it as an attempt to Europeanise self-regarding French 
interests (European Diplomats G and I 2013; German Diplomat 2013; German 
Officials B and C 2013; Senior NATO Officials A and B 2013). The French support 
for l’Europe de la défense was, for instance, perceived as an attempt to re-vitalise the 
country’s struggling defence industry (European Diplomat G; German Diplomat 
2013). French narratives of a common ‘European interest’ meet with particular 
scepticism if they concern interventions in francophone Africa, where the country 
“seems to intervene every other week” (UK Diplomat C 2013). 
But the three case studies were also illustrative of the internal tension between two 
traditional principles of French foreign policy: Europeanism and autonomy. This 
tension was reflected in France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security, 
published on 29 April 2013. It incorporated lessons from the Malian intervention and 
announced a “return to Africa” (French Government 2013). The Paper stressed the 
need to maintain France’s “sovereignty, by making sure it retains resources to act 
and influence events” (French Government 2013: 125). It promoted a more sober 
form of Europeanism by calling for an urgent and “pragmatic revitalisation of the 
(…) CSDP” (French Government 2013: 62). But it also highlighted its limitations, 
including the member states’ diverse strategic cultures and perspectives on the use of 
force, which it described “a source of mutual suspicion” (French Government 2013: 
17). French Diplomat E (2013) added: “We have to accept these differences and 
count on ad hoc coalitions”. 
The White Paper also emphasised the responsibility to protect, but mentioned a 
trade-off between rapid reaction and international consultations: “How can we 
reconcile the urgency which, in certain situations, applies to the implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect, with the patience that is essential to achieving an 
international consensus?” (French Government 2013: 31). The 2013 White Paper 
indicated a decreasing willingness to wait for reluctant European partners in future 
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crises, especially if national values or interests call for a rapid response (French 
Diplomat E 2013). The interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic 
showed that France remains keen to Europeanise unilateral engagements ex post. 
Europeanisation does not only enhance legitimacy, but also facilitates financial 
burden sharing – a French priority in times of austerity.    
Britain’s responsibility constrained  
British Diplomat B (2013) depicted his country’s predisposition for an activist 
foreign and security policy as instinctive: “It is in our blood really. There is a 
presumption of intervention based on the British perspective and on its colonial 
legacy in Africa. There is a common expectation that if something happens in the 
world, we should deal with it. This is a key difference with the political leaders of 
Slovenia, Croatia, or even Germany”. This instinct helps explain the UK’s leadership 
in the Libyan and Somali cases.  
Another British instinct is its reliance on the US and the emphasis on NATO’s 
primacy. The Libyan case clearly showed that the transatlantic Alliance remains the 
UK’s instrument of choice when it comes to high-intensity conflicts. German 
Official C (2013) commented that “it is better to be the junior partner in a bilateral 
relationship, than one among 28”. But while the UK remains interested in the African 
continent, the US is increasingly turning towards the Pacific. “The British fear that 
the US wipes them off on the way and that they will have to put up with the 
European partners and play a greater leadership role in Europe” (German Official C 
2013). The Lancaster House Treaty (2010), sealing a special relationship with France 
in security and defence, can be seen as a consequence of this fear. And Britain’s 
European lead on Somalia showed that a NATO framework might not always be 
practicable.  
Pragmatic European alliances do, however, not entail increasing Europeanism. 
British Diplomat B (2013) insisted that it was not in the UK’s “national psyche” to 
think of the EU in terms of follow-up. He also found clear words on the differences 
between the ‘Big Three’ on the preferred modes of multilateral cooperation: “We are 
similar to the French: if we don’t get broad multilateral agreement, we are not afraid 
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to go ahead. This is very different for the Germans who would not do anything 
unless there was broad European agreement.”  
However, the UK is also facing increasing domestic restraints when it comes to 
forceful or unilateral intervention. The British public is scarred by the controversial 
intervention in Iraq in 2003. Over a decade of substantial military engagement in 
Afghanistan with large numbers of victims has led to an ‘intervention fatigue’ 
(Clements 2014: 119). In addition, austerity politics have entailed important defence 
budget cuts. The impact of domestic constraints was very visible in the case of Syria 
where public opinion prevailed over Atlanticism. Following a chemical weapons 
attack close to Damascus on 21 August 2013, the US proposed limited military air 
strikes against the allegedly responsible Assad regime. In favour of supporting the 
Americans, Prime Minister Cameron put a motion to parliament. However, on 29 
August 2013, the motion was defeated by 285 to 272 votes. Elite and public were 
wary of another, potentially illegitimate intervention, based on shaky evidence about 
the regime’s use of chemical weapons, and with unforeseeable regional 
repercussions. Here, the link to Iraq was even more pronounced than in the Libyan 
case.111 Cameron conceded that the public did not want military intervention and 
correspondingly withdrew his pledge for military support (Dominiczak and 
Whitehead 2013).112  
The UK’s growing domestic constraints on the use of force do not imply a general 
shift away from its traditionally activist security policy. However, public opinion can 
be assumed to play a more important role in the future. Its influence will depend on 
the conditions surrounding intervention (stated rationale, international or regional 
support, UN mandate) and on the domestic context (electoral salience, party political 
                                                
111 A key difference between the Libyan intervention and the proposed Syrian one was the absence of 
a UN resolution authorising the use of force in the latter case.  
112 The UK’s vote was influential at a global scale. Only two days later, Obama announced his 
intention to seek congressional approval. In the run-up to the vote, the Assad regime agreed to hand 
over its chemical weapons, thereby averting military intervention altogether. 
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consensus, and approval rates of the government) (Clements 2014: 131). Overall, the 
emergence of a more vocal domestic veto player is not likely to facilitate collective 
EU decision-making on military crisis management.  
Berlin’s new international responsibility 
Germany’s culture of military restraint played an important role in decisions on the 
use of force. It was the rationale behind the abstention on UNSC resolution 1973. It 
slowed down European discussions on operations EUFOR Libya and EUTM Mali. 
And it divided government and opposition in the vote on the reinforcement of 
operation Atalanta.  
European Diplomat F (2013) described Germany’s distinct approach to the use of 
force as follows: “The British and the French see a problem and say: ‘let’s do it’. The 
Germans first ask how can we attain our goals sustainably? What is the added value 
of the military? And what is our exit strategy?” This cautious approach is closely 
linked to German history and a political system that makes the use of force 
dependent on parliamentary approval. Aware of a generally pacifist public, German 
politicians know that an activist security policy can “lead to international gains, but 
entail domestic losses” (German Official C 2013). Finally, there is the perception 
that Germany has the economic clout to attain international gains without having to 
project military force (German Official C 2013).   
The latter point is reminiscent of Germany’s traditional role as a civilian power 
(Krotz 2001). But it is also illustrative of its growing confidence as a leading 
economic power within Europe. In recent years, Berlin has become more assertive in 
its pursuit of national interests abroad. According to Guérot and Hénard (2011), its 
policy-makers feel they have “overcome the burden of history”. Examples include 
Germany’s open defence of commercial interests in the Somali case and arms deals 
with Saudi Arabia at the height of the Arab uprisings. An Italian Official (2011) 
critically commented: “Germany has become a ‘reluctant power’ that mainly thinks 
in terms of economic security”. Less critical observers argue that Germany 
increasingly resembles a ‘normal’ power that yields more room to domestically 
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defined national interests in foreign and security policy decision-making (Bulmer 
and Paterson 2010; Oppermann 2012).   
However, the Libyan crisis clearly showed that Germany’s partners and allies did not 
welcome the discrepancy between economic power and military restraint. The 
ensuing German domestic debate, oscillating between the principles of Alliance 
solidarity and military restraint, continued to haunt German security policy in the 
Somali and Malian cases. Meanwhile, the international pressure was maintained. 
Senior NATO Official B (2013) argued: “Germany needs to act even when it doesn't 
perceive its essential national interests to be involved. Solidarity with collective 
NATO decisions should be reason enough”. Though understanding of Germany’s 
historical specificity, UK Diplomat C (2013) noted: “We do think it would be good 
to review this historical position. And we absolutely think that there is nothing 
ethically or morally wrong with German intervention abroad.” 
The effects of this international pressure became visible in January 2014 when 
German Federal President, Joachim Gauck, launched the new foreign and security 
policy narrative of ‘responsibility’. In his opening speech at the 50th Munich Security 
Conference on 31 January 2014, he announced a more active German foreign and 
security policy, which is commensurate with its weight. This proactive role expressly 
included the use of military force. He argued that restraint could be “taken too far” 
and that some used “Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to 
disengage from the world” (Gauck 2014). But, he also warned of power politics or 
unilateral interventions and strongly advocated European cooperation. The new 
narrative had been pre-agreed with the foreign and defence ministers, whose 
speeches echoed it, even if in less fervent terms (Steinmeier 2014; von der Leyen 
2014).  
The immediate implementation of this narrative was an enhanced German 
engagement in Africa. In February 2014, Berlin agreed to send parts of the Franco-
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German brigade to reinforce EUTM Mali.113 It was the first time that the Brigade 
was deployed to Africa. Furthermore, it decided to contribute to EUTM Somalia 
(then stationed in Mogadishu) and to pledge 80 troops as well as transport and 
sanitary aircraft for the Union’s military operation in the Central African Republic 
(EUFOR CAR), launched on 1 April 2014. One month later, the German government 
published its new Africa Policy Guidelines, which underlined the promise to play “a 
more prominent role” on the continent (Federal Government 2014: 3). The reference 
to international pressure was explicit: “Western partners are also looking more to 
Germany, which they expect to show a level of commitment commensurate with its 
position and capabilities (Federal Government 2014: 3).  
It remains to be seen whether the new narrative of responsibility will truly change 
German security policy. Gauck (2014) underlined that the use of force remains the 
last resort and that Germany should not agree to it “unthinkingly”. “A democracy 
must, of course, have the right to remain on the sidelines occasionally”, he added. 
The latter brings us back to domestic constraints. In May 2014, polls showed that 
only 37 per cent of Germans were in favour of greater engagement in international 
crises while 62 per cent opposed it (TNS Infratest 2014). Half of the opponents 
justified their opinion with German history. Whereas a large majority of the polled 
supported greater humanitarian and diplomatic engagement, 82 per cent rejected a 
stronger military contribution (TNS Infratest 2014). These numbers are significant, 
as military operations will continue to require parliamentary approval. Germany’s 
foreign policy might thus become more active, but its capacity to enact the new 
responsibility in the military realm continues to depend on domestic constraints.  
Institutional learning, socialisation, and obstacles  
During the first five years after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, there were signs of 
institutional learning and socialisation. Learning effects can be observed across the 
                                                
113 François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl established the Brigade in 1987 by as a sign of Franco-
German friendship and security cooperation. Until 2014, only parts of it had been deployed in the 
Balkans.   
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three analysed cases. The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa was based on 
lessons from the Sahel Strategy. The Union’s 2011 crisis management simulation 
exercise that was modelled on a Somalia-type conflict incorporated lessons from the 
Libyan crisis response. And operation EUTM Mali was designed on the basis of 
EUTM Somalia. In addition, there was continuous “learning by doing” concerning, 
for instance, the new crisis coordination mechanism such as the Crisis Platform 
(Senior EEAS Official A 2012). But the lesson learning process was also described 
as “an endless negotiation process” (EEAS Official C 2012). “There is always a risk 
that this process is hampered by political sensitivities and that the results are watered 
down” (Senior EEAS Official A 2012). 
Socialisation processes had first effects in lowering institutional tensions. In 2013, 
EEAS Official D (2013) mentioned that a common EEAS esprit de corps was 
“gradually flourishing”. Senior EEAS Official B (2013) spoke of an “unbelievable 
intensification of cooperation within the EEAS, especially between the old 
Commission staff and the former members of the Council Secretariat that have 
joined the service”. Socialisation dynamics may continue to forge a common esprit 
de corps among EU officials in the EEAS, but their effect on national officials is 
likely to be weaker. If constructivist assumptions hold, diplomatic rotation should 
limit the degree to which their loyalties shift from the capitals to the EEAS.  
By presenting a Joint Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach to 
external crises and conflicts, the EEAS and the Commission (2013b) attempted to 
forge a shared understanding of its implementation. In addition, the Council 
approved the revised crisis management procedures in June 2013. The review 
updated the concrete steps for comprehensive conflict analysis and planning and 
should accelerate decision-making (Council 2013f). One of the key innovations 
foreseen by the new procedures is to base EU crisis management on a “political 
framework for crisis approach”. The document precedes the CMC and outlines the 
parameters of the crisis, the motives for collective action, and potential response 
options (Mattelaer 2012). It is to be drafted by the relevant services within the EEAS 
(Pirozzi 2013: 13).  
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The new crisis management procedures should provide more clarity about the 
division of responsibilities. However, a German Diplomat (2013) predicted a “new 
great game”. The preceding analysis and various interviews allow for speculation on 
the parameters of this game: the member states fear a loss of influence in the 
planning process and hold on to multiple decision steps and push, together with the 
EEAS, for a more flexible use of the Commission’s financial instruments. 
Meanwhile, the latter fences its budget and with it its decreasing role in EU foreign 
policy. The humanitarian aid and development players uphold the norm of apolitical 
aid in an increasingly politicised procedure. Finally, the military struggles to 
maintain its voice in a process largely populated by civilian players.  
Conclusion  
The omnipresence of coherence and the comprehensive approach in the politico-
administrative discourse testifies to the awareness of coherence-related norms. 
However, the three case studies suggest that the Union’s crisis management players 
are only thinly socialised into these norms (Checkel 2005). National security and/or 
economic interests as well as embedded domestic and organisational norms (still) 
prevail.   
Domestic contexts strongly constrained the member states in their ability to act 
coherently. In line with hypothesis 1a, conflicting economic and electoral interests 
negatively influenced the degree of coherence. The empirical evidence suggests that 
a high degree of coherence in EU crisis management is more likely if national 
economic interests converge without competing. It is also more likely when EU 
decision-making is relatively insulated from domestic constituencies. However, in 
accordance with the proposed scope conditions for rational calculation, the influence 
of domestic interests was dependent on the level and calculability of stakes. When 
stakes were low or uncertain, member states were more prone to act in line with 
embedded norms. Pursuant to hypothesis 1b, ingrained norms on the use of force and 
modes of multilateral cooperation were particularly salient in EU crisis decision-
making.    
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The evaluation of intergovernmental interaction showed that competitive and 
cooperative dynamics interacted. Under consensus rules, the member states agreed 
on lowest common denominator and mutual compromise outcomes. High stakes, 
risks, and urgency facilitated strategic interaction. Contrary to our assumption in 
hypothesis 2a, the costs of collective EU crisis management activities did not play a 
decisive role. But national threat or risk perceptions, mediated by precedent cases, 
helped explain the willingness for collective action (H2a). Meanwhile, longer and 
politically insulated intra-European consultations were more conducive to mutual 
and viable compromises (H2b).  
Confirming liberal intergovernmentalist expectations, the influence of institutional 
players crucially depended on the degree of delegation of national sovereignty, and 
thus on the legal division of competences.114 Nonetheless, the member states also 
delegated competences ad hoc in domains such as a diplomacy and defence. Ad hoc 
delegation was contingent on the level of stakes and the congruence of national 
preferences. The cases showed that high stakes and divisions tended to constrain the 
autonomy of supranational entrepreneurs. Their ability to ensure vertical coherence 
was thus rather limited.  
Institutional influence on the degree of horizontal coherence was hampered by inter- 
and intra-institutional competition and rivalry. Tensions generally occurred when 
competences were not clearly divided and concerned the distribution of resources 
(H3a). Competition for turf was most obvious at the intersection of security and 
development, and thus between the EEAS and the Commission. Furthermore, 
coherence-related norms clashed with the norm of apolitical aid. Attempts to 
establish a unifying organisational culture met with resistance. While there were first 
signs of institutional learning effects and socialisation, continuing processes of 
procedural change and rotation make a rapid consolidation of these effects unlikely. 
Based on the first years of operational post-Lisbon crisis management, hypothesis 3b 
has to be rejected. 
                                                
114 See articles 2-6 TFEU.  
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Case comparison thus offered evidence for five out of the six hypotheses. The 
findings reflect the initial assumption that the degree of coherence in EU crisis 
management is a function of competing and conflicting interests and norms. 
However, they also indicate that – depending on the level of stakes and certainty – 
domestic and national interests tend to prevail over embedded norms. There were 
some examples where economic or electoral interests led decision-makers to deviate 
from long-standing norms. In contrast, the analysed case studies did not include 
situations where ingrained norms clearly prevented decision-makers from endorsing 
an option with potentially high electoral or economic payoffs. Similarly, there was 
no evidence of autonomous institutional influence contravening collective, or even 
individual national preferences. Overall, case comparison suggests that the Union 
represents a rather unpredictable crisis management actor, whose multi-level 
coherence is contingent on the context-specific balance between domestically 
defined interests, stakes, and salient norms.  
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 Conclusion Chapter 8:
According to the EEAS Review (2013b: 3), one of the three key elements that stood 
out during the first years of operation of the Service was the comprehensive 
approach, making “the EU uniquely able to tackle all aspects of a foreign policy 
issue”. However, the HR and Commission acknowledged that “the ideas and 
principles governing the comprehensive approach have yet to become, 
systematically, the guiding principles for EU external action across all areas, in 
particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution” (European 
Commission and HR 2013b: 2). The comprehensive approach is thus a central theme 
of post-Lisbon crisis management, but its implementation still faces important 
obstacles.  
This thesis analysed these obstacles by investigating the causal factors behind 
varying degrees of coherence. It applied liberal intergovernmentalism and 
sociological institutionalism to evaluate the influence and interaction of norms and 
interests across governance levels. The derived hypotheses were examined on the 
basis of three prominent cases of post-Lisbon crisis management: Libya (2011), 
Somalia (2011-2012), and Mali (2012-2013).  
This concluding chapter starts by summarising key findings of theory-led analysis in 
light of the hypotheses and propositions. To link these findings to the broader 
picture, section two addresses potential trade-offs in the pursuit of coherence in the 
issue area of crisis management. On this basis, section three draws conclusions for 
the Union’s role and future as an international security actor. The chapter closes by 
discussing the limitations of this study and points towards future avenues of research. 
8.1 Linking theory and evidence  
The theoretical starting point of this thesis was the assumption that coherence is a 
function of conflicting interests and norms. Coherence was understood as the 
absence of contradiction (consistency) and existence of synergies between various 
crisis management policies, instruments, and activities geared towards a set of 
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overarching objectives. How coherent were the Union’s crisis responses? And to 
what extent did underlying multi-level rational or norm games account for variation?  
Varying degrees of coherence  
This study showed that coherence is, in fact, a dynamic concept. It is a matter of 
degree and can never be fully attained. The Union’s response to the Libyan crisis in 
2011 displayed inconsistencies and contradictions between different crisis 
management instruments and activities. There was no common EU strategy in 
response to the crisis (Balfour 2011; Biscop et al. 2012). While there were some 
common objectives, such as Gaddafi’s resignation, the member states were openly 
divided on the means to attain this goal. Additionally, the process of EU crisis 
management was characterised by inter-institutional rivalries and tensions. Analysts 
and media reports drew parallels between the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis and 
the foreign policy debacle over Iraq in 2003. Libya was even described as a ‘death 
blow’ for the CFSP and CSDP (Armellini 2011; Brattberg 2011). For these reasons, 
the Union’s coherence in the Libyan crisis response was categorised as low.  
By contrast, the Union’s response to the Somali conflict was described as a showcase 
example for the implementation of the comprehensive approach. The Union had a 
common Strategic Framework outlining a range of common objectives as well as the 
collective priority of counter-piracy (Council 2011a). It deployed a large range of 
instruments and measures, including development and humanitarian aid, political 
dialogue, civilian and robust military CSDP operations, and support to the rule of law 
sector. There were no open divisions between the member states and few reported 
inter-institutional tensions. Collectively, the Europeans were the most important aid 
donor to Somalia and heavily invested in maritime counter-piracy. The coincidence 
of consistency, strategy, collaborative interaction, and collective resources led to the 
conclusion that the Union’s crisis management in Somalia displayed a relatively high 
degree of coherence.  
Finally, the case of Mali proved to sit in between. The Union disposed of a collective 
regional strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel with a collective focus 
on counter-terrorism (EEAS 2011b). However, there was an imbalance in favour of 
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development instruments and the Strategy’s implementation displayed gaps. The 
Union failed to act despite recurrent warnings by the French and thus missed its 
chance for conflict prevention. When the situation escalated in January 2013, France 
had to act unilaterally to prevent an Islamist offensive from reaching the country’s 
capital. The French reaction triggered European diplomatic and logistic support and 
sped up the Union’s crisis management efforts. There were few open divisions or 
tensions between EU member states and institutions. However, the distribution of 
development and security-related resources indicates a disproportionately French, 
rather than collective effort. The discrepancy between collective strategy on the one 
hand, and largely unilateral implementation on the other, led to the classification of 
the Union’s crisis response in Mali as intermediate.  
The overview of the three crisis management cases in Table 25 shows that coherence 
varies over time, but not in a linear fashion. There was no steady increase (or 
decrease) in the degree of coherence throughout the three subsequent crisis 
management cases. The variation on the dependent variable thus confirmed that legal 
and institutional provisions alone do not determine the degree of coherence in EU 
crisis management. This finding might seem unsurprising. However, as outlined in 
section 1.3, some scholars and policy-makers seem to assume that there is a linear 
positive link between institutional coordination mechanisms and legal provisions on 
the one hand, and coherence on the other.  
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Table 25: Variation in the degree of coherence 
Conflicts Libya (2011) Somalia (2011-12) Mali (2012-13) 
Consistency Partial contradiction 
between policy 
outputs or activities 




strategy and few 







Interaction  Member state 





No open member 





intervention, but no 
open member state 
divisions  
Compliance  Partial defection 
from previously 







resources – at 
institutional and 




Low  Relatively high  Intermediate  
Source: own compilation 
The power of the rational game  
From a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, EU crisis management was depicted 
as a fast coordination game (Wagner 2003). The degree of coherence was seen as the 
unintended result of strategic interaction between rational actors pursuing self-
regarding interests. The key actors in the game were prosperous and large member 
states, which have most bargaining power. The influence of supranational 
entrepreneurs was assumed to depend on the level of delegation, the transaction costs 
of intergovernmental bargaining, and their comparative advantage in terms of 
information and issue linkage. These basic assumptions led to the three hypotheses 
on the determinants of coherence listed in Table 26. 
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Table 26: Liberal intergovernmentalist hypotheses   
Arena Hypoheses 
Domestic H1a: If an EU crisis management measure or activity entails 
calculable sector-specific economic costs or expected 
electoral costs in one or several of the ‘Big Three’, the 
degree of coherence will be low. 
Intergovernmental H2a: If threat perceptions of the ‘Big Three’ diverge, or the 
costs and risks of participation in joint EU crisis 
management activities exceed benefits, outcomes reflect 
the lowest common denominator and the degree of 
coherence will be low. 
EU institutional  H3a: If supranational entrepreneurs have overlapping 
competences and if resources for a given EU crisis 
management measure or activity are scarce, the degree of 
coherence will be low. 
Source: own compilation 
Case analysis and comparison suggested that economic interests played an important 
role for the degree of coherence. The most visible example for the influence of 
sector-specific economic costs was EU decision-making on sanctions and restrictive 
measures in the Libyan case. Italy’s reluctance to agree to sanctions and initial 
deviations could be traced back to the disproportionate costs sanctions on Libya’s 
energy and financial sectors inflicted upon influential economic players. In terms of 
sector-specific gains, the Somali case offered an interesting example. Collective EU 
counter-piracy measures were clearly in line with key economic interests in the ‘Big 
Three’. These interests may not have been the sole factors behind the relatively high 
degree of coherence, but there is evidence that economic players made their voice 
heard in the political process.  
Electoral interests also influenced the coherence of EU crisis-decision-making. 
However, as Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) suggested, the key intervening 
variable was political salience. The latter was particularly high if decisions 
concerned the use of force; if government and opposition were divided; and if 
elections were approaching. In addition, the popularity or approval rates of national 
decision-makers seemed to enhance their likelihood to engage in electoral 
calculation. The main example in this respect was Germany’s decision to abstain in 
the vote on UNSC resolution 1973, authorising the use of force in the Libyan case. 
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The decision to abstain was taken right before important regional elections, at a time 
when Germany’s political parties were divided, and the approval rates of the foreign 
minister were at a low point. The empirical evidence thus confirms the importance of 
domestic constraints as outlined in hypothesis 1a.  
National decision-makers took their domestically determined preferences to the 
European bargaining table. In line with hypothesis 2a, there were some examples 
where domestic constraints led to lowest common denominator outcomes. The 
failure to act decisively on the brewing crisis in Mali in 2012 is one of them. Neither 
the UK, nor Germany had domestic incentives to follow France’s calls for action in 
the Sahelian country. The Mali case also confirmed the need to broaden the process 
of preference formation to include national threat perception. Though counter-
terrorism represented a common strategic priority on paper, national intelligence 
reports showed that only France held this perception. For the UK and Germany, 
terrorism in the Sahel was not a real priority until early 2013.  
Finally, liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions on the influence of supranational 
entrepreneurs were largely confirmed. Institutional actors played a role in domains 
where the levels of delegation were high, namely in development and humanitarian 
aid. In areas of diplomacy and defence, their influence was generally marginal and 
strongly constrained by national prerogatives. The relatively superior influence of 
supranational entrepreneurs in the Somali case could be traced back to the 
congruence of national preferences and the EU institutions’ superior ability to link 
multiple elements of the Union’s crisis response in a context marked by high levels 
of complexity. In line with hypothesis 3a, contested institutional leadership led to 
tensions within the EU’s crisis management structures. The combination of 
competence overlaps and resource interdependence triggered dysfunctional 
cooperation between the Commission and the EEAS. 
Overall, the application of liberal intergovernmentalism to the field of EU crisis 
management holds considerable explanatory power. The liberal perspective was 
particularly useful in elucidating the important role and influence of domestic players 
and interests as well as the decision-makers’ perception thereof (see also Pohl 2012). 
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The depiction of EU decision-making as a two-level game permitted us to establish 
links between the domestic, intergovernmental, and supranational arenas. An 
example was Germany’s acquiescence to the reinforcement of operation Atalanta, 
which arguably resulted from the combined pressure of domestic economic players 
on the one hand, and European partners on the other. However, a range of member 
state decisions affecting the degree of coherence could not be traced back to 
domestic interests or intergovernmental bargains. Liberal intergovernmentalism thus 
missed an important dimension, which called for the introduction of an alternative 
game.  
The influence of norm contestation  
This study applied sociological institutionalism to depict EU crisis management as a 
multi-level norm game. In this version of the game, the degree of coherence was 
understood as a function of horizontal and vertical norm contestation. It was thus 
seen as the result of the interaction between EU-level coherence norms on the one 
hand, and embedded national or organisational norms on the other. Institutions were 
expected to play a key role as socialising platforms at all governance levels. Their 
socialising effect was made contingent on the time and intensity of interaction. Table 
27 lists the derived hypotheses.  
The analysis showed that national decision-making was often shaped by domestically 
embedded standards of appropriateness. As suggested by hypothesis 1b, ingrained 
norms were particularly relevant for decisions on the use of force and on the 
framework for multilateral cooperation. Prominent examples include the UK’s strong 
adherence to Atlanticism, France’s consistent push for European crisis management 
contributions, and Germany’s instinctive military restraint. In several cases, these 
norms conflicted and thus negatively influenced the degree of coherence. Examples 
where they influenced collective European outputs, in the absence of immediate 
economic or electoral incentives, included the UK-imposed limitations on the EU 
Operations Centre and the German push for the designation of operation EUFOR 
Libya as a mission. However, adherence to national predispositions varied from case 
to case. It was most pronounced in the Libyan case where EU and international 
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decision-making processes were politically salient. Somalia – the case with the 
lowest level of political salience – displayed the most evident deviations.  
Table 27: Sociological institutionalist hypotheses  
Arena Hypoheses 
Domestic H1b: If an EU crisis management measure or activity 
conflicts with embedded national predispositions regarding 
the use of force or preferred modes of cooperation, the 
degree of coherence will be low. 
Intergovernmental H2b: If intergovernmental decision-making is insulated from 
international and societal pressures, cooperative bargaining 
produces mutual compromise outcomes and the degree of 
coherence will be high. 
EU institutional  H3b: If formal and informal inter-institutional coordination 
mechanisms provide for frequent and intense social 
interaction between institutional actors responsible for EU 
crisis management activities, the degree of coherence will 
be high. 
Source: own compilation 
Case comparison showed that the degree of coherence increased when the level of 
political salience decreased. This finding is in line with hypothesis 2b, but raises the 
question whether co-variation really stemmed from the shifting of national loyalties 
to the European level. The answers are mixed. In the Malian case, loyalty with 
France played an important role for the British and German decisions to yield 
logistical support and strong diplomatic backing. However, loyalty considerations 
did not entail substantial material and operational support, for instance, in the form of 
ground troops. In the Somali case, it seemed that pragmatic considerations and 
domestic economic interests, rather than shifting loyalties, stood behind European 
compromise outcomes. Hypothesis 2b thus only finds partial confirmation.  
The socialising impact of formal institutional coordination mechanisms was (still) 
limited. During these first years of post-Lisbon crisis management, institutional 
actors found themselves in a difficult transition phase. Attempts to introduce an 
overarching culture based on the comprehensive approach and coordination met with 
bureaucratic resistance and longer-standing professional norms. The most prominent 
example of horizontal norm contestation was between the humanitarian principles 
and coherence norms. To a lesser extent, this line of contestation was reproduced at 
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the security-development nexus. It is too early to tell whether formal coordination 
mechanisms will lower these cognitive barriers over time. Meanwhile, informal 
cooperation and people-to-people contacts showed their first effects in attenuating 
inter-institutional tensions. However, our case study evidence largely falsifies 
hypothesis 3b. 
Overall, the norm game provided an important complement to the rationalist game. 
Although embedded norms were not always decisive, they often shaped national and 
institutional crisis decision-making and rhetoric. Ingrained national and professional 
norms were more influential than EU-level coherence norms, providing further 
evidence to constructivists arguing that processes of national or sub-organisational 
socialisation prevail over their respective European or pan-organisational counter-
parts (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). This study 
thus confirmed that long-standing norms should be included in national and 
institutional preference functions in the field of EU crisis management. The analysis 
of vertical and horizontal norm contestation allows for a more fine-grained analysis 
of norm influence across governance levels and helps draw the boundaries of rational 
behaviour.  
The relevance of game changers 
The question of boundaries between rational and rule-based behaviour leads us to the 
so-called ‘game changers’. The evaluation of the two theoretical lenses showed that 
the degree of coherence in EU crisis management is indeed a function of norms and 
interests. But it also indicated that their respective explanatory power depends on 
contextual scope conditions. We argued that high stakes and certainty of pay-offs 
favoured strategic calculation while the existence of socially embedded and 
determinate norms rather incited rule-based action. Table 28 reiterates the 
propositions on the interaction of the logics of consequences and appropriateness.  
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Table 28: Game changers – three propositions   
Proposition 1 If stakes are high and information is abundant, while norms are 
shallow or indeterminate, the logic of consequences prevails. 
Proposition 2 If stakes are low or information is scarce, while norms are 
embedded and determinate, the logic of appropriateness 
prevails. 
Proposition 3 If stakes are high and information is abundant, while norms are 
embedded and determinate, both logics are at play 
Source: own compilation  
For the purpose of this study, high stakes were defined as important economic and 
electoral pay-offs. In line with proposition 1, EU member states mostly deviated 
from embedded norms when faced with high and calculable stakes. This could be 
seen in the case of Somalia where counter-piracy presented measurable incentives for 
collective action. As a result the UK deviated from its Atlanticist preference and 
Germany from the culture of military restraint. Furthermore, high electoral stakes 
seemed to influence Germany’s abstention in the vote on UNSC resolution 1973. 
Domestic contestation between multilateralism and restraint suggested that German 
politicians were faced with indeterminate norms. At the same time, opinion polls and 
approaching elections presented them with relatively high and calculable electoral 
incentives. Electoral calculation is thus more likely to have shaped Germany’s 
abstention than its embedded culture of military restraint.  
An example for the applicability of proposition 2 was the decision to activate the 
Operations Centre for the CSDP mission and operations in Somalia. The economic 
costs of the activation were relatively low and the public salience of the measure was 
almost nil. In this decision, the ‘Big Three’ clearly acted in line with embedded 
norms on the preferred modes of international cooperation. France pushed for the 
activation; Germany seconded it; and the UK stuck to its traditional Atlanticist 
position by minimising the scope and scale of the institutional body.   
Finally, the Libyan intervention presented examples for proposition 3. National 
decision-makers where faced with high stakes and salient, determinate norms. The 
behaviour and rhetoric of the ‘Big Three’ suggested that both logics of action were at 
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play. France agreed to NATO leadership for pragmatic reasons. But, in line with its 
Europeanist vocation, it continued to emphasise that Europe was in the lead, and 
pushed for engagement in the framework of the CSDP. The UK reluctantly agreed to 
CSDP operation EUFOR Libya. However, British decision-makers did not mention 
Europe’s potential military contribution to its domestic audience. Equally reluctant, 
Germany also agreed to operation EUFOR Libya, but carefully depicted it as an 
essentially humanitarian, non-military endeavour at the domestic level. Faced with 
high stakes and competing standards of appropriateness, emanating from different 
governance levels, Europe’s decision-makers agreed on an operation that was not in 
line with external (UN and Libyan) expectations, and never deployed.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that the degree of coherence in EU crisis management 
is likely to vary on a case-by-case, depending on the situation-specific combination 
of salient norms and interests. Coherence is most likely if the member states’ 
interests and threat perceptions are congruent, if the risks of casualties are relatively 
low, and if there is ample time for internal coordination and consultation. 
Conversely, incoherence becomes likely in situations of urgency, where a strong and 
potentially costly or risky response is required, and if the EU and NATO are 
competing for a crisis management role.    
8.2 Coherence and its trade-offs  
The analytical findings lead us back to the broader implications of intra-European 
coherence. The latter is usually seen as a necessary condition for efficiency, 
effectiveness, and ultimately EU actorness. But, are these assumed linkages truly 
valid for the issue area of crisis management? This question leads us back to the 
distinction of process, outcome, and output coherence.115 While the core of this study 
has focused on the links between process and output coherence, this section situates 
                                                
115 Process coherence referred to interaction of political and administrative players in the elaboration 
of common crisis management policies and activities. Output coherence designated the inter-
relationship between various crisis management activities and instruments. And outcome coherence 
was defined as the interplay of the effects of crisis management activities and measures 
 
  234 
the findings in the broader causal chain leading from process to outcome, in other 
words, to the effectiveness of comprehensive EU crisis management.  
Coherence and timeliness  
It lies in the nature of crises that they often require immediate and forceful reaction. 
However, comprehensive EU crisis management usually involves intensive and time-
consuming internal coordination. The latter is particularly relevant for instruments in 
the realm of the CSFP, as (most) decisions require unanimity. In addition, internal 
national coordination processes precede or run parallel to EU deliberations. The 
member states tend to display differing reaction speeds, depending on their political 
culture and systems. As European Diplomat F (2013) explained: “There are those 
that argue that everything has to happen quickly, and those that emphasise 
thoroughness”. The present study showed that France can be assigned to the former 
and Germany to the latter category. Reaction times particularly differ with regard to 
decisions on the use of force.  
The trade-off between timeliness and coherence was visible in the Libyan and 
Malian cases. In Libya, the imminent massacre in Benghazi would not wait for 
European consensus. In Mali, intra-European consultations and procedures 
prolonged the planning process for operation EUTM Mali. In January 2013, France 
was the only nation capable of providing a timely response to the Islamist offensive. 
The French President could decide on intervention within 24 hours. French Diplomat 
E (2013) commented: “We had to intervene very quickly and that is always easier 
alone than in coalition.”  
Proposals to use the Union’s rapid reaction instrument, the Battlegroups, generally 
met with little enthusiasm.116 In Libya, the deployment of the Battlegroup was 
considered in the framework of operation EUFOR Libya. However, the main 
contributors to the Battlegroup then on stand-by were reticent: Sweden and Finland 
                                                
116 The Battlegroups are units of around 1,500 troops, which are usually based on contributions of 
several member states. Since 2007, they have been rotating on a bi-annual basis so that two were 
readily deployable (within five to ten days) at all times (Council 2013c). 
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were wary of blurring the demarcation between military and humanitarian activity; 
the Netherlands pointed to budgetary limitations; and a German contribution was 
contingent on parliamentary approval (Koenig 2012). These reservations rendered 
the deployment of a single coherent Battlegroup rather unlikely. When France 
intervened in Mali, the ‘Weimar Battlegroup’, consisting of German, Polish, and 
French troops, was on stand-by. However, its deployment was not really considered 
(Ziedler 2013). A senior French military officer critically remarked: “Battlegroups 
are fine if there is no combat. If we had to fight, we would probably see very few 
Germans and Poles in the field” (in Rettman 2013).  
According to EEAS Official E (2013), the tension between coherence and timeliness 
also extends to the Union’s institutional actors: “In a crisis, there is no time to 
coordinate with other institutions. (…) Being comprehensive comes at a price.” The 
combination of a broadening notion of EU crisis management and an increasingly 
inclusive planning process might, in fact, prolong rather than condense the reaction 
time of the Union’s institutional crisis management machinery (Senior EEAS 
Official A 2011).  
Coherence over time  
The analysis also showed that European crisis responses tend to become more 
coherent over time. In the case of Somalia, the Union gradually built up a range of 
collective activities and measures before embedding them within a comprehensive 
Strategic Framework. Coherence also increased in the cases of Mali and Libya after 
the most urgent and consequential decisions had been taken. In the Libyan crisis 
response, the most divisive month was March 2011, when divisions on diplomatic 
reactions, sanctions, and the use of force coincided. Reflecting on the early divisions, 
French Diplomat A (2011) argued: “The question of coherence is a double-edged 
sword. Sometimes, the procedure is not coherent but there is an approach with 
leadership, and dissensions are overcome ex post.” In fact, the EU member states 
overcame the divisions on sanctions; endorsed the Franco-British-led military 
intervention; and reached a diplomatic compromise by opening an EU liaison office 
in Benghazi in May 2011. In the case of Mali, France’s unilateral intervention was 
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immediately welcomed and triggered a substantial acceleration of the dragging 
European crisis management agenda.  
The gradual increase of coherence is in line with the analytical findings of this study. 
With time, the level of uncertainty and risk drops. Crisis management instruments 
usually move into the civilian realm. With decreasing urgency, risks, and uncertainty, 
crises also tend to become less salient. Political decision-making thus increasingly 
takes place behind closed doors and is less constrained by domestic legitimacy 
demands or electoral payoffs. An EU role in civilian crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction is usually less controversial for the member states. In 
addition, its added value is internationally recognised. While key national interests 
and norms slowly recede to the background, EU-level socialisation dynamics come 
to the fore.  
Increased time for coordination and consultation does not, however, imply that 
policy outputs become more substantive. The pursuit of coherence implies taking 
into account and reconciling a number of partly conflicting interests and norms of 
different groups or stakeholders. The result is often a second-best solution (Hoebink 
2005: 17). This study identified a range of intergovernmental outcomes, which were 
described as lowest common denominators or ‘rotten compromises’, rather than 
substantial or innovative crisis management contributions.  
Coherence and effectiveness 
The “link between coherence and the impact of European foreign policy is as old as 
European foreign policy itself” (Barbé et al. 2009: 385). Decision-makers and 
academics tend to assume there is a linear positive relationship between coherence 
and effectiveness. However, the link between collective outputs and outcomes is far 
from linear. A full-fledged analysis of the effectiveness of the Union’s crisis 
responses goes beyond the scope of this study. But a brief juxtaposition of the EU’s 
objectives in the analysed cases and their attainment proves illustrative.  
In Libya, the Union’s collective goal was that Gaddafi should relinquish power so 
that the country could “embark on an orderly transition” (European Council 2011). 
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Gaddafi was eventually ousted, but mainly through the rebels and the substantive 
military support by the NATO-led intervention. The Union’s common objective was 
thus attained despite internal divisions on the use of force. Even if the Europeans had 
collectively agreed on the use of military means, they would have had to rely on the 
participation of others, notably the US, due to their lack of capabilities.  
Meanwhile, Libya’s democratic transition was far from orderly. Addressing the 
UNSC in September 2013, UN Libya Envoy Tarek Mitri reported that the country’s 
“faltering” transition was fraught with political disagreements and severe security 
problems (in UN News Centre 2013b). Reflecting political tensions, Libya’s interim 
Parliament extended the post-revolutionary transition period by another year in 
December 2013 (Associated Press 2013). But Libya’s rocky transition rather stems 
from the country’s lack of democratic tradition than from intra-European divisions.  
The Union’s collective objectives in relation to Somalia, as outlined by the Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa, were to “support the people of the region in 
achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government” 
(Council 2011a: 4). The eradication of piracy represented a priority. The Union’s 
collective counter-piracy effort led to visible successes. Between 2011 and 2013, the 
number of attempted pirate attacks off the Somali coast dropped from 276 to 7 
(Atalanta 2014). However, it is questionable whether this success will last without 
sustainable solutions on land (Ehrhart 2013). The fact that Somalia still ranked last 
on the Failed States Index in 2013 shows that the broader objectives of the Strategic 
Framework remain to be attained (Fund for Peace 2014).  
There was thus a disconnection between the relatively high degree of coherence of 
the Union’s crisis management on the one hand and the Somalia’s continued 
political, economic, and security-related grievances on the other. But “even if the EU 
had a perfect comprehensive approach, this would not guarantee success given the 
manifold local, regional and international intricacies of the Somalia issue” (Ehrhart 
and Petretto 2012: 4).  
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The Sahel Strategy outlined three key objectives for the region: reducing insecurity, 
improving development, and strengthening governance and stability (EEAS 2011b). 
A strategic priority was the fight against AQIM and other terrorist networks. After 
the coup d’état in Bamako in March 2012, the Union’s priority for Mali became “the 
reestablishment of the constitutional order and the holding of democratic elections” 
(Ashton 2012a). Between 2012 and 2013, Mali experienced the worst decline on the 
Failed States Index on a global scale (Pavlou 2013). The Union did not prevent the 
Islamist offensive in January 2013. It was only after French-led intervention that the 
country’s constitutional order and territorial integrity were restored. While the 
collective objectives of the Union’s regional strategy reflected the situation on the 
ground, forceful unilateral intervention was decisive for their implementation. It 
remains to be seen whether the successes attained by French-led intervention can be 
consolidated in the medium-term (ICG 2014: i). Meanwhile, intra-regional trust 
remains low and regional cooperation in tackling interlinked security challenges is 
faltering (ICG 2014: i). 
The positive link between output and outcome coherence is thus not linear, as 
external variables intervene. In complex and multidimensional conflicts, lasting 
solutions can hardly be imposed from outside. This problem is not EU-specific, as 
past US failures to pacify Vietnam or Somalia demonstrate (Niemann and Bretherton 
2013: 267). The difficulty to establish causal links between crisis management 
outputs and impacts also stems from the fact that the latter may only become visible 
in the longer run, if at all. According to the UN Development Programme (2008), 
between 25 and 50 per cent of post-conflict countries fall back into conflict in the 
course of a few years. In general, coherence can thus be seen as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for effective and sustainable EU crisis management (Stahl 2006; 
Thomas 2012).  
The argument slightly differs if situations require rapid and forceful intervention. 
The cases of Mali and Libya showed that unilateral responses or coalitions of the 
willing might be more effective. In these particular situations, coherence is thus 
neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for goal attainment. Process coherence 
and respective compromise outcomes may even stand in the way of effectiveness in 
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the short-term (Missiroli et al. 2001: 4). Unless decision-making rules in the area of 
CFSP change towards QMV, the potential trade-offs between coherent, timely, and 
effective European crisis management are likely to persist (Wagner 2003). The above 
does not preclude an ex-post Europeanisation of national crisis management efforts 
once situations move from immediate to medium- and longer-term activities in the 
realm of structural conflict prevention. Though there is no guarantee for 
effectiveness, the Union’s combined economic and political weight, and thus 
potential for politics of scale, remains unparalleled.  
8.3 The EU’s future as a security actor  
At the end of the analysed time frame of this study, the Union’s narrative of 
comprehensiveness was stronger than ever. The EEAS review (2013b: 3) identified 
the comprehensive approach as central guiding principle of the Service. The HR and 
the Commission underlined the ambition for comprehensive EU security actorness in 
their Joint Communication on the comprehensive approach. And the Council 
approved new procedures “for coherent, comprehensive EU Crisis Management” 
(Council 2013f). This section evaluates the extent to which the Union has lived up to 
this self-conceptualisation and outlines potential future paths amidst ideational and 
material constraints. 
A comprehensive actor?  
The ideational consensus among Europe’s key crisis management players still lies 
with the traditional role concept of civilian power. The overview of the three post-
Lisbon crisis management cases showed that the Union’s responses in the arena of 
development and humanitarian aid were quick and substantial. It was the most 
important humanitarian aid donor in the Libyan crisis and the largest development 
aid donor to Somalia. Two days after the coup d’état in Bamako in March 2012, the 
Union suspended development aid cooperation with Mali. In fact, the immediate aid 
suspension constituted the Union’s sole substantial response to the deteriorating 
security situation in the country. Later in 2013, Europe pulled its collective economic 
weight and pledged more than one third of the dedicated international funds for 
Mali’s post-conflict reconstruction. Even if the distribution of aid among the member 
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states differed across conflicts, the Union’s role as major aid donor was not internally 
contested.  
The same cannot be said for the Union’s military role. In the Libyan case, there were 
open divisions on the use of force. A reinforcement of Somali operation Atalanta 
provoked divisions among the member states. And there was little appetite to engage 
militarily in Mali as the lengthy preparations for the small-scale military EU training 
operation demonstrated. There were signs of ideational convergence among the ‘Big 
Three’ on questions concerning the use of force. But while Germany announced a 
more proactive foreign and security policy, the UK signalled greater restraint. At the 
same time, the French demonstrated an increasing willingness to act without or 
before its European partners.  
The Union’s profile as an international security actor is also materially bounded. The 
analysed conflicts showed that its military capability gaps are widening. The Libyan 
air campaign would not have been possible without substantial US support in 
intelligence, surveillance and recognition, air-to-air refuelling, and precision 
ammunitions. Italy even had to withdraw its aircraft carrier in the midst of NATO’s 
Libya operation due to defence budget cuts (AFP 2011a). Similarly, the French 
intervention in Mali heavily relied on US in the area of air logistics, including air-to-
air refuelling and transport (Croft 2013). Though capability gaps were less salient in 
Somalia, former naval power Britain was rarely able to contribute a ship to operation 
Atalanta due to the downscaling of the Royal Navy (Willett 2011: 23). 
On 19 and 20 December 2013, the European Heads of State or Government met in 
Brussels to discuss – for the first time in five years – the future of European defence. 
On the eve of the meeting, President Hollande made a proposal for the creation of a 
common permanent fund for EU military operations (Ricci 2014). “We can’t 
continue to do things on a case-by-case basis and improvise as we’re doing in places 
like Mali and Libya,” a French diplomat commented (in Hale 2013). The proposal 
came two weeks after Paris had embarked on yet another costly and unilateral 
military intervention in the CAR. However, the European Council did not endorse 
the French proposal. Amongst others, the UK rejected the proposal on the grounds of 
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sovereignty considerations and the fear of duplication with NATO. Chancellor 
Merkel argued: “We cannot finance military operations if we are not included in the 
decision-making process” (in Reuters 2013).  
The rejection of the French proposal leaves doubts about the practicability of article 
44 of the TEU allowing for intra-European coalitions of the willing and able. Few of 
the experts and decision-makers interviewed in the context of the present study were 
even aware of this Treaty provision. European Diplomat D (2013) questioned its 
added value, as decisions would still require unanimity and thus be subject to intra-
European negotiation. 
While a collective fund for military operations was ruled out, the December 
European Council meeting agreed on further initiatives in the field of pooling and 
sharing. The member states decided to intensify their defence cooperation in four 
areas: long-range reconnaissance drones, air-to-air-refuelling, satellite 
communications, and cyber capabilities (European Council 2013). However, these 
initiatives will not offset defence budget cuts in the medium to long-term (Senior 
NATO Official A 2013). In 2012, the outgoing Director General of the EUMS, Ton 
van Osch (2012), conceded that pooling and sharing initiatives would only make up 
for around 1 per cent of national defence budget cuts. And while global defence 
spending is generally on the rise, Europe’s share continues on its steady course of 
decline (IISS 2013).  
There are thus ideational and material constraints to comprehensive EU actorness. 
The first years after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty clearly reaffirmed the 
Union’s profile as a civilian power. Within the CSDP, the existing trend of a 
majority of civilian missions is bound to continue. Meanwhile, the military CSDP is 
likely to concentrate on small-scale operations and the lower end of the Petersberg 
tasks. In functional terms, military training and capacity building could constitute a 
new focal area, as illustrated by EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, and EUCAP Nestor 
(German Official A 2013). Another future area of engagement, that is slightly more 
controversial, could be small, targeted operations aimed to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid (European Official 2012). In the medium-term, the EU can be seen 
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as a comprehensive actor with a multitude of civilian instruments but with a rather 
dull military edge.   
A regional actor? 
The Union’s role as an international security actor remains firmly anchored in its 
neighbourhood. Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly understood as a part of Europe’s 
broader neighbourhood and with it one of the world’s most conflict-ridden regions 
(HIIK 2014). According to European Diplomat E (2013), “Africa is and will 
continue to be Europe’s key security concern. It is in the neighbourhood and it is a 
region where we can make a difference.” Accordingly, post-Lisbon EU crisis 
management has displayed an important regional focus. All of the new CSDP 
missions and operations were deployed on the African continent (see Table 29).  
Europe’s increasing engagement as a security actor in Africa is also in line with the 
international division of labour in crisis management. The Libyan and Malian crises 
showed that the US has little appetite to intervene in the region. The Americans are 
shifting their attention towards the Pacific and increasingly consider Africa as 
Europe’s backyard. They have become less willing to provide costly military support 
for operations in the region. The American reluctance to lead the Libyan operation 
and their attempt to bill the French for operational support in Mali were illustrative in 
this regard.  
The limited US interest in Africa goes hand in hand with NATO’s geographic 
outlook. In an interview following the In Amenas hostage crisis in January 2013, 
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2013) ruled out a role for the 
Alliance in Africa. He rejected allegations that Somalia, Mali, Algeria, Niger, and 
Mauritania constituted “a new front” for NATO. He added that the latter could not be 
“the world’s policemen” and called for a division of labour while welcoming 
Europe’s engagement in Mali.  
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Table 29: CSDP missions and operations (2010-2014) 
Name Location  Nature  Type Staff117 Duration  
EUTM  Somalia  Military Training  125 Since 2010 
EUFOR  Libya Military Military / Planned: 2011118 
















137 Since 2012 
EUBAM Libya Civilian  Border  110 Since 2013 
EUTM Mali Military  Training  560 Since 2013 
EUFOR  CAR Military Military 400-600 2014- 
Source: EEAS (2014c) 
However, the Union’s increasing focus on Africa is not equally backed by all EU 
member states. The case studies showed that the ‘Big Three’ diverged in this regard. 
Germany was much less willing to intervene in African conflicts than the UK and 
France with their historical ties to the regions and respective Diasporas or expatriate 
communities. Along with its new narrative of international responsibility, Berlin 
showed greater willingness to engage in African theatres. But the crisis in Ukraine 
(2013-) might also re-focus the Union’s attention back to the East. In any case, it 
                                                
117 Staff numbers refer to EU or international staff. They based on the status quo in 2013 (EEAS 
2014c).  
118 Operation EUFOR Libya was planned, but never deployed. It is listed on the EEAS website under 
„completed operations“ (EEAS 2014c).  
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might be more difficult to persuade Eastern European and Baltic countries to engage 
in costly African operations while Russia is flexing its muscles in their more 
immediate neighbourhood.  
A strategic actor? 
The literature on the EU’s role as an international security actor shows that the 
European Security Strategy of 2003 remains the key reference document (Council 
2003a). The Report on the Implementation of the Strategy of 2008 constituted an 
attempt to update it in light of the changing security environment (Council 2008b). 
However, the Report was published just after the Russo-Georgian war and at the 
height of the financial crisis, and did thus not receive much attention (Senior 
Commission Advisor 2011). Since then, a “discourse coalition of ‘euro-strategists’” 
– consisting of decision-makers, scholars, and think tank experts in Brussels – has 
been pushing for the development of a new ‘grand strategy’ covering all relevant 
aspects of EU external action (Rogers 2009).   
As part of this push, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden initiated the “think tank 
process for a European Global Strategy” (EGS 2014). The aim of the initiative, 
launched in 2012, was to forge a collective strategic culture and vision that would 
feed into a revised strategic document. However, Think Tank Expert A (2013) 
described the process as a “non-starter”. The participating institutes presented their 
report to decision-makers, but the resonance was feeble. There were hopes that the 
2013 European Council on Defence would launch a political process for the revision 
of the European Security Strategy, but the conclusions did not mention the 
document. It thus seems that the Union – or at least its member states – are not ripe 
for an overarching strategic overhaul.  
However, the present study showed that the Union was ready for the formulation of 
regional strategies. In addition to the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and 
the Sahel Strategy, the Union also published a Strategic Framework for the Great 
Lakes Region in mid-2013 (European Commission and HR 2013a). Admittedly, 
some interviewees argued that these documents did not represent real strategies 
(German Diplomat 2013; UK Diplomat A 2013). The goals were often vague and the 
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described measures more often represented enumerations of existing EU activities 
than targeted action plans. The analysed crisis management cases showed that the 
strategies served as reference documents and provided ‘agreed language’. However, 
they did not significantly affect the Union’s more immediate crisis response. Their 
effect on medium- to longer-term activities is also questionable. The strategies are 
not legally enforceable and as the Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes region 
prominently states on page one: they have “no budgetary impact as such” (European 
Commission and HR 2013a). 
The new crisis-specific political frameworks foreseen by the revised crisis 
management procedures might have more impact (Council 2013e). As the 
Commission and HR (2013b: 4) emphasised, responses to conflicts or crises “must 
be context-specific and driven by the reality and logic of real life situations 
encountered: there are no blue-prints or off-the-shelf solutions”. According to the 
new procedures, the member states or the HR can initiate the process of designing a 
political framework document, which would be taken forward by the EEAS Crisis 
Management Board (Mattelaer 2012). The strategic potential of these documents will 
depend on the ability of the relevant EEAS services to weave together the different 
crisis management measures while taking into account the various member states’ 
preferences and interests. The documents are still subject to national consent. The 
extent to which the EEAS will be able to overcome existing obstacles to horizontal 
and vertical coherence in a timely fashion and without diluting the policy output 
remains to be seen.  
Overall, it does not seem that the Lisbon Treaty has truly enhanced the Union’s 
security actorness. Its internal coherence is fragile and depends on the context-
specific combination of material and ideational incentives to deviate. It would thus 
be misleading to start an analysis of EU crisis management on the basis of a unitary 
actor assumption. When the Union does act collectively, it is not the quickest, nor the 
most robust security actor. The UN tends to agree before the Union and NATO has a 
clear advantage when it comes to quick and forceful reaction. However, Europe’s 
collective economic weight and ability to combine various civilian and some military 
instruments place it in a unique position to influence regional developments in the 
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neighbourhood in the medium- to long-term. The effects of this influence might not 
be as visible as ‘quick wins’ in the military realm – but they might be more 
sustainable in the longer run. The quest for coherence in crisis management thus 
remains an important aim and unifying norm, despite recurrent ideational and 
rational incentives to deviate.  
8.4 Limitations and future avenues of research 
This study sought to contribute to the literatures on policy coherence, EU crisis 
management, and EU foreign policy. It demonstrated the benefits of theory-led, 
comparative enquiry into the multiple layers of comprehensive EU crisis 
management. However, the choices of theory, research design, and cases also 
entailed limitations. This section discusses some of the study’s limitations and points 
towards future avenues of research.  
Case selection and implications 
In-depth qualitative investigation into processes of multi-level crisis decision-making 
necessarily restricted the number of selected cases and analytical units. Three 
potential limitations follow. First, this study opted for the analysis of three crisis 
management cases in Africa. The choice was based on perceived variation on the 
dependent variable and was advantageous in terms of case comparability. However, 
it also narrowed the applicability of findings and excluded potential explanatory 
factors. The study did not include cases in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood. Crisis 
management on the continent and in light of enlargement perspectives provides a 
different level and distribution of stakes. It can be assumed that effective crisis 
management in Balkans is of greater relevance to more EU member states than 
would be the case in Mali.  
Second, there were specificities related to the chosen time frame. The study focused 
on post-Lisbon crisis management between February 2011 and August 2013. Within 
this time period, the Union’s crisis management machinery was undergoing 
substantial changes and revisions. In addition, national debates centred on the effects 
of the financial crisis and on the future of the euro zone rather than European foreign 
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policy. Furthermore, crisis decision-making took place in the shadows of a decade of 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have, to an extent, discredited the use of 
force as a means of external intervention. The specificities of the chosen time frame 
may partly account for the member states’ limited enthusiasm concerning the 
military implications of invoking action via the CSDP; a generally more inward-
looking perspective; and heightened inter-institutional tensions.  
The third limitation concerns the choice of embedded analytical units. This study 
chose to focus on France, the UK, and Germany. The selection was based on their 
weight in EU crisis decision-making as well as their variation on relevant norm-
related dimensions. But, as Italy’s role in the Libyan crisis showed, other EU 
member states with particular historical or economic ties to the conflict country or 
region may be equally relevant for the degree of coherence. In addition, the analysis 
of the role and influence of norms would have profited from the inclusion of a 
neutral country such as Austria or Finland. Neutrality would have enhanced variation 
with regard to norms on preferred modes of cooperation and the use of force 
(Howorth 2002; Meyer 2005).   
Future studies on the causes of coherence in EU crisis management might thus opt 
for a longer time frame. Case comparison over time could solidify conclusions on the 
link between national norms and behaviour as well as on the impact of institutional 
socialisation processes at the European level. In addition, the effects of subsequent 
administrations and political leaders could be evaluated. To provide a more 
comprehensive picture of EU crisis management, cases from various regions, 
including the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East could be included 
and compared.   
Calculation or socialisation?  
In empirical reality, the lines between calculation and socialisation remain hard to 
draw. It is not always possible to reconstruct the whole crisis decision-making 
process as some passages may occur in small circles and behind closed doors. Even 
interviews with decision-makers might not uncover the real motivating factors 
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behind political decisions. Furthermore, the motivations behind these decisions are 
likely to be based on a variety of factors and considerations.  
This study showed that ideational predisposition and strategic calculation might point 
towards the same policy outputs. For example, the UK’s adherence to Atlanticism 
may be principled, but it also promises greater influence in a special bilateral 
relationship and entails important benefits in terms of financial burden sharing. 
Similarly, Germany’s culture of restraint may well stem from historical roots, but 
could also serve as an excuse to avoid risky and costly foreign interventions that are 
not of direct or primary national interest. The European context also represents a 
difficult case when it comes to disentangling processes of social and rational learning 
as it offers repeated and sustained interaction among the same players (Levy 1994).  
Notwithstanding, the interface between norms and interests certainly yields 
interesting future avenues for research. Analyses could further scrutinise the scope 
conditions that help distinguish logics of action. This study showed that detailed 
process tracing and the comparison of rhetoric and behaviour across audiences and 
time could provide clues as to which logic prevailed. A broader empirical basis and a 
longer time frame might yield interesting insights in this regard. The literatures on 
the strategic use of norms (Goffman 1959; Schimmelfennig 2003; Shannon 2000) 
and on ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Brunsson 2002; Lipson 2007) would provide useful 
tools for the analysis of de-coupling of rhetoric and behaviour across governance 
levels.  
Crisis management and domestic politics  
Liberal intergovernmentalist theory yielded valuable insight into the analysis of EU 
crisis decision-making. The depiction of EU crisis management as a two-level game 
showed that national decision-makers stand at the interface of partly conflicting and 
partly congruent societal and European demands. Liberal intergovernmentalism gives 
priority to governmental interests, namely the desire to be re-elected. Political leaders 
first ask how decisions are likely to affect their own power before considering 
potential systemic implications. As Pohl (2012: 2) argued, liberalism could be 
“characterised as ‘realism reversed’”. 
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The empirical analysis provided evidence for trade-offs between internal losses and 
external gains. In the Libyan case, Germany weighed potential risks and domestic 
losses against diffuse and uncertain international gains. In Mali, the UK’s domestic 
‘peace’ prevailed over costly support to France. And in Somalia, domestic and 
European demands pointed towards collective European action. The study also 
illustrated cross-country variation in societal constraints. While domestic publics in 
France and (to an extent) in the UK seem to expect decisive crisis management 
behaviour from their leaders, the German public tends to reward cautious and 
considerate action. Electoral calculation is thus a mechanism where historically 
shaped societal norms and governmental interests meet (Pohl 2012). Overall, this 
study suggests that the neglect of the domestic arena entails a real risk of omitted 
variable bias. 
However, the application of liberal intergovernmentalism to the ‘hard’ case of 
comprehensive crisis management also has its limitations. There are instances in 
which the domestic incentive structure is ambiguous (Pohl 2012: 15). This is 
particularly the case for less visible and less consequential decisions such as those in 
the diplomatic arena or concerning EU-internal institutional developments. In these 
areas, decision-making is contingent on the preferences of national foreign and 
security policy elites. To grasp the nature of these preferences, the present study 
relied on social constructivism and neo-realism. But the parsimony of liberal 
intergovernmentalism was necessarily compromised.  
Future research might investigate further under which conditions domestic 
constraints become salient. A large, cross-national series of expert interviews with 
political decision-makers could yield further insight into the elements of preference 
functions in crisis decision-making and the weight of domestic constraints therein. 
Finally, the role and influence of domestic economic interest groups in crisis 
decision-making deserves greater empirical attention.   
EU actorness and effectiveness  
If coherence is a central component of actorness, then the latter is also a matter of 
degree (Niemann and Bretherton 2013: 266). This study showed that there is a 
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rationale to return to the micro-foundations of EU actorness and to assess internal 
and external constraints in selected policy areas. Reviewing material and ideational – 
internal and external constraints – provides a more realistic perspective on EU 
actorness and can also provide room for (cautious) forecasting (Meyer 2011). It can 
thus contribute to lowering the ever-growing expectations on the EU’s role in 
international affairs (Meyer 2011: 688). 
A promising avenue for research lies at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and 
sociological role theory (Aggestam 2006; Cantir and Kaarbo 2012; Thies and 
Breuning 2012). The combination allows us to bridge agency and structure and to 
evaluate the ideational and material factors underpinning international roles. Role 
theory provides the link between identity, norms, foreign policy behaviour, and 
external expectations (Breuning 2011: 16). Meanwhile, foreign policy analysis 
provides useful tools for the study of processes of contestation concerning Europe’s 
international roles among foreign policy elites, and between these and their publics 
(Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). A multi-level role theoretical framework thus permits us 
to bring the domestic dimension in and to link it with external role expectations 
(Aggestam 2006; Koenig 2014a). The combination of these two theoretical strands 
would allow us to shed new light on the ongoing debate on the nature and future of 
Europe’s international roles.  
Finally, more empirical research is needed to test the link between coherence and 
effectiveness. This study only provided a brief overview in this regard. However, this 
overview indicated that the often-assumed positive link between the two concepts “is 
more intuitive than well-founded” (Missiroli et al. 2001: 3-4). Scholars have started 
to question this link systematically by evaluating intervening variables in various 
policy areas (Brattberg and Rhinard 2013; Bretherton and Vogler 2013; Edwards 
2013; Elsig 2013; Groen and Niemann 2013; Niemann and Bretherton 2013; Thomas 
2012). These are valuable contributions that ought to be taken into account when 
discussing the Union’s role as a power in international affairs. But a detailed study 
into the issue area of crisis and conflict management is still missing. Such a study 
might provide substance to those claiming that the Union’s own definition of 
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effectiveness or success is, in fact, more contingent on its internal ability to agree 
than on its external ability to achieve (Edwards 2013: 287). 
Conclusion 
The preamble of the Lisbon Treaty emphasised the Union’s resolve to “implement a 
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy (…), thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence 
in order to promote peace security, and progress in Europe and in the world”. A 
review of the first years of post-Lisbon crisis management shows that there is, yet 
again, a gap between ambition and reality (Hill 1993). The institutional innovations 
introduced by the Treaty have not significantly enhanced the Union’s coherence, and 
thus its ability to agree or to act collectively. Europe was not independent from its 
Atlantic allies. And the effects of the Union’s collective crisis management on peace, 
security, and progress in the world were often hard to discern. Meanwhile, the 
pursuit of a common defence policy has lost traction as compared to the preceding 
decade.  
Hill (1993: 321) proposed two solutions to close the famous capabilities-expectations 
gap: either lower expectations or increase capabilities. This study argued that a better 
understanding of the ideational and material constraints of coherent EU crisis 
management might bring expectations down to a more realistic level. But there are 
also external factors that continue to call for increased capabilities. The Union’s 
neighbourhood now includes Africa’s arc of instability that regularly demands rapid 
and forceful responses. The US and NATO prove to be more and more reluctant to 
provide financial and operational backing for operations in Europe’s broader 
neighbourhood. In addition, the crisis in Ukraine visibly brought power politics back 
to the European continent. While a more robust CSDP might not have altered 
Europe’s response to the Crimean crisis, credible deterrence with tangible military 
capabilities still represents an important asset. The rationale behind the quest for 
coherence, and thus greater ideational and material convergence that would allow for 
“early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” thus remains valid (Council 
2003a: 11). 
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Appendix 1: Initial coding scheme 
The initial coding scheme was devised on the basis of the analytical framework and 
operationalisation of variables (chapters 2 and 3). It constituted the basis for thematic 
qualitative content analysis of political speech acts and transcribed expert interviews. 
Not every case study included references to all of the initial codes. Additional codes 
and sub-categories were created inductively in relation to the specificities of the case 
studies. Examples include the codes ‘responsibility to protect’ for the Libyan case or 




Coherence  Common 
objectives 
References to common EU aims 
with regard to a particular conflict or 
crisis  
 Common priority References to collective EU 
priorities with regard to the 
management of a particular conflict 
or crisis 
 Common strategy References to common EU 
strategies in relation to a given 
conflict or crisis  
 Common 
resources 
References to financial or personnel 
contributions to EU-level crisis 
management activities 
 Consultation or 
coordination 
References to processes of mutual 
consultation or coordination among 
EU member states or institutions 
 Mutual 
information  
References to information exchange 





Bilateral trade References to bilateral trade 
relations with conflict or crisis 
country 
 






References to levels of foreign 
investment in conflict or crisis 
country 
 Interest group References to economic interest 
group or representative thereof in 
relation to a given conflict or crisis  
 Raw materials References to raw materials (oil, 





Threat perception  References to security threats (e.g. 
regional stability, organised crime, 
migration, terrorism, energy 
security) emanating from a given 





References testifying to domestic 
political controversy about EU or 
member state crisis management 
activity or instrument  
 Public opinion  References to the role of public 
opinion in relation to a given conflict 
or crisis  
 Elections References to upcoming elections in 
relation to crisis management 





Alternative  References to potential costs, risks, 
or benefits of non-EU international 
cooperation (unilateral, NATO, UN 
etc.) 
 Benefits References to potential benefits or 
advantages of collective EU crisis 
management activities or 
instruments 
 




 Costs References to material costs of 
collective EU crisis management 
activities or instruments 
 Risks References to potential risks or 
negative security-related 
repercussions of collective EU crisis 
management activities or 
instruments 
National norms  Alliance solidarity References to solidarity or loyalty 
with key international partners and 
alliances (such as NATO) 
 Atlanticism References in favour of partnership 
and cooperation with the US, 
bilaterally or within NATO 
 Europeanism References in favour of EU-level 
cooperation or proactive EU role in 
relation to a given conflict or crisis  
 Independence References on the ability to act 
independently, and if necessary, 
unilaterally with regard to a given 
conflict or crisis 
 International 
responsibility 
Value-based justifications for action 
or leadership with regard to a given 
conflict or crisis (can include 
references to the responsibility to 
protect, human rights appeals, 
democratic values etc.) 
 Multilateralism References to importance of 
multilateral cooperation or resource 
pooling in the management of a 
given conflict or crisis  
 Reliability References to ambition of 
representing a ‘reliable partner’ in 
international affairs 
 








References to unclear division of 
roles or responsibilities within or 
between EU institutions 
 Competition References to rivalry or competition 
between or within EU institutions  
 Resource 
dependence 
References to resource-based 
interdependence between European 
institutions (such as reliance on 
funds of another organisation) in 





References to organisational or sub-
organisational norms (such as 
humanitarian principles) 
 Procedures  References to divergent or 
incompatible procedures or 
processes in relation to crisis 
management  
 Time frames  References to diverging time 




HR References to the role of the HR in a 
given crisis response  
 CMPD References to the role of CMPD in a 




References to the role of the Crisis 
Management Board in a given crisis 
response 
 Crisis Platform  References to the role of the Crisis 
Platform in a given crisis response 
 DG CROC  References to the role of DG CROC 
in a given crisis response EU  
 




 EEAS References to the role of the EEAS 
in a given crisis response 
 EUSR References to the role of the EUSR 
in a given crisis response 
 Informal 
coordination 
References to informal coordination 
and consultation processes in a 
given crisis response  
 Operations 
Centre 
References to the role of the EU 
Operations Centre in a given crisis 
response  
Source: own compilation.  
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Appendix 2: List of interviews  
Interviewee (designation) Interview 
location 
Interview date 
Academic Expert A Rome  19 June 2011 
Academic Expert B Brussels 10 April 2013 
Academic Expert C Brussels 10 April 2013 
EEAS Official A Brussels 9 June 2011 
EEAS Official B Brussels 15 March 2012 
EEAS Official C Brussels 15 March 2012 
EEAS Official D Brussels 12 April 2013 
EEAS Official E Brussels 11 April 2013 
EU Official Brussels 7 June 2011 
EUMS Official Brussels 2 March 2012 
European Diplomat A Brussels 6 June 2011 
European Diplomat B Rome 7 June 2011 
European Diplomat C Brussels 7 November 2013 
European Diplomat D Berlin 4 June 2013 
European Diplomat E Berlin 5 June 2013 
European Diplomat F Berlin 5 June 2013 
European Diplomat G Paris 25 November 2013 
European Diplomat H Paris 25 November 2013 
European Diplomat I Paris 25 November 2013 
European Diplomat J Paris 25 November 2013 
European Official Brussels 2 March 2012 
French Diplomat A Brussels 8 June 2011 
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Interviewee (designation) Interview 
location 
Interview date 
French Diplomat B Brussels 28 June 2011 
French Diplomat C Paris 25 November 2013 
French Diplomat D Paris 25 November 2013 
French Diplomat E Paris 27 November 2013 
German Diplomat  Brussels 11 April 2013 
German Official A Berlin 4 June 2013 
German Official B Berlin 4 June 2013 
German Official C Berlin 6 June 2013 
IOM Official Rome 13 June 2011 
Italian Official Rome 15 June 2011 
Member of the Humanitarian Aid 
Department, German Foreign 
Office 
Berlin 6 June 2013 
Policy Analyst A, OECD Unit for 
Policy Coherence for 
Development 
Paris 19 March 2012 
Policy analyst B, OECD Unit for 
Policy Coherence for 
Development 
Paris 19 March 2012 
Senior Commission Advisor Brussels 8 June 2011 
Senior EEAS Official A Brussels 7 March 2012 
Senior EEAS Official B Brussels 9 April 2013 
Senior NATO Official A Brussels 9 June 2011 
Senior NATO Official A (second 
interview) 
Brussels 12 April 2013 
Senior NATO Official B Brussels 10 April 2013 
Think Tank Expert A Berlin 6 June 2013 
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Interviewee (designation) Interview 
location 
Interview date 
Think Tank Expert B Berlin 25 June 2013 
UK Diplomat A London 8 August 2012 
UK Diplomat B London 28 November 2013 
UK Diplomat C London 28 November 2013 
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Appendix 3: Sample interview questionnaire  
Interview questionnaires usually consisted of 8 to 12 questions. Variation in 
nationality, expertise, position, and role in the decision-making process called for 
their flexible adaptation. Questionnaires usually followed a sequence moving from 
introductory, general questions, to more specific, case-related ones, and ended with 
one or two broader concluding questions. The order of questions was flexibly 
modified depending on the flow of the conversation and the respondents’ use of 
keywords. The following sample questions were directed to a national diplomat: 
 
Introductory question 




2. How would you assess the degree of coherence in the EU’s response to the 
Libyan crisis? What were its strengths and weaknesses? 
3. How would you explain France’s proactive role in the Libyan crisis?  
4. Why did France recognise the Libyan National Transitional Council one day 
ahead of the extraordinary European Council?  
5. How would you explain Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council?  
6. What role did the High Representative and European External Action Service 
play in the coordination of the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis? 
 
Somalia  
7. According to you, how coherent was the Union’s crisis management in 
Somalia? 
8. Why did the United Kingdom play such a proactive role in European and 
international crisis management in Somalia? 
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9. Would you say that the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the 




10. Would you describe security in Mali – or more broadly in the Sahel zone – as 
a priority for your country?  
11. Why did the EU member states not react to France’s recurrent warnings on 
the brewing Malian crisis in 2012? 
 
Concluding question 
12. Finally, how would you evaluate the Union’s future in crisis management and 
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